Welch v. Houston County Hosp. Bd.
Decision Date | 02 January 1987 |
Citation | 502 So.2d 340 |
Parties | James WELCH, Administrator Of The Estate Of Shirley Welch, Deceased v. HOUSTON COUNTY HOSPITAL BOARD. 85-677. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Cada M. Carter of Carter & Hall, Dothan, and P. Russell Tarver, Birmingham, for appellant.
Michael K. Wright of Norman, Fitzpatrick, Wood, Wright & Williams, Birmingham, for appellee.
This is an appeal by James Welch, as administrator of the estate of Shirley Welch, deceased, from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Houston County Hospital Board, in Mr. Welch's action for the wrongful death of Mrs. Welch. We reverse and remand.
When she died, Mrs. Welch was a patient at the Southeast Alabama Medical Center, which is owned and operated by the defendant, Houston County Hospital Board ("Hospital Board"). She had been diagnosed as having developed cervical cancer. Mrs. Welch was admitted to the hospital on July 29, 1979, and, on July 30, Dr. Rufus Clyde Smith, Jr., performed an abdominal hysterectomy on her. She appeared to be having a normal recovery until the morning of July 31, 1979, when she suffered a grand mal seizure. After this seizure, Mrs. Welch was generally stabilized, although no central nervous system function was ever detected. Mrs. Welch died on August 3, 1979. An autopsy revealed hypoxic changes in the brain.
Thereafter, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator, filed this action for wrongful death. Named as defendants were the Hospital Board, three drug manufacturers, and other fictitiously named defendants. All defendants were subsequently dismissed except the Hospital Board.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the Hospital Board "was negligent in its care and treatment of plaintiff's decedent in that it failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care, skill, and diligence as used by hospitals generally in the community." In response to the Hospital Board's motion for a more definite statement, plaintiff alleged the following:
Following the exchange of certain discovery requests, the Hospital Board filed its motion for summary judgment, alleging "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and this Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This motion was based on the pleadings and the Hospital Board's answers to interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff and two of the drug manufacturers. In responding to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint against it, the Hospital Board argued in its motion that it had "answered interrogatories identifying each drug administered, the physician prescribing the same, the quantity administered pursuant to physician's order, and the hospital personnel involved in such administration," and argued further that "[i]t is undisputed that all medications administered were administered in the appropriate amounts or quantity, pursuant to the physician's order."
In opposition to the Hospital Board's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed the affidavit of Bertie Enfinger, the mother of plaintiff's decedent Shirley Welch. That affidavit stated, in pertinent part:
Apparently, at the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff also offered the deposition of Dr. Rufus Clyde Smith, one of Mrs. Welch's attending physicians, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The trial judge entered an order granting the Hospital Board's motion, wherein he stated:
"After consideration of the motion, arguments and brief of counsel, answers to interrogatories and the deposition testimony of Dr. Rufus Clyde Smith, Jr., the Court is of the opinion that the motion is well taken and due to be granted."
This appeal followed. We hold that summary judgment was improper in this case. None of the evidence material to the issues in this case, offered either in support of or in opposition to the summary judgment motion, would be admissible at trial and, therefore, that evidence cannot properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
While Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P., permits evidence in the form of depositions and answers to interrogatories to be submitted in support of, or in opposition to, a summary judgment motion (see Vulcan Freight Lines v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 446 So.2d 603, 604-05 (Ala.1982)), that evidence must, nevertheless, conform to the requirements of Rule 56(e) and be admissible at trial. Griffin v. Little, 451 So.2d 284, 286 (Ala.1984); Day v. Merchants National Bank of Mobile, 431 So.2d 1254 (Ala.1983); Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So.2d 529, 532 (Ala.1980). That is, the content of the deposition or answers to the interrogatories must be asserted on the personal knowledge of the deponent or person giving the answers, must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the deponent or person giving the answers is competent to testify to the matters asserted. Vulcan Freight Lines v. South Carolina Ins. Co., supra; Morris v. Morris, 366 So.2d 676, 678 (Ala.1978); Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2722, pp. 48-52 (1983). These requirements are mandatory. Arrington v. Working Woman's Home, 368 So.2d 851, 854 (Ala.1979); Oliver v. Brock, 342 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Ala.1976). Matters stated based only upon information and belief are essentially hearsay and are, therefore, insufficient. Vulcan Freight Lines v. South Carolina Ins. Co., supra; Oliver v. Brock, supra.
Powell v. Mullins, 479 So.2d 1119, 1120 (Ala.1985). Thus, although Mrs. Enfinger's affidavit can be considered as evidence of what happened on the morning of Mrs. Welch's seizure (because she witnessed the events), the Hospital Board is correct in its argument that Mrs. Enfinger's statement, "[I believe] she was given the wrong medication," is inadmissible as evidence of that alleged fact. There is nothing in the record to show that Mrs. Enfinger possessed the qualifications or expertise to allow her to draw this conclusion from what she observed. Nor is there any other evidence to show that Mrs. Enfinger had specific knowledge that the medication administered to Mrs. Welch minutes before her seizure was the wrong medication.
Notwithstanding Mrs. Enfinger's affidavit, the substantive issue in this case remains whether the Hospital Board, as the moving party, met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether it properly administered to Shirley Welch only those drugs prescribed by her physicians. The Hospital Board contends it met this burden, relying on pertinent portions of Dr. Smith's deposition and the Hospital Board's answers to interrogatories which were given and signed by its "Administrator." Without question, the matters material to this case, asserted in the answers and deposition, are based almost exclusively on the medical chart and hospital records of the plaintiff's decedent, Mrs. Welch. Neither these medical records nor sworn or certified copies thereof were ever made a part of this record. In Oliver v. Brock, supra, at 4-5, this Court held as follows:
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