Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 April 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 36243,36243 |
| Citation | 242 Minn. 141,64 N.W.2d 366,49 A.L.R.2d 688 |
| Parties | , 49 A.L.R.2d 688 WEIS v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where an automobile liability insurance policy provides for payment of damages for injuries, et cetera, Caused by accident and for the defenses of suits alleging such injuries and where it appears from the record that no accident occurred but, rather, that the incidents complained of were, on insured's own admissions, his intentional and deliberate acts while personally operating his own automobile covered by the policy, there was no coverage. It therefore follows that there was no liability on the part of defendant insurance company, under the circumstances here, to defend the case against the insured.
2. Situation where another is driving plaintiff's automobile with his consent distinguished.
Johanson, Winter & Lundquist, Wheaton, for appellant.
Hall & Forbes, Marshall, Gordon Forbes, Worthington, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment and decree of the district court in favor of plaintiff.
This is an action to recover attorneys' fees from defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company allegedly incurred in the defense of actions brought by third parties against plaintiff, Virgil C. Weis, its insured.
On May 19, 1951, plaintiff, Weis, owned an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant, which policy was in full force and effect at that time. About 8:15 in the evening on that date the Weis automobile, while being driven by him, came in contact with a car driven by one George James. On July 12, 1951, Weis was served with complaints in actions brought against him by George James and Anna James, his wife. The complaints alleged that Weis had negligently, carelessly, and recklessly, deliberately, and unlawfully run into the rear of the James automobile and that he wantonly, maliciously, wilfully, and repeatedly did so. Weis took the complaints to his attorney on the same day and he in turn promptly forwarded them to defendant. On July 19, 1951, an adjuster for defendant called on Weis and discussed the occurrences of May 19. According to the adjuster, Weis stated that he had had no accident and referred to the situation as the famous bumping case and further stated that he, Weis, could not see how defendant could be involved in the matter at all. However, on that same afternoon Weis, his attorney, and the insurance adjuster had a meeting, at which time Weis signed a nonwaiver agreement and proof-of-loss statement and gave the adjuster a statement.
On July 25, 1951, defendant informed Weis that it could not defend the pending actions brought by Mr. and Mrs. James because it claimed that no accident had occurred. On September 28, 1951, Weis, through his attorneys, again tendered the defense of the actions to defendant and advised it that the cases were to be on the calendar call in Nobles county on October 9, 1951. Defendant again refused to defend the actions on the ground that no accident was involved and that the entire occurrence resulted from deliberate actions on the part of its insured. The James cases were tried before a jury. A verdict of no cause of action was rendered in favor of Weis in each case, and judgments were entered for him. Thereafter, a demand was made upon defendant insurance company for reimbursement of Weis's attorneys' fees and expenses, which demand was refused by defendant.
This action by Weis for attorneys' fees was then commenced and was tried before the district court upon a written stipulation of facts. As far as is pertinent to our determination of the case, the trial court concluded (a) that the suit papers and facts upon which they were based stated and constituted purported causes of action which were risks within the coverage and defense clauses of the policy; (b) that defendant, by refusing to defend the actions, is concluded by the implications of the judgments of no cause of action entered in the Nobles county district court; and (c) that the reasonable implication from the jury verdicts and judgments entered thereon in Nobles county is that the James suits were groundless and false. The trial court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff for $925.
The principal question which we deem determinative on this appeal is whether defendant insurance company was obligated to defend actions brought against Weis, its insured, under the automobile policy of insurance involved, where the insured's personal actions were admittedly deliberate and intentional.
The pertinent provisions of the policy which we must consider are that defendant company agrees with the insured, in consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance upon the statements in the declarations and subject to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions, and other terms of the policy, as follows:
'(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.'
Briefly, the damages because of bodily injury, et cetera, which the company agrees to pay under the policy in question must be Caused by accident. It also agrees to defend any suit against the insured alleging such injuries (caused by accident) referred to in paragraph I, Coverage A, even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent.
The word 'accident,' as used in an automobile liability insurance policy, in its common signification means an unexpected happening without intention or design. 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 829, p. 887.
It is our opinion that, limited to the facts and...
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