Weinstock v. Wilk
| Decision Date | 16 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.3:02CV1326(PCD).,CIV.3:02CV1326(PCD). |
| Citation | 296 F.Supp.2d 241 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Gloria WEINSTOCK, Plaintiff, v. Timothy WILK, Defendant. |
Glenn Mead Conway, Knight, Conway & Cerritelli, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
James Newhall Tallberg, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, PC, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is thereby entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion is granted.
On October 27, 1999 Defendant Timothy Wilk, a Southington Police Officer, responded to an accident (the "Accident") involving three vehicles. When he arrived at the scene, only two vehicles remained. The third had fled the scene (the "fleeing vehicle").
Defendant learned that the fleeing vehicle had triggered a chain reaction by striking one vehicle from behind, which in turn collided with the car in front of it. From the other vehicles' drivers, Defendant learned that the driver of the fleeing vehicle was a woman, approximately five feet tall, weighing approximately 115-120 pounds. The fleeing vehicle was described as dark colored, possibly gray, resembling a Volvo, with Connecticut registration number 638-LBN. Plaintiff was then the registered owner of a gray Volvo, Connecticut registration number 638-LBN. She matched the physical description provided by the other operators.
On November 9, 1999, Defendant went to the motor vehicle registration address listed. The current resident informed him that Plaintiff no longer resided there. He did speak with Plaintiff by telephone, during which Plaintiff denied involvement in the Accident claiming that she was not in Southington on October 27, 1999 and that only she had used her vehicle that day. Although she agreed to come to the Southington Police Department on November 11, 1999, she failed to appear.
On November 30, 1999, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge issued an Arrest Warrant for Plaintiff's arrest alleging that she evaded responsibility and followed too closely in violation of CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-224 and 14-240. Plaintiff was processed on the charges and advised of her rights. At trial, she was acquitted on all charges.2
Count One alleges that Defendant deprived Plaintiff of her right to be free from abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and unreasonable arrest and seizure in violation of her constitutional and civil rights as provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Count Two alleges that Defendant deprived Plaintiff of her right to be free from false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress, secured by Connecticut law.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that her arrest constituted a false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that she was deprived of her right to be free from intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A movant for summary judgment must establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. (c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is utilized to eliminate the delay and expense of a trial where there is no issue to be tried. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000); Willis v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., 193 F.Supp.2d 436, 442 (D.Conn.2001).
The evidence must be examined in the light most favorable to, drawing all inferences in favor of, the non-moving party. Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 253 (2d Cir.2002). "A party opposing a properly brought motion for summary judgment bears the burden of going beyond the pleadings, and `designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). It is not, however, the court's prerogative to resolve disputed issues of fact. See Law v. Camp, 116 F.Supp.2d 295, 300 (D.Conn.2000). A court must assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried while resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Id. Summary judgment may be granted only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). "Conclusory allegations will not suffice to create a genuine issue." Delaware & H.R. Co. v. Conrail, 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990). Determinations as to the weight to accord evidence or credibility assessments of witnesses are improper on a motion for summary judgment as such are within the sole province of the jury. Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that she was falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Defendant argues that summary judgment is proper because the undisputed facts demonstrate that he had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was responsible for the crime for which she was arrested, and that probable cause acts as a complete defense to a civil rights claim alleging false arrest or malicious prosecution. See Garcia v. Gasparri, 193 F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Conn.2002).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for false arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because at the time of her arrest there was probable cause that Plaintiff committed the offenses charged. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant did not have the requisite probable cause to arrest her because the arrest warrant used to procure her arrest contained "false and misleading information." Consequently, Plaintiff contends that the Court must "correct" the arrest warrant affidavit by setting aside "false and misleading information" pertaining to eyewitness identification of Plaintiff at the scene of the Accident. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to include in his arrest warrant affidavit the fact that neither eyewitness present at the scene of the Accident was able to identify Plaintiff in a photo line up.
An individual has a clearly established right not to be arrested or prosecuted without probable cause. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996). To prevail on a Section 1983 false arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant intentionally arrested him or had him arrested, (2) the plaintiff was aware of the arrest, (3) there was no consent to the arrest, and (4) the arrest was not supported by probable cause. Shattuck v. Town of Stratford, 233 F.Supp.2d 301, 306 (D.Conn.2002). Because Plaintiff only argues that Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest her, whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the false arrest claim turns on whether, based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff's right to be free from arrest without probable cause was violated.
Probable cause exists under federal law when "the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir.1995). Likewise, under Connecticut law, probable cause "comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred." Reese v. Garcia, 115 F.Supp.2d 284, 290 (D.Conn.2000). Whether probable cause existed is a question that may be resolved as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment if there is no dispute with regard to the pertinent events and knowledge of the officer. See Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. Therefore, to satisfy his burden and to establish that he had probable cause, Defendant must demonstrate that in procuring Plaintiff's arrest he had a quantum of evidence "more than rumor, suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect." United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir.1983).
To establish probable cause, the evidence required does not have to support a conviction. See id. The fact that Plaintiff was acquitted of a crime for which she was arrested does not mean that probable cause was lacking. See Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir.1989). Whether there was evidence to support a finding of probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances and those facts available to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. See Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir.1996). In civil rights cases involving the claim of false arrest or prosecution without probable cause, a court must "put aside allegedly false information, supply any omitted information, and determine whether the contents of the corrected affidavit would have supported a finding of probable cause." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If at the conclusion of this analysis probable cause remains, no constitutional violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights has occurred. See id.
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim. See Garcia, 193 F.Supp.2d at 449. Probable cause only exists when there are "facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Lowth, 82 F.3d at 569. Probable cause is presumed when the arrest is made pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. See Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991). A plaintiff...
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