Mathison v. Felton

• Decision Date: 24 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 9626,9626
• Citation: 408 P.2d 457,90 Idaho 87
• Parties: Wendell H. MATHISON, Petitioner and Applicant, v. Honorable Tom FELTON, District Judge, and the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce, and Roy E. Mosman, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Nez Perce, Idaho, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 457

408 P.2d 457

90 Idaho 87

Wendell H. MATHISON, Petitioner and Applicant, v. Honorable Tom FELTON, District Judge, and the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce, and Roy E. Mosman, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Nez Perce, Idaho, Respondents.

No. 9626.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 24, 1965.

Blake, Givens & Feeney, Lewiston, for petitioner.

Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., Boise, Roy E. Mosman, Prosecuting Atty., and Donald K. Worden, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Lewiston, for respondents.

McFADDEN, Justice.

This original proceeding for writ of review or in the alternative for writ of prohibition was instituted by Wendell H. Mathison, as the petitioner and applicant to review a district court judgment holding the petitioner in contempt of court. The contempt judgment arose out of a declaratory judgment of the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District for Nez Perce County, in the case of Mosman v. Mathison and others, which judgment was appealed to this court by the applicant here. The decision of this court on that appeal has been released this day. (90 Idaho ----, 408 P.2d 450).

In this proceeding, writ of review was issued and the record before the trial court certified to this court. By stipulation, the appeal in Mosman v. Mathison and others, and this proceeding were consolidated for the purposes of argument.

In the declaratory judgment entered in Mosman v. Mathison, it was decreed that Wapsheli Road was a public road, and

'that Wendell Mathison, his agents, servants, and/or employees and acting in conjunction with Wendell Mathison, are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from any further interference with the public's right of free access to the aforementioned road and let permanent injunction issue. * * *'

Seven months after entry of the judgment, Mr. Mosman moved that the trial court enter a show cause order why Mathison should not be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the provisions of the decree, which motion was supported by affidavits of certain persons alleging Wapsheli Road was impassible. Mathison answered the charge and hearing was had before the court on the issues framed. The trial court rendered finding of fact and conclusions of law, and based thereon entered its judgment holding Mathison in contempt of court, fining him $500.00, and sentencing him to five days in jail, which jail sentence was to be suspended if he removed certain obstructions from the Wapsheli Road.

Under the provisions of I.C. § 7-614 ¹ the order holding holding a person in contempt of court is not an appealable order. However, the writ of review has been recognized as a proper method by which the actions of a trial court can be reviewed in a contempt proceeding. Vollmer v. Vollmer, 46 Idaho 97, 266 P. 677; Hay v. Hay, 40 Idaho 159, 232 P. 895; 14 Am.Jur.2d, 802, Certiorari, § 25; 12 Cal.Jur.2d, 101, Contempt, § 80.

Petitioner contends that the contempt involved here, if any was committed, was a criminal contempt, and not a civil contempt as the trial court held in its conclusions of law. While there may be merit in petitioner's contention, it is not material here, for the determination of this cause is not dependent upon such classification of whether the contempt is of a civil nature or a criminal nature. The issues presented in this proceeding are whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuance of the contempt judgment.

I.C. § 7-208 provides:

'The review upon this writ can not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or officer.'

Uniformly this court has held that the scope of review afforded by a writ of review is to only inquire whether the tribunal, board or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction, and that the facts will be reviewed only to determine whether the tribunal, board or body exceeded its jurisdiction. Ada County v. Bottolfsen, 61 Idaho 64, 97 P.2d 599; Vaught v. District Court, 46 Idaho 642, 269 P. 595; Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Budge, 16 Idaho 751, 102 P. 390, 691; State Ins. Fund v. Hunt, 52 Idaho 639, 17 P.2d 354; Lansdon v. State Board of Canvasers, 18 Idaho 596, 111 P. 133; Hay v. Hay, 40 Idaho 159, 232 P. 895; Mays v. District Court, 40 Idaho 798, 237 P. 700; Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 P.2d 194; Weiser Nat. Bank, v. Washington County, 30 Idaho 332, 164 P. 1014; Beus v. Terrell, 46 Idaho 635, 269 P. 593.

In State Insurance Fund v. Hunt, supra, this court stated:

'Upon application for a writ of review, the sole business of this court is to inquire into the single question of jurisdiction.'

In Vollmer v. Vollmer, 46 Idaho 97, 266 P. 677, the author of the majority opinion, discussing the scope of a writ of review stated:

'While a writ of review may not ordinarily be used to inquire into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, yet upon an order such as imprisonment for contempt until performance of an act 'which is yet in the power of the person to perform,' such review extends to the evidence itself, when questioned, to the extent of inquiring whether there was any evidence to furnish a substantial basis for adjudging the person guilty of contempt, and that the act 'is yet in the power of the person to perform.''

46 Idaho at 104, 266 P. at 678.

In that case, Justice Budge in a special concurring opinion stated:

'I am convinced from the record that issuance of the citation to plaintiff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and his answer thereto vested the court with jurisdiction of the person and of the subjectmatter. The record further discloses beyond controversy that evidence was taken, and that there was some evidence to support the judgment entered. Upon a writ of review this court will not consider the weight, competency, or sufficiency of the evidence, but will determine the sole question of whether the court had jurisdiction.' 46 Idaho at 110, 266 P. at 681.

In causes of this type dealing with contempt orders always involved in the jurisdictional question is the secondary question of whether the facts show a contempt of court. While the reviewing court may not weigh the evidence, it has the right to examine the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the order of the trial court, for if there is a lack of evidence, then the trial court would be acting in excess of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of California has dealt with this problem, and its reasoning is persuasive here, inasmuch as the statutes of that state are practically identical with the comparable sections of the Idaho Code. See: I.C. § 7-202, and Cal.Civ.Code Proc. § 1068.

The Supreme Court of California in the case of Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939) (Reversed on other grounds than discussed below, 62 S.Ct. 190, 314 U.S. 252, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346) stated:

'In considering the third major question presented by the record in this proceeding; it is important that we keep in mind the nature of the particular proceeding before us, and not confuse it with the ordinary appeal from a judgment, nor with an original proceeding in contempt before a trial court. On petition to review the judgment of the trial court, it is definitely settled that the sole question before the reviewing court is one of jurisdiction of the trial court to render the judgment under review. If it be determined that in the rendition of said judgment the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, then the inquiry ends, and the only order the reviewing court is authorized to make is one affirming the proceedings of the trial court. On the other hand, should it appear from the record as certified to us that the court either had no jurisdiction to pronounce said judgment, or exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so, then the proceedings should be annulled. Sec. 1075, Code Civ.Proc. Other than as just indicated, the writ of certiorari will not be granted to review errors of law (People v. Latimer, 160 Cal. 716, 117 P. 1051), or mere questions of fact. White v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 60, 42 P. 480. However, in passing upon the question of the trial court's jurisdiction, the reviewing court may consider the evidence before the trial court for the purpose of determining whether it was sufficient to give that court jurisdiction to render its judgment finding the accused guilty of contempt, and in case the court finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction it will annul the judgment. McClatchey v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 51 P. 696, 39 L.R.A. 691; Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506, 217 P. 73, 29 A.L.R. 127, and Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 44, 29 P.2d 206. But in such a case, the review of the evidence is limited to determining whether there was any substantial evidence before the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction. The power to weigh the evidence rests with the trial court. Daily v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.App.2d 127, 134, 40 P.2d 936; McFarland v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 407, 228 P. 1033; In...