Weiser National Bank v. Washington County

• Decision Date: 21 April 1917
• Parties: WEISER NATIONAL BANK, a Corporation, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY et al., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

164 P. 1014

30 Idaho 332

WEISER NATIONAL BANK, a Corporation, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 21, 1917

BANKS-TAXATION-STATUTES-CERTIORARI.

1. In proceedings upon writ of review, the constitutionality of the statute upon which the inferior tribunal, the action of which is reviewed, based its authority cannot be passed upon.

2. According to the intent and purpose of sec. 173 of the Revenue Act of 1913 (Sess. Laws 1913, p. 230), the proportion of the capital stock, surplus and undivided profits of a bank invested in or represented by property outside of the county in which the bank is located is not to be deducted from the full cash value of its capital stock in listing the same for assessment.

[As to taxation of banks by the states, see notes in 96 Am.Dec. 290; Ann.Cas. 1912D, 37]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Washington County. Hon. Chas. P. McCarthy, Presiding Judge.

Petition for writ of review. From a judgment granting part of the relief sought, the petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment of the district court affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents.

Ed. R Coulter, for Appellant.

This revenue act must be read and construed as a whole, and the whole must be interpreted to give meaning to the intent of the legislature. It is true that in sec. 173 there are two different phrases which seem at first reading to limit the real estate to that within the county. Take the whole act secs. 4, 173-180, and construe them together, and it clearly appears that it was not the intention that there should be any double taxation or lack of uniformity. Read the sections 161-171 on taxation of migratory stock. There the same clear intent appears.

In the sections on migratory stock, they provide for an adjustment between the counties of the tax for the year on such stock. The legislature in those sections properly use the words "counties" in fixing status of the property. We find them immediately taking up the question of taxation of banks and bank shares and using their same word "county," and using it in a sense which is clearly at variance with the evident intent and purpose which was in the minds of the legislators.

"Whenever a statute contains a clause which is directly contrary to the legislative intent, as collected from the whole act, such clause will be treated as surplusage and will be disregarded in the proper construction of the act." (State v Forch, 26 Idaho 755, 760, 146 P. 110.)

Statutes will be construed with the view of ascertaining the intent of the law-making power and giving force and meaning to the language used. (Idaho Mutual Co-operative Ins. Co. v. Myer, 10 Idaho 294, 77 P. 628; Greathouse v. Heed, 1 Idaho 494; Empire Copper Co. v. Henderson, 15 Idaho 635, 99 P. 127; In re Bossner, 18 Idaho 519, 110 P. 502; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 347.)

T. A. Walters, Atty. Genl., J. P. Pope, Asst., George Donart and Harris & Smith, for Respondents.

A writ of review cannot be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued its authority or has exceeded its jurisdiction (Rev. Codes, sec. 4968), and it is equally well established that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the terms of the statute, and that the question of constitutionality of the statute cannot be reviewed on certiorari. (Adleman v. Pierce, 6 Idaho 294, 55 P. 658; Wright v. Kelley, 4 Idaho 624, 43 P. 565; McConnell v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Idaho 652, 83 P. 494.)

Authorities are very meager which construe or define the term "uniformity" as applied to taxation. But it would seem that both the better reasoning and the weight of authority confines the application of the term to the rate of taxation and not to the mode of assessment. (People ex rel. Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Henderson, 12 Colo. 369, 21 P. 144; Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 Ill. 530; People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351.)

MORGAN, J. Rice, J., sat at the hearing but took no part in the decision of this case. BUDGE, C. J., Concurring.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

The appellant is a national bank located at Weiser, in Washington county. On the second Monday of January, 1915, its capital stock was $ 75,000, divided into 750 shares of the par value of $ 100 each; its surplus and undivided profits amounted to $ 15,540, making a total of $ 90,540. It appears that $ 32,368 of this amount was invested in the bank building furniture and fixtures, $ 4,350 in real estate in Weiser, $ 1,652.67 in real estate in Owyhee county, and $ 2,600 in real estate in Adams county. In April, 1915, appellant gave to the assessor of Washington county a sworn statement showing the capital stock, surplus and undivided profits as they existed on the second Monday of January, 1915, and also the proportionate amount of the same which was invested as above set forth. The assessor deducted from the sum of $ 90,540 the $ 32,368 invested in the bank building, furniture and fixtures, and the remainder, $ 58,172, he prorated among the 750 shares of stock and assessed it against the shares in the names of the shareholders. The other real estate was assessed, respectively, by the assessors of Washington, Owyhee and Adams counties, and the taxes upon the same were paid by the bank. The payment of taxes assessed against the capital stock of the bank to the assessor and tax collector of Washington county was made under protest and a petition was filed with the board of county commissioners, sitting as a board of equalization, praying that an additional deduction from the capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, amounting to that proportion of the same invested in the real estate in the three counties above named and not used in connection with the bank, be allowed. This was denied. Appellant thereafter procured a writ of review from the court below and respondents moved to quash the same. After hearing the matter the court made and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and...