Weisshaus v. Teichelman
| Decision Date | 27 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-CV-035-Z-BR |
| Parties | YOEL WEISSHAUS, Plaintiff, v. STEVE COY TEICHELMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (ECF No. 26), filed on September 28 2022. Having considered the Motion, briefing, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS the Motion and renders summary judgment in Defendant's favor.
This case arises out of a traffic stop that occurred on March 2 2020. Plaintiff Yoel Weisshauss and passenger Sasha Lee were driving through Texas, en route from Oklahoma to Arizona. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges he was pulled over by Defendant - an officer working for the 100th Judicial District Traffic Enforcement Division - for speeding and displaying an obscured license plate.[1] Id. Defendant identified Plaintiff as a middle-aged male and his passenger as an African-American female who appeared to be in her early 20s. ECF No. 27 at 10. Plaintiffs driver's license indicated he was from New Jersey. Id. Defendant asked Plaintiff to step out of his vehicle and sit in the front of Defendant's patrol vehicle while Defendant “processed a warning.” ECF No. 1 at 5. While in the patrol vehicle, Defendant asked Plaintiff questions regarding where he was traveling, how long he intended to stay at his destination, and his lodging plans. ECF No. 27 at 10. Defendant states Plaintiff was short with his responses and unable to provide any details.[2] Id. Given that Plaintiff was traveling with a driver's license from New Jersey on 1-40 - which Defendant asserts is “a known drug and human trafficking corridor”[3] - with a female who appeared to be considerably younger with no familial connection, Defendant argues he developed a suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
Defendant then asked the female passenger the same general questions. Id. at 11. Defendant asserts Ms. Lee could not provide details and “appeared nervous, timid, and scared.” Id. Defendant then asked Plaintiff and Ms. Lee to stand away from the vehicle as he walked his canine partner Kobra around the vehicle. Id. After Kobra gave Defendant a passive alert, Defendant searched the vehicle.[4] Id. However, Defendant did not find any narcotics. Id. Defendant then let Plaintiff and Ms. Lee leave with a warning relating to Plaintiffs speeding and obscured license plate or registration insignia. Id.
Plaintiff filed suit on March 2, 2022, naming Officer Teichelman and the 100th Judicial District as Defendants. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges Defendant's search was an “unconstitutional detention in violation of [Plaintiffs] rights pursuant to the 100th Judicial District's practice of prolonging traffic stops past when the purpose for the stop had concluded in order to illegally detain and search citizens and subject them to civil forfeiture proceedings.” ECF No. 1 at 3. The 100th Judicial District filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 10.
The Court granted the motion, finding Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead the existence of an official policy under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See ECF No. 21. Defendant then filed the instant Motion on September 28, 2022. Plaintiff argues there are genuine disputes of material fact concerning: (1) whether Defendant had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support detaining Plaintiff after the purposes of the traffic stop had concluded; and (2) whether an illegal search of Plaintiff s vehicle was conducted. ECF No. 29 at 1.
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). A fact is “material” if resolving it one way or another would change the outcome of the lawsuit. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009). A genuine dispute over that fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)). Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve factual controversies in the nonmovant's favor. Id. (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 31 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
Qualified immunity protects government officials acting within their authority from individual liability “when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 412 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Once a government official establishes that his conduct was within the scope of his discretionary authority it is up to the plaintiff to show: (1) the official “violated a statutory or constitutional right”; and (2) the right was “clearly established at the time.” Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2019)). Courts have discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226 (2009). “But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014). And “to overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiffs version of those disputed facts must also constitute a violation of clearly established law.” Edwards v. Oliver, 31 F.4th 925, 929 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal marks omitted).
“A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal marks omitted). Although there is no requirement that a case be “directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (internal marks omitted). “In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal marks omitted); see also Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (). “It is the plaintiff s burden to find a case in his favor that does not define the law at a high level of generality.” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal marks omitted).
“Even if the government official's conduct violates a clearly established right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.” Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal marks omitted). “The defendant's acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant's circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff s asserted constitutional or federal statutory right.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal marks omitted). Thus, denial of an official's motion for summary judgment predicated upon qualified immunity requires two distinct determinations: (1) “a certain course of conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law”; and (2) “a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether the defendant(s) did, in fact, engage in such conduct.” Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal marks omitted).
To trigger the qualified-immunity framework, the government official must “satisfy his burden of establishing that the challenged conduct was within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Sweetin v. City of Texas City, 48 F.4th 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cherry Knoll, L.L. C. v. Jones, 922 F.3d 309,318 (5th Cir. 2019)). Courts look to state law in determining whether an official was acting within the scope of his duties. Id. (internal marks omitted). In Sweetin - for example - the Fifth Circuit held this “oft-overlooked threshold requirement” was dispositive “because state law does not give a permit officer the authority to conduct stops of any kind.” Id. (internal marks omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant was acting within the scope of his discretionary duties. Defendant is an officer employed with the 100th Judicial Traffic Enforcement Division. Therefore, the traffic stop was within the scope of Defendant's discretionary duties.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Traffic stops are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). In determining the legality of a traffic stop, courts first examine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and then inquire whether the officer's subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,1920 (1968)).
The Court first notes while Plaintiff denies that he was speeding or displaying an obscured license plate, he does not appear to be challenging the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop. But...
To continue reading
Request your trial