Weinstein v. State

• Decision Date: 04 August 1942
• Citation: 9 So.2d 710,151 Fla. 287
• Parties: WEINSTEIN et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

9 So.2d 710

151 Fla. 287

WEINSTEIN et al. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

August 4, 1942

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; H. L. Sebring, Judge.

Robert H Anderson and James E. Calkins, both of Miami, for appellants.

William A Hallowes, III, of Jacksonville, J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen Millard B. Conklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Woodrow M. Melvin Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BUFORD, Justice.

In this case two young women, college and law school graduates, members of the Bar and of previous good character and reputation, are shown to have been guilty of grave infractions of the rules of professional ethics. In fact, both freely, honestly and with apparent humility and regret, admit the irregularities in their law practice in connection with divorce cases.

They were charged with having forged answers, waivers and stipulations filed in such cases. This, the most serious charge made, they deny and the record fails to reveal proof of that charge. There is nothing in the record which shows either of the appellants to have been guilty of any immoral or criminal act.

It is the opinion of the writer that the charges proven as to irregular and unethical acts were not so serious as those made and proved in the case of In the Matter of Charges of Unprofessional Conduct against Samuel Rubin, 9 So.2d 190, opinion filed here on the 12th of May, 1942. The majority of the Court does not concur in this view. In that case we reduced the period of suspension from five years as fixed by the Circuit Court to two years. In this case the order was of suspension for a period of five years.

In an able opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Terrell in the case of J. Carl Lambdin v. State, 9 So.2d 192, filed at this term of the Court, the Court availed itself of the opportunity to enunciate clearly the rules of conduct which must govern members of the Bar in the practice of law, if the Bar is to retain the confidence and respect of the public. We shall not now assume to add to what was said in that case.

The conduct of these young women merited the condemnation which it has received; but, in vies of all the facts, we think the judgment of five years suspension was equivalent to disbarment and was out of proportion to the wrong which they did.

The information was in thirty-two counts. The thirty-second count was too vague and indefinite to constitute a charge which the accused were required to answer.

The State failed to sustain by proof some of the material allegations of each and every of the other counts of the information. In attempting to prove the allegations of such counts the State did prove repeated irregular actions and reprehensible conduct committed by the accused.

Also, the record discloses that these unethical, irregular and reprehensible actions on the part of the accused were, as heretofore stated, admitted by them in their formal answer, as well as in their testimony. Therefore, upon consideration of the entire record and the arguments and briefs of counsel, it is, on the evidence and the admissions of respondents in the court below, ordered and adjudged that the 'order of suspension' is hereby affirmed with the exception that the suspension of respondents be and is hereby adjudged to be 'for and throughout a period of two years from date of the original order.'

It is so ordered.

BROWN, C. J., and WHITFIELD, CHAPMAN, THOMAS, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

TERRELL, J dissents.

CHAPMAN, Justice (concurring).

Challenged on this appeal is an order entered by the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, suspending from the office of attorney at law for a period of five years Natalie Weinstein and Diana D. Coopersmith, formerly engaged in the practice of law with offices at Miami Beach, Florida, under the firm name of Weinstein & Coopersmith. The trial court entered the suspension order based on a motion of the State Attorney to disbar the appellants because of dishonest conduct, deceit, tampering with court records, and other acts of unprofessional conduct growing out of the handling by them of numerous divorce suits during the years 1939, 1940, and 1941. The files of these several divorce actions have been transmitted here and by the Court duly considered.

The appellants by answers and in their testimony denied that they misled or deceived the court, or that they filed spurious or forged pleadings, or reports, or made false representations to the Master or the Court while professionally engaged in handling the divorce suits described in the pleadings. As a defense to the motion to disbar by answer they set out that pursuant to a recognized practice then obtaining and common in Miami Beach, they reached an agreement with attorney Leon Stoller, whereby they (Weinstein & Coopersmith) requested their clients to procure their spouses to designate Stoller to represent them in their (Weinstein & Coopersmith) cases and to authorize him to appear, answer and sign stipulations for the expedition of and promotion of the progress of the several divorce suits. Stoller likewise had a reciprocal agreement with Weinstein & Coopersmith applicable to divorce suits, where he appeared as attorney for the plaintiff.

The appellants represent that at all times they acted in good faith, intended no wrong, observed no impropriety in conducting the divorce litigation by them handled, but they simply followed a practice then established and prevailing in Dade County for the professional handling of such litigation.

The record discloses one of the appellants was a graduate of the Florida State College for Women and subsequently obtained a degree and diploma from the Law School of the University of Florida, and by the presentation of the diploma, the State Board of Law Examiners, as a matter of law, issued to her a certificate to practice law in the several courts of Florida. The other appellant is shown to be a High School graduate and likewise graduated from a reputable law school, after five years of study, and by an examination held by the State Board of Law Examiners, a certificate to practice in the several courts of Florida was granted to her. The qualifications of the appellants, both prelegal and subsequent legal training, under usual conditions, should well qualify each of the appellants for the practice of the law.

It is generally recognized that the right or privilege to engage in the practice of the law is a matter of grace to be granted or withheld on the part of the sovereign power rather than a matter of right, and, while the courts and the public can or may excuse, tolerate or indulge an attorney for an inadequate knowledge of the law applicable to contested issues on controverted matters, simultaneously no excuse or justification can exist for defects or want of character on the part of licensed attorneys.

The secretary of attorney Stoller for a period of six years testified that Stoller acted as defense counsel in divorce suits brought by Weinstein & Coopersmith, and Miss Coopersmith did the same for Stoller in suits brought by him; that Stoller gave form letters to his clients requesting the appointment of Weinstein & Coopersmith as counsel for defendants; that Stoller's name was used as defense counsel in suits brought by Weinstein & Coopersmith; that she (Stoller's secretary) brought to the attention of Stoller authorization letters reaching his office and a formal answer would be filed; then a stipulation signed by counsel would be filed in the cause to the effect that the giving of notice as to the place and time of the Master's hearing, the proceedings before the Master, the notice of filing of the Master's report, as well as findings and the application for a final hearing and the entry of a final decree would be waived. These...