Webber v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 31 December 1854 |
| Citation | 55 N.C. 9,2 Jones 9 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | SAMUEL WEBBER AND SUSAN HIS WIFE v. BENJAMIN TAYLOR. |
Where a purchaser might see from his title deed, that his vendor had given less than one sixth of what he was giving for the same land, it was a circumstance to put him upon an inquiry, and coupled with the fact that there was another in possession than the person he was buying from, it was held that the purchaser under such circumstances had a notice of the prior equity of the plaintiff: sufficient at any rate to induce a Court to continue an injunction against defendants entry under a judgment and execution at law.
APPEAL from the Court of Equity of Greene County, at December Term, 1854.
The appeal was taken from an interlocutory order made by his Honor dissolving the injunction heretofore granted, and the case presented by the bill and answer, is sufficiently stated in the opinion of his Honor.
No counsel for the plaintiffs in this Court.
J. W. Bryan for the defendant .
Thebill alleges that Susan Webber, one of the plaintiffs, was the owner, in her own right, of a tract of land, which, after her intermarriage with the other plaintiff, Samuel Webber, it was agreed between them, should be conveyed to one Spiers Witherington, for the purpose of being sold, and that the money arising from the sale, should be placed in the hands of Thomas Moore, for the sole and separate use of the said Susan. All of which was accordingly done, and the purchase money amounting to $87, was by the said Witherington, delivered over to the said Moore, who agreed to hold it on the trust above stated. The bill further charges that the plaintiff, Susan, purchased from Mrs. Rebecca Hart the tract of land now in contest, and on which she and her husband were then living, and where they continued to live, and now live, for the price of $135, and to make up this sum, the said Thomas Moore paid over to her agent, M. Barret, the sum of $87 so in his possession belonging to the plaintiff, and she paid the balance, $48 of her own money. It is further charged that the plaintiff, Samuel, being indebted to one Edward Carman, in the sum of $30, the land was, with her consent, conveyed to him, she joining in the conveyance. That though the deed was absolute on its face for the full sum of $135, it was intended only as a security for the money due him, Carman, and that no money was paid; that she offered, subsequently, to pay to him the amount of his debt, and demanded a reconveyance which he declined to make. Subsequently, Carman conveyed the land to the above named Thomas Moore for $30, which she paid him, but he refused to reconvey it to the plaintiff unless she would consent to pay to him a debt of $50 due to him from the plaintiff, Samuel. A reconveyance from Moore was demanded, with an offer to pay him the sum he claimed, which he refused, and afterwards, in December 1852, sold and conveyed the land to the defendant for the sum of $200: and the plaintiffs charge, that Taylor, at the time of his purchase, had full notice of their equitable title. From him a reconveyance was demanded. They further show that the defendant has instituted a suit in ejectment, and recovered a judgment, as they could make no defence, and threatens to turn them out of possession. An injunction issued according to the prayer of the bill.
The defendant admits his purchase and the amount paid, but alledges he is a purchaser without notice of the equity which the plaintiffs claim, and without any knowledge of the alledged promises of Carman or Moore. He admits that at the time he purchased the land, he knew that the plaintiffs were living on it, but he supposed and believed that they were living there as the tenants at will of Thomas Moore.
Upon the coming in of the answer, the injunction was dissolved, and the plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
The deed to Carman from the plaintiff, was executed in October 1850.
Our sole inquiry, at present is, whether there is error in the interlocutory decree dissolving the injunction. The equity of the plaintiffs claim, rests upon the alledged knowledge of the defendant of its existence at the time of his purchase. It is a rule in Equity that a purchaser, taking with notice of a prior equity, takes subject to that equity, for he shall be assumed to have contracted for that only,...
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Love v. US
...the land's possession by one other than the vendor would be sufficient to constitute notice to a subsequent purchaser. Webber v. Taylor, 55 N.C. 9 (1854); Johnson v. Hauser, 88 N.C. 388 (1883); Mfg. Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N.C. 485, 11 S.E. 568 The United States' objections are overruled. 2. ......
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Perkins v. Langdon
...knowledge thereof. Actual possession is treated as the equivalent of notice to the purchaser and as a substitute for registration. Webber v. Taylor, 55 N.C. 9; Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N.C. 177; Tankard v. Tankard, 79 N.C. 54; Heyer v. Beatty, 83 N.C. 285; Bost v. Setzer, 87 N.C. 187; Johnso......
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Grimes v. Andrews
...his vendor might honestly dispose of, having due regard to the equities existing against him in favor of others. Adams' Eq. 151; Webber v. Taylor, 55 N.C. 9; Maxwell Wallace, 45 N.C. 251. And the kind of notice spoken of in said rule may be an actual or constructive notice. In this case the......
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Patterson v. Mills
...possession, the actual possession was in some one else than the vendor. Johnson v. Hauser, 88 N.C. 388; Bost v. Setzer, supra; Webber v. Taylor, 55 N.C. 9. second prayer for instruction was properly refused. Sarah Mills had no equity in the note sued on, and the plaintiffs' taking it after ......