Wehrli v. Wabash R. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 July 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 46162,No. 2,46162,2 |
| Citation | 315 S.W.2d 765 |
| Parties | Cloyd WEHRLI, Respondent, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Ely & Voorhees, Wayne Ely, St. Louis, for (defendant) appellant. John L. Davidson Jr., Chares P. Lippert, St. Louis, of counsel.
Mark D. Eagleton, Eugene K. Buckley, Albert J. Stephan, Jr., St. Louis, for respondent.
The defendant has appealed from a judgment for $40,000 in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Secs. 51-60, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff at a railroad crossing in Adrian, Michigan, as the result of a collision between the railroad motor car upon which he was riding and an automobile traveling on the highway. The relief sought on appeal is a judgment for the defendant in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Plaintiff's petition alleged that the defendant negligently provided the plaintiff with an unsafe and dangerous method and place of work in that the defendant insulated its motor car so as to prevent it from activating the protective electric signal devices to warn motorists at the public crossing of the presence and danger of the approaching railroad motor car, and failed and omitted to furnish plaintiff appliances or devices which would warn motorists at the public crossing of the presence and danger of approaching railroad motor cars. The defendant denied that it was negligent in any respect, and alleged that the collision and plaintiff's injuries were caused by and resulted solely from acts of negligence of the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile separately or in combination.
The defendant first charges that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the defendant was negligent or that plaintiff's injuries resulted from defendant's negligence. The evidence bearing on these issues will be stated most favorably to the plaintiff, the prevailing party.
The plaintiff, a resident of Monroe County, Missouri, was employed by the defendant railroad company as a signal maintenance man. On February 9, 1955, in the course and scope of his employment, plaintiff was operating a railroad motor car on the defendant's railroad tracks at a public crossing in Adrian, Michigan. At the place in question the railroad tracks run generally north and south, and intersect East Beecher Street, a public street running generally east and west. At the crossing the defendant operated and maintained protective electric signal devices which were activated by railroad trains on the tracks, so as to warn motorists of the presence and danger of the trains approaching and passing over the public crossing and to prevent collisions between railroad equipment and private automobiles. The railroad motor car operated by the plaintiff was insulated so as to prevent it from activating the electric signal devices at public crossings. At the East Beecher Street crossing a collision occurred between an automobile being driven on the highway and the railroad motor car being operated by plaintiff on defendant's tracks. This much is established by the allegations and admissions of the pleadings.
East Beecher Street, at the place in question, is a concrete-surfaced highway and practically level. It is traversed by two sets of defendant's railroad tracks. The crossing is protected by electrically operated flasher lights and a bell designed to warn highway travelers of the approach of railroad trains. The warning signals with which we are concerned are on a standard erected on the southwest corner of the intersection. In addition to a pair of flasher lights and a warning bell, there is a sign reading: 'Railroad Crossing' and below that, 'Stop on Red Signal.' When a train approaches, the red lights fiash and a bell rings, and they continue to so operate until the rear of the train has passed over the crossing.
The accident ocurred at about 11:00 a. m. The weather was clear and the pavement dry. Feneley Pope, age 15, was driving the automobile which collided with the railroad motor car on which the plaintiff was riding. Feneley was considering the purchase of a used car and had been invited by a dealer to drive this one to try it out. The dealer was located about two blocks west of the railroad crossing. Feneley, accompanied by his father, a deaf mute, drove eastwardly on East Beecher toward the crossing. He was driving close to the middle but on the right-hand side of the roadway at about 30 to 35 miles per hour. He was familiar with the crossing and had gone over it many times. He looked at the crossing signals on this occasion and saw that the lights were not flashing. As he approached the crossing he continued to watch the signals to see whether they were going to flash and paid no attention to anything except the signals. He did not look either to the right or left, but kept his eyes 'fixed on that signal.' He reduced his speed about five miles an hour as he was about to pass over the crossing because he thought the lights might come on. He drove in a straight line and did not swerve either to the right or left and did not apply his brakes at any time before the collision. He did not see the motor car prior to the time he struck it, although he thought it came from his left.
At the time of the accident plaintiff was en route to repair some gates and flasher signals at Madison, three or four miles south of Adrian. He was traveling alone on a railroad motor car sometimes referred to as a one-man inspection car. He had started from a point about a block and a half or two blocks north of the Beecher Street crossing. He was traveling on the west or southbound set of tracks. As he approached the crossing he was moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour, but slowed down and brought his motor car to a stop about 10 feet north of East Beecher Street. At this point he had an unlimited and unrestricted view. He looked to his left and to his right; he could see a block or two in both directions. He did not see any automobile traffic moving in any direction. The plaintiff had no recollection of anything that happened from the time he stopped at the crossing until February 21, the day preceding his release from the Adrian hospital. He did not know what hit him or where he landed.
The plaintiff had been sent to Adrian to relieve another workman. He had worked there before and was familiar with the territory. He knew that this motor car, as were all others which he had operated, was insulated so that it would not operate the crossing signals. He had never seen one that was not insulated. The purpose of insulating the motor cars was to prevent their operating the signals and thus interfering with the movement of trains. There was also evidence that motor cars, by reason of their short wheel base, could not be depended upon to operate a circuit and would be untrustworthy if not insulated. The circuit that operates the crossing signals also operates automatic block signals and interlocking signals.
John Bland, a consulting engineer who had visited the scene of the accident and inspected the electric protective signals at the crossing, testified on behalf of the plaintiff that a simple and practical method of activating the signal so as to afford protection to a motor car operator from automobile traffic would be the use of a manual switch along the track. The best method would be a key switch so the public could not get into it. This method would employ the same signals now operated by trains. The motor car operator approaching the crossing could turn on the device and activate the flasher signals and the bell. After he had crossed over, he could turn off the signals by means of another key switch. Witnesses for the defendant, experts in signal operation and maintenance, conceded on cross-examination that crossing signals such as those in question could be wired and equipped with switches so they could be operated manually by a key.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are binding upon the state courts in the determination of issues arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, including the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to make a submissible case. Headrick v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., Mo., 305 S.W.2d 478, 482.
In the recent FELA case, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, the plaintiff, a section laborer, stopped his weed burning operations to inspect journals of a passing train for hot boxes in accordance with instructions. He was injured when he slipped and fell while retreating from the flames fanned by the passing train. The court held a jury case was made, stating, 77 S.Ct. 447: 'These were probative facts from which the jury could find that respondent was or should have been aware of conditions which created a likelihood that petitioner, in performing the duties required of him, would suffer just such an injury as he did.'
And further the court stated, 77 S.Ct. 448-449[6-8]: ...
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