Weems v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3,97736 and 97737,Nos. 97725,s. 97725,3
• Parties: Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Company, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Allstate Insurance Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 287

533 N.W.2d 287

448 Mich. 679

Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Company, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Allstate Insurance Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Virginia Ruth WEEMS, Widow of Clifford Weems, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 97725, 97736 and 97737.

Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 7, 1994.

May 31, 1995.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1995.

Thurswell, Chayet & Weiner by Lenny Segel and Tammy J. Reiss, Southfield, for plaintiff.

Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by Dennis P. Partridge, Robert D. Goldstein, and Daniel Saylor, Detroit, for intervening plaintiff-appellant Allstate Ins. Co.

Lacey & Jones by Michael T. Reinholm, Birmingham, for defendant.

RILEY, Justice.

In this case, we must construe various aspects of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Specifically, we must decide whether the plaintiff in this action was wholly or partially dependent on her deceased husband, where her contribution to the family's household income ¹ was nineteen percent. Additionally, we must determine the proper formula for calculating a partially dependent person's weekly benefit pursuant to M.C.L. § 418.321; M.S.A. § 17.237(321). ² Finally, we must determine whether a partially dependent person's weekly benefit is subject to the statutory maximum and minimum rates of compensation. ³

We conclude that plaintiff contributed to the household income by means of a regular and substantial pension and therefore was only partially dependent on her husband when he died. Additionally, we hold that the proper formula for the calculation of a weekly benefit for a partially dependent person must include consideration of such person's regular and substantial income as follows:

Deceased employee's annual after-tax x 80% x Deceased employee's

earnings after-tax weekly wage

--------------------------------------

Total relevant annual family income

Finally, we determine that once the weekly benefit is calculated under this formula, it is not subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation. We note, however, that a partially dependent person's weekly benefits are inherently subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation because the calculation of a wholly dependent person's weekly benefit is included in the partially dependent person's calculation.

I

On March 10, 1986, Clifford Weems, an employee of defendant Chrysler Corporation was injured in a work-related automobile accident that resulted in his death on March 23, 1986. Because Mr. Weems died in a work-related accident his widow, plaintiff Virginia Weems, was entitled to death benefits pursuant to M.C.L. § 418.321; M.S.A. § 17.237(321). ⁴ At the time of her husband's death, plaintiff had retired from the IRS and was receiving a monthly pension of $850. Chrysler therefore maintains that Mrs. Weems was only partially dependent on her husband.

On May 13, 1986, Chrysler filed a petition for determination of rights with the Bureau of Worker's Disability Compensation requesting a determination of who was dependent on Mr. Weems at the time of his death and whether they were wholly or partially dependent on him. Mrs. Weems also filed a petition for hearing on June 16, 1986, claiming that she and her three grandchildren were dependent on Mr. Weems. Additionally, Allstate Insurance, Mr. Weems' no-fault insurer, filed a petition to intervene aligning itself with plaintiff.

The magistrate held that plaintiff was fully dependent, but that her grandchildren were not dependents. ⁵ Chrysler was ordered to pay weekly benefits to Mrs. Weems at the maximum rate of $374 per week for five hundred weeks starting from the date of Mr. Weems' death. Defendant filed an application for review of claim with the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. Plaintiff did not seek review. The WCAC modified the magistrate's decision holding that because of Mrs. Weems' monthly pension, she was only partially dependent on Mr. Weems. Additionally, the WCAC concluded that the maximum and minimum rates of compensation applied to persons partially as well as wholly dependent. Therefore, because the formula the WCAC used to calculate plaintiff's benefits produced a figure lower than the minimum rate of compensation, ⁶ the WCAC awarded Mrs. Weems the then-minimum rate of compensation of $207 per week.

