Luce v. United Technologies Corporation/Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Div., 15839

• Decision Date: 22 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15839,15839
• Citation: 717 A.2d 747,247 Conn. 126
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Daniel LUCE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION et al.

Page 747

717 A.2d 747

247 Conn. 126

Daniel LUCE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION et al.

No. 15839.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 28, 1998.

Decided Sept. 22, 1998.

Francis X. Drapeau, with whom, on the brief, was Mark D. Leighton, Rockville, for appellant (plaintiff).

Michael J. McAuliffe, Glastonbury, for appellees (defendants).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

In this certified appeal, we must decide whether the Appellate Court properly affirmed the decision of the compensation review board (board) excluding certain benefits from the calculation of the plaintiff's average weekly wage under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-310 ¹ for purposes of establishing his workers' compensation payments. We conclude that it did and thus affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are not disputed. The workers' compensation commissioner for the first district (commissioner) found that the plaintiff, Daniel Luce, suffered a compensable back injury on September 6, 1991, while working for the named defendant, United Technologies Corporation/Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Division. ² The commissioner also found that, as a result of the injury, the plaintiff had suffered a 20 percent permanent partial disability of his back. The plaintiff requested that the commissioner, in determining the plaintiff's average weekly wage under § 31-310, include the value of certain benefits, namely, medical insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, accidental death and dismemberment insurance, disability insurance, pension contributions, and vacation and sick pay. ³ The commissioner denied the plaintiff's request and awarded compensation based solely on his weekly salary.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for articulation seeking a finding by the commissioner confirming the value of each of the fringe benefits that the plaintiff had maintained should be included in the determination of his average weekly wage under § 31-310. ⁴ The plaintiff also filed a motion to correct the commissioner's decision, claiming that the award should have included the value of the fringe benefits. ⁵ The commissioner denied both motions.

The plaintiff appealed the commissioner's decision to the board on the ground that the commissioner improperly had failed to include the value of the fringe benefits in the calculation of the plaintiff's average weekly wage. ⁶ The board affirmed the decision of the commissioner. Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 3080 CRB 1-95-6 (December 16, 1996). In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the value of his insurance benefits and pension plan contributions should be included in his wage determination under § 31-310, the board relied on its decision in Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 328, 332 (1995), aff'd, 44 Conn.App. 397, 689 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 926, 692 A.2d 1282 (1997), in which the board had determined that because the term "wage" is not as broad as the term "income," the compensation wage rate does not include fringe benefits. Thereafter, the Appellate Court subsequently agreed with the board and held that because the definition of the term "income" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act (act); General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.; expressly included all forms of remuneration, including wages, accident and health insurance coverage, life insurance coverage and employee welfare plan contributions, the legislature, in using the term "wages" in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-310 instead of the broader, more encompassing term "income," must have intended that insurance benefits and pension plan payments not be included in the calculation of an employee's wages under § 31-310. ⁷ Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., supra, 44 Conn.App. at 400, 689 A.2d 1132. The board in the present case also reasoned that any requirement that the value of insurance benefits be included in the calculation of the plaintiff's average weekly wage would be inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127, 113 S.Ct. 580, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992) (federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA] preempts states from requiring private employers to provide health insurance benefits for injured employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits). ⁸ See Luis v. Frito-Lay, Inc., Supreme Court, Docket No. SC 14536 (order, April 27, 1993) (in light of holding of District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, supra, at 125, 113 S.Ct. 580, requirement of General Statutes § 31-284b [a] that "any employer who provides accident and health insurance or life insurance coverage for any employee or makes payments ... for full-time employees to an employee welfare plan, shall provide to the employee equivalent insurance coverage or ... contributions while the employee is ... receiving compensation pursuant to this chapter" is unenforceable against private employers); Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 298-99 n. 14, 649 A.2d 523 (1994) (same). ⁹

As for vacation and sick pay, the board adopted the approach that it previously had employed in Graziano v. St. Mary's Hospital, 11 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 10 (1993). In Graziano, the board held that vacation and sick pay could be included in an employee's average weekly wage calculation under § 31-310 if they were proven to be "payments dependent on hours worked or payments by way of compensation for hours worked or sums paid due to contractual or quasi-contractual obligations." Id., 13. ¹⁰ The board in the present case concluded, however, that because the commissioner had made no findings regarding the existence of any one of these three prerequisites, the plaintiff was not entitled to the inclusion of either vacation or sick pay in the calculation of his average weekly wage under § 31-310. ¹¹

The plaintiff here appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the board's decision in a per curiam opinion, stating that "[t]his case is controlled by Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., [supra, 44 Conn.App. 397, 689 A.2d 1132]." Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 47 Conn.App. 909, 701 A.2d 351 (1997).

We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification limited to the following question: "Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Court properly excluded from the calculation of the workers' compensation weekly benefit rate the value of the following forms of remuneration: medical, dental, life, accident/death and dismemberment and disability insurances; pension benefits; vacation and sick pay?" Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 958, 704 A.2d 804 (1997). The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the inclusion of these fringe benefits in the calculation of his average weekly wage because the term "wages" as used in § 31-310 includes such benefits. He also claims that the failure to do so violates his rights under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

We first consider whether, as a matter of statutory construction, the term "wages" in § 31-310 includes fringe benefits. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case.... In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carriero v. Naugatuck, 243 Conn. 747, 753, 707 A.2d 706 (1998). "It is the duty of the court to interpret statutes as they are written; Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980); and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Glastonbury Co. v. Gillies, 209 Conn. 175, 179, 550 A.2d 8 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 534, 542, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993).

A

We address first the question of whether the legislature intended to include insurance and pension benefits in the calculation of an employee's wages for purposes of § 31-310. The term "wages" is not defined in § 31-310 or anywhere else in the act. The term "income" is defined, however, under § 31-284b (a) ¹² to include all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment, including wages and other benefits.

In Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., supra, 44 Conn.App. 397, 689 A.2d 1132, the Appellate Court considered whether the employer's contributions to the employee's pension, health and welfare fund, and his annuity, properly should be included in the calculation of his average weekly wage under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-310. The court concluded that "[a]t the time of the [employee's] injury [in 1989], income was defined in § 31-275(14) ¹³ to include wages, accident and health insurance coverage, life insurance coverage and employee welfare plan contributions. Section 31-310, however, provided that in order to calculate the claimant's average weekly wage and base compensation rate, wages received by an employee during the twenty-six weeks prior to the date of injury are to be used.... From the use of the term wages instead of income in § 31-310, it is clear that the legislature intended that fringe benefits remuneration, such as health coverage and employee welfare plan...