Weidig v. Crites

• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 43,43
• Citation: 323 Md. 408,593 A.2d 1094
• Parties: , 12 A.L.R.5th 969 Jeffrey C. WEIDIG et al. v. Brad CRITES. Misc.,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 408

323 Md. 408

593 A.2d 1094, 12 A.L.R.5th 969

Jeffrey C. WEIDIG et al. v. Brad CRITES.

Misc. No. 43, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 19, 1991.

Motion for Reconsideration Denied Oct. 4, 1991.

Albert D. Brault (Daniel L. Shea, Janet S. Zigler, Brault, Graham, Scott & Brault, all on brief), Rockville, for appellant.

Deborah A. Vitale (Miller & Vitale, both on brief), Alexandria, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and BELL, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

The following question has been certified to this Court by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 12-601 through 12-609:

"DOES THE HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ACT (COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE, SECTION 3-2A-01, et seq.) AFFORD THE HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION OFFICE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER A NON-HEALTH CARE PROVIDER WHO IS ALLEGED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE OF A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER AND WHICH EMPLOYEE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE PROVIDED HEALTH CARE TO THE PLAINTIFF, RESULTING IN A CLAIMED MEDICAL INJURY?"

Procedurally, this case is not new to us. It began when Brad Crites (Crites) filed a health claims arbitration proceeding against Jeffrey C. Weidig, M.D.; Jeffrey C. Weidig M.D., Chartered; and Joseph Kies (Kies). Kies filed a motion for summary judgment in that proceeding based on the fact that he was not a "health care provider" within the meaning of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1990 Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 3-2A-01 through 3-2A-09, (the Act). The panel chairman denied Kies' motion, and Kies filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County requesting a preemptory writ prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction over him in the arbitration proceedings and mandating that he be dismissed from those proceedings for want of jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the requested relief, and Kies appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Weidig v. Tabler, 81 Md.App. 488, 568 A.2d 868, vacated, sub nom., 321 Md. 1, 580 A.2d 701 (1990). We granted Kies' petition for a writ of certiorari, but while that action was pending, an arbitration award was entered against Kies and Weidig. A notice of rejection and an action to nullify the award were filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, at which time Crites filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In view of those proceedings, we determined that the issue before us had become moot. We vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, remanding to that court with directions to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and remand to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the action as moot. Kies v. Tabler, 321 Md. 1, 580 A.2d 701 (1990). We now reach the issue as a certified question.

The parties have referred to the issue in this case as one of jurisdiction, that is, whether the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) has "jurisdiction" over a non-health care provider. Jurisdiction is the authority by which a court hears and determines a judicial proceeding. Black's Law Dictionary 766 (5th ed. 1979). Health claims arbitration is not a judicial proceeding, nor is it an administrative proceeding. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 283-88 385 A.2d 57, 63-65, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91, 447 A.2d 860, 864-65 (1982). Furthermore, the HCAO "exercises no judicial function whatever." Johnson, 282 Md. at 286, 385 A.2d at 64. The term "jurisdiction," therefore, is a misnomer. Perhaps more accurately, the issue before us is not whether the HCAO has power or authority over a non-health care provider; it is whether a non-health care provider can come within the class of persons that are required by statute to submit to arbitration under the Act. See Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Health Plan, 309 Md. 641, 645, 526 A.2d 46, 49 (1987) (The requirement of mandatory arbitration creates a condition precedent to institution of court action; it does not divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction over health claims).

Generally, "[a] party cannot be required to submit any dispute to arbitration that it has not agreed to submit." Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103, 468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983); accord United Steelwkrs. of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf N. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1417 (1960); C.W. Jackson & Associates v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658, 666, 426 A.2d 378, 382 (1981). The statute at issue in the instant case is an exception to that general rule. It requires that certain health care providers in this state must submit to arbitration of medical malpractice claims.

We recently summarized the rules of statutory construction in State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 581 A.2d 9 (1990):

"When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the wording of the relevant provisions. If 'the language in question [is] so clearly consistent with apparent purpose (and not productive of any absurd result) ... further research [is] unnecessary.' Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). In the event that ambiguity clouds the precise application of the statute, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 480, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990); Harford County v. University, 318 Md. 525, 529, 569 A.2d 649, 651 (1990); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988); In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482, 484, 505 A.2d 507, 508 (1986). To perform this task, legislative intent should be gleaned first from the phrasing of the statute itself, giving the words their 'ordinary and popularly understood meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention.' In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520, 471 A.2d 313, 315 (1984). See also Jones, 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 474. When engaging in the interpretive process, however, the purpose, aim or policy of the legislature cannot be disregarded. Taxiera, 320 Md. at 480, 578 A.2d at 765; Harford County v. University, 318 Md. at 529, 569 A.2d at 651; Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632. Resultant conclusions are to be reasonable, logical and consistent with common sense. Harford County v. University, 318 Md. at 529-30, 569 A.2d at 651; Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987)."

Bricker, 321 Md. at 92-93, 581 A.2d at 12. The particular statute at issue in this case is Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-2A-01(e), which provides,

" 'Health care provider' means a hospital, a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article, a physician, an osteopath, an optometrist, a chiropractor, a registered or licensed practical nurse, a dentist, a podiatrist, a psychologist, a licensed certified social worker-clinical, and a physical therapist, licensed or authorized to provide one or more health care services in Maryland. 'Health care provider' does not mean any nursing institution conducted by and for those who rely upon treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination."

Kies was an employee of Dr. Weidig or of Jeffrey C. Weidig, M.D., Chartered. He worked in Dr. Weidig's office and was not a licensed physician. No allegation was made, and it does not appear, that he was a registered or licensed practical nurse. As we shall explain, Crites' claim that Kies is governed by the Act is based on his argument that Kies was a "physician," albeit an unlicensed one.

Crites would have us ignore the plain meaning principle of statutory construction, which holds:

"The threshold inquiry in any issue of statutory construction is whether the language is ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. If it is not, then the Court applies its plain and ordinary meaning. Only where the language is of uncertain meaning or doubtful import should the Court seek to judicially construe the statute." (Citations omitted.)

Taylor v. Dep't of Employment, 308 Md. 468, 472-73, 520 A.2d 379, 381 (1987). Because the Act does not define the word "physician," Crites urges that we should go outside the Act in defining the phrase "physician, ... licensed or authorized to provide ... health care services in Maryland," and urges that we consult the Health Occupations Article of the Maryland Code. ¹ The theory he presents is a creative one.

Maryland Code (1981, 1991 Repl.Vol.), Health Occupations Art., § 14-101(i), defines "physician" as "an individual who practices medicine." "Practice medicine" is defined in subsection (j) of the same section, which states, in pertinent part,

"(1) ... to engage, with or without compensation, in medical:

(i) Diagnosis; ...

(iii) Treatment; or

(iv) Surgery.

(2) 'Practice medicine' includes doing, undertaking, professing to do, and attempting any of the following:

(i) Diagnosing, ... treating, preventing, prescribing for, or removing any physical, mental, or emotional ailment or supposed ailment of an individual:

1. By physical, mental, emotional, or other process that is exercised or invoked by the practitioner, the patient, or both; or

2. By appliance, ... operation, or treatment...."

According to Crites, Kies was a physician as defined in the Health Occupations Article because he practiced medicine by diagnosing Crites' baldness and by assisting at surgery. If we accept this analysis, a boy scout who renders medical aid to an injured person on a mountain trail has "practiced medicine," making him a physician. A waitress who performs the Heimlich maneuver on a...