Plaintiff and defendant appealed the WCAC's decision in the Court of Appeals. The Court affirmed the WCAC, holding that plaintiff was partially dependent ⁷ and was entitled to the minimum weekly benefit. Although the Court's holding with respect to this issue is confusing, in order to achieve its result, the Court necessarily concluded that a partially dependent person's weekly benefit is subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation. ⁸ We granted leave to appeal ⁹ and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of partial dependency. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision granting plaintiff, as partially dependent, the statutory minimum weekly benefit and instead adopt a formula for calculating death benefits that properly considers the partially dependent person's regular and substantial income. Additionally, we reverse the Court of Appeals determination that a partially dependent person's weekly benefit is directly subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation. We reiterate that the maximum and minimum rates of compensation are inherent within the formula for calculating a partially dependent person's benefits. The partially dependent person's formula includes consideration of what a partially dependent person would have received if wholly dependent, and that figure is subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation.

II

We are limited to a review of the findings of fact made by the WCAC. Holden v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 257, 263, 484 N.W.2d 227 (1992). Additionally, the standard of review of a final WCAC decision is that its findings are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. Id. at 261-263, 484 N.W.2d 227; Corbett v. Montgomery Ward, 194 Mich.App. 624, 631, 487 N.W.2d 825 (1992).

Mindful of these standards, we must first determine whether there is any competent evidence supporting the WCAC's conclusion that Mrs. Weems was partially dependent on her husband at the time of his death. It is conceded that nineteen percent of the Weems' household income was derived from Mrs. Weems' $850 monthly pension. Plaintiff, however, asserts that her contribution was de minimis and is no indication that she was only partially dependent on her husband. ¹⁰ However, decisions of this state, as well as decisions of other jurisdictions, persuade us that Mrs. Weems was partially dependent on her husband when he died. ¹¹

We first note that in Rose v. Paper Mills Trucking Co., 47 Mich.App. 1, 7, 209 N.W.2d 305 (1973), the Court held that the decedent's stepson, who was receiving monthly social security benefits of $105, was partially dependent on his deceased stepfather. The Court concluded that dependency is a question of fact, and, if the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that the claimant was not totally dependent, a court could determine that the claimant was partially dependent as a matter of law.

Similarly, in Ammons v. Dunbar & Sullivan Construction Co., 54 Mich.App. 107, 109-110, 220 N.W.2d 323 (1974), the claimant lived with her son and daughter. Until his death, the claimant's son paid the entire cost of maintaining the home, which amounted to approximately $400 monthly. During the time the decedent maintained the home, his mother received a pension and social security benefits, totaling $115 monthly. The claimant, however, saved all these payments and made no contribution toward household expenses. The Court held that the plaintiff was only partially dependent on her son, stating that "while the plaintiff may have chosen to depend wholly upon her son's contribution despite her regular independent income, because of such income she was not wholly dependent upon the earnings of the deceased." ¹² Therefore, in addition to holding that the claimant's payments rendered her partially dependent, the Court held that the manner in which a dependent disposes of any supplemental income is irrelevant to the determination whether the person was wholly or partially dependent. ¹³

Plaintiff relies on Kalcic v. Newport Mining Co., 197 Mich. 364, 163 N.W. 962 (1917), for the proposition that her income was trifling. However, in Kalcic, unlike the present case, the supplemental income the claimant received was sporadic, twenty or thirty cents a day, two or three times per month. ¹⁴ The claimant's husband contributed roughly ninety-three percent of the annual income, while her irregular wages provided only approximately seven percent of the annual income. We are therefore persuaded that Kalcic is clearly distinguishable from the present case.

From these cases, it is apparent that the law of dependency is well settled in Michigan. The law is likewise well settled in most other jurisdictions. ¹⁵ Virtually all jurisdictions agree that a regular and substantial supplemental income, which is not merely temporary, mandates a determination of partial dependency. In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff received regular payments of $850 per month. These payments were determined by the WCAC to be substantial, rather than de minimis. ¹⁶ On the basis of the decisions of this state and a plain reading of the statute distinguishing between partial and whole dependents, we agree that Mrs. Weems was partially dependent on her deceased...