Webster v. State, 25A03-9807-CR-330
| Decision Date | 31 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 25A03-9807-CR-330,25A03-9807-CR-330 |
| Citation | 708 N.E.2d 610 |
| Parties | Daniel E. WEBSTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant-defendant Daniel E. Webster ("Webster") appeals from his convictions for Burglary as a Class B felony, Residential Entry as a Class D felony, and Battery as a Class A misdemeanor.
Webster presents three issues for our review which we rephrase as follows:
(1) whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in rejecting Webster's guilty pleas for residential entry and battery because of an insufficient factual basis;
(2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Webster's conviction for burglary; and
(3) whether the trial court properly merged Webster's conviction of the lesser included offense of residential entry with the conviction and sentence of the greater offense of burglary.
The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that Webster and Teresa Mathias ("Teresa") met a few days before her marriage to Manford Mathias on June 17, 1994. Teresa and Webster's relationship consisted of occasionally drinking alcohol together. On July 29, 1997, at approximately 6:30 a.m., Webster arrived at Teresa's mobile home at 2253 West 45 North, Rochester, Indiana. During his visit, Teresa and Webster consumed several beers. Around 9:00 a.m., Teresa and Webster drove to a local tavern in Leiters Ford, Indiana, to buy more beer and some vodka. Because the tavern in Leiters Ford had not yet opened, Webster and Teresa decided to drive to a liquor store in Argos, Indiana, to purchase the beer and vodka. After they bought the alcohol in Argos, Webster and Teresa went to the home of Kevin Coleman, a mutual friend, to feed and look after his dogs. Webster then drove Teresa back to her home, dropped her off, and left. Teresa cleaned her home and then took a nap.
Later that afternoon, Webster returned to Teresa's home and stacked two cinder blocks beneath a screened window. Webster then stood upon the blocks, cut through the screen with his keys, opened the window, and entered Teresa's home. After Webster entered the house, he removed his clothing, went into Teresa's bedroom, and crawled naked into her bed. When Teresa awoke and discovered Webster naked in her bed, she immediately jumped out of her bed and ran into another room crying for assistance; Webster followed. Webster struck Teresa twice in the face with his fist, chipping one of her teeth. Webster then ripped Teresa's shirt, shorts and underwear off her body. Teresa ran naked from her home into the garage of Judy Swank ("Swank"), her neighbor, and hid underneath a table in Swank's garage. Swank covered Teresa with a blanket and asked her what had happened. Teresa informed Swank that Webster had attempted to rape her. Swank then called the police to report the attempted rape; Teresa remained under the table until the police arrived. While the women waited for the police, Webster drove past Swank's home, told Swank that he had not tried to rape Teresa, and drove off.
On November 18, 1997, the State charged Webster with burglary (with rape as the underlying felony), residential entry, and battery. On December 2, 1997, an initial hearing was held where the trial court entered a preliminary plea of not guilty on Webster's behalf. On February 25, 1998, a change-of-plea hearing was conducted where Webster withdrew his plea of not guilty for residential entry and battery and entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the burglary charge. However, the plea agreement was silent as to the sentence to be imposed by the trial court for the guilty pleas.
At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court informed Webster of the nature of the charges against him and the statutes upon which the charges were based. The trial court also informed Webster that he could receive a sentence which included a fine ranging from $1.00 to $15,000.00 and up to four years in prison. The trial court then asked Webster to summarize the events that occurred in the early afternoon of July 29, 1997. Webster testified that Teresa had locked herself out of her home and that he had cut the screen window to let her inside. The trial court informed Webster that to be guilty of residential entry he could not have had Teresa's consent to enter her home. The trial court then asked Webster if he entered Teresa's home with her consent to help her get inside; he answered affirmatively. The trial court then refused to accept the plea agreement, finding an insufficient factual basis to support the residential entry charge because Webster did not admit to any criminal activity. The trial court then set this matter for trial. Webster and the State waived their right to a jury trial, requesting a bench trial.
On March 3, 1998, Webster was found guilty of burglary, residential entry, and battery. Webster was sentenced to a term of 18 years' imprisonment for burglary, with three (3) years suspended; he was also sentenced to one (1) year of imprisonment for battery, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The residential entry conviction was merged with the burglary conviction as a lesser included offense; therefore, the trial court did not sentence Webster for this conviction.
Webster asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his guilty pleas for residential entry and battery by failing to find the existence of an adequate factual basis. Indiana has long recognized that the criminally accused may forgo a trial before a trier of fact and plead guilty. Harris v. State, 671 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives certain constitutional rights; therefore, "a trial court has a duty to evaluate the validity of every plea before accepting it." Butler v. State, 658 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind.1995). IND. CODE § 35-35-1-3 requires a court to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea and whether there is a factual basis for it. 1 Id. The finding of a factual basis is a subjective determination that permits a trial court wide discretion due to the varying degrees and kinds of inquiries required by different circumstances. Id. at 76. "A factual basis exists when there is evidence about the elements of the crime from which a trial court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty." Id. at 77.
Because a trial court exercises its discretion in accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, this Court reviews claims of error under an abuse of discretion standard. Roeder v. State, 696 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). A reversal is appropriate only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. In deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting Webster's plea, we are required to examine the inquiry undertaken at the time and the facts established as a result thereof. See Butler, 658 N.E.2d at 77.
Webster entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to residential entry and battery, and the State agreed to dismiss the burglary charge. See IND. CODE § 35-35-3-1. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Webster to summarize the events that purportedly took place in the early afternoon of July 29, 1997. Webster testified that Teresa had locked herself out of her home and that he had cut the screen window to enter her home to unlock the door. Webster stated that he believed that he had Teresa's consent to enter her home to unlock the door.
In order to plead guilty to residential entry, Webster had to admit that he knowingly or intentionally broke and entered Teresa's dwelling. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1.5. A defendant's reasonable belief that he had permission of the dwelling's owner to enter is a defense to the charge of residential entry. McKinney v. State, 653 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Webster raised the defense sua sponte when he stated that he had entered Teresa's home with her consent. The trial court recognized that Webster's summary of the facts, if true, provided a viable defense to the residential entry charge and rendered his guilty plea untenable. In fact, Webster's version of events amounted to a claim of innocence.
In North Carolina v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a trial court could accept a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence. Harris, 671 N.E.2d at 868, citing 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). In Alford, a defendant entered a guilty plea for murder because he faced the possibility of the death penalty if he did not. Id. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a criminally accused maintains his innocence should not be a bar to his entering and the court accepting a guilty plea. Id. at 868, citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-39, 91 S.Ct. at 167-168, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171-172. The Supreme Court said:
Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty. An individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
Whether he [defendant] realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither [Defendan...
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