Webster v. State

• Decision Date: 29 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 41,41
• Citation: 359 Md. 465,754 A.2d 1004
• Parties: Craig Nathaniel WEBSTER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

754 A.2d 1004

359 Md. 465

Craig Nathaniel WEBSTER v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 41, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 29, 2000.

John l. Kopolow, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.

M. Jennifer Landis, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW,¹ RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The issue this case presents involves the State's right to appeal a trial court's reduction of a mandatory sentence, entered pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 643B(a),² which, at the time of sentencing, included daytime housebreaking in the list of predicate crimes of violence, when, at the time of the reduction, that statute had been amended to delete that offense as a predicate offense. Important, if not critical to the resolution of that issue, is the propriety of the trial court's action. Rejecting the State's contention that it enjoyed a right of appeal pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.) § 12-302(c)(2),³ of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, State v. Webster, 119 Md.App. 585, 596, 705 A.2d 151, 157 (1998), the Court of Special Appeals held that the State had a common law right of appeal, which was authorized in that case, since

"Given the sole reason for the sentence modification tendered by appellee and the circuit court, the trial court possessed no authority to deviate from this legislative mandate [that a mandatory sentence be imposed] via the sentence modification/review process, and thus, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction."

Id. at 599, 705 A.2d at 158. We granted the petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We shall reverse in part, and affirm in part.

I

The petitioner was convicted July 15, 1993 by a Howard County jury of daytime housebreaking and felony theft. At that time, daytime housebreaking was a crime of violence pursuant to § 643B (a). The State having both timely, in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-245,⁴ notified the petitioner and the court of its intention to seek a mandatory sentence pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 643B (c),⁵ and established the predicate for the imposition of such sentence, the court, on January 25, 1994, merged the convictions and sentenced the petitioner to 25 years imprisonment without parole. On January 26, 1994, the day after the petitioner was sentenced, Senate Bill 322 was introduced. That bill proposed to delete daytime housebreaking, among other offenses, from the list of crimes of violence, set out in § 643B (a), for the purpose of imposing mandatory minimum penalties on subsequent offenders. Thereafter, the petitioner timely filed, pursuant to Rule 4-345(b),⁶ a Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence. Subsequently, Senate Bill 322 was enacted, effective October 1,1994. See 1994 Md. Laws, Chap. 712. Just as had been proposed, the bill removed daytime housebreaking from § 643B(a) as a crime of violence for purposes of § 643B(c).

The trial court held a hearing on the petitioner's motion to modify or reduce his sentence on December 19, 1996 and, based on amended § 643B (a), on May 9, 1997, vacated the mandatory sentence it earlier had imposed, in favor of concurrent ten year sentences for the housebreaking and theft convictions. The State noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 1997 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302(c)(2), of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. That court issued an opinion reinstating the mandatory sentence. Webster, 119 Md.App. at 599, 705 A.2d at 158. We granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which the petitioner filed in this Court, to consider the important issues this case presents. Webster v. State, 350 Md. 274, 711 A.2d 867 (1998).

II

The petitioner argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the State had any right to appeal the trial court's order granting the petitioner a reduction of sentence. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that the State had no statutory right of appeal. He argues that, under § 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, the State may appeal final judgments only. With this, the Court of Special Appeals agreed. Webster, 119 Md.App. at 596, 705 A.2d at 157. In addition, the petitioner rejects the State's claim that it has a common law right of appeal in this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear the timely filed motion for reconsideration, and the legality of the sentence imposed, the petitioner argues, may be addressed by either the doctrine of plain error or by the inherent power of an appellate court to correct error. Next the petitioner argues it was error to hold that the trial court had no authority to reduce his sentence and impose a sentence that was lawful at the time of resentencing. Although the sentence on resentencing would not have been lawful when the petitioner's initial sentence was imposed, the petitioner submits that, because resentencing took place after the effective date of the revision to § 643B (a), the trial court was not obliged to reimpose the mandatory sentence.

Also, the petitioner maintains that Maryland Rule 4-345(b) gives the trial court broad discretion to revise a defendant's sentence; thus, the petitioner concludes on that basis as well, that imposition of a lesser sentence under the revised § 643B (a) was proper.

The State argues that the petitioner's initial sentence was not subject to reinterpretation, that the trial court had no authority to reduce a sentence legally imposed pursuant to mandatory sentencing provisions, simply because the Legislature amended those provisions to remove the qualifying conviction. This is so, it argues, because § 643B (a), as amended, is, by its terms, prospective in operation, and clearly so,⁷ and, therefore, limits the court's ability to impose more lenient sentences on those defendants initially sentenced before its effective date.

III

We must first decide whether the State may appeal when it alleges that the court exceeded its authority in sentencing the defendant. The petitioner maintains, relying on Telak v. State, 315 Md. 568, 556 A.2d 225 (1989), and Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 642 A.2d 232 (1994), that the State may not. In Telak, we held that the State's appeal, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) § 12-401(a)⁸ of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, filed more than 30 days after the judge rendered a verdict, was untimely. 315 Md. 568,556 A.2d 225. There, the defendant was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, but, notwithstanding that the defendant previously had been placed on probation before judgment, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 641(a)(2),⁹ the trial court struck the guilty verdict and imposed probation before judgment. Id. at 569, 556 A.2d at 225. Rather than appealing the court's action, the State filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Only after that motion was denied did the State file an appeal pursuant to § 12-401. By then, however, the 30 day appeal period had expired. The State argued that its appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the denial of its collateral motion. See id. at 574, 556 A.2d at 228. Examining the legislative history of §§ 12-401 and 12-302, we rejected the State's argument that the 30 day deadline for filing an appeal started to run after the collateral motions timely filed in the case had been decided. Concluding that "an order placing a defendant on probation before judgment ... was a final judgment in the criminal case for purposes of appeal," id. at 577, 556 A.2d at 229, we stated:

"The language and the framework of Ch. 49 of the Acts of 1976 demonstrate that the appealable order is the order which imposes a sanction upon the defendant and which ordinarily represents a disposition of the criminal case. The final judgment in a criminal case consists of the verdict and, except where there is an acquittal, the sanction imposed, which is normally a fine or sentence of imprisonment or both. See e.g., Christian v. State, 309 Md. 114, 119, 522 A.2d 945 (1987)

; Jones v. State, 298 Md. 634, 637, 471 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1984); Sigma Repro. [Reproductive] Health Cen. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983); Lewis v. State, 289 Md. 1, 4, 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1980); Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 596, 399 A.2d 578, 583 (1979). An order denying a later motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the final judgment in the criminal case."

Id. at 575-76, 556 A.2d at 228-29. Based on this reasoning and citing Valentine v. State, 305 Md. 108, 501 A.2d 847 (1985), overruled, State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 184, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999), the petitioner argues that no right of appeal would lie from the allegedly illegal granting of a collateral motion such as the defendant's motion for reconsideration of sentence.¹⁰

The petitioner also relies on Chertkov, on which the State, interestingly, relies for the opposite proposition. In that case, we held that the State's appeal pursuant to § 12-302(c)(2) was improper where the sentence its appeal challenged was one allowed by Maryland law. At issue in Chertkov was the trial court's modification of a sentence entered pursuant to a written plea agreement which contemplated a specific sentence. 335 Md. at 165,642 A.2d at 234. After the defendant had pled guilty and the agreed sentence had been imposed, she timely filed, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b), a motion for reconsideration of that sentence. The court granted the motion more than 90 days later, after she had served the unsuspended portion of the sentence, striking the previously entered guilty findings and imposing probation before judgment. Id. at 165, 642 A.2d at 234. On appeal, the State argued that the court's modification of...