Welfare of G. (NMN) M., Matter of
| Decision Date | 09 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C9-95-812,C9-95-812 |
| Citation | 542 N.W.2d 54 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the WELFARE OF G. (NMN) M., a/k/a W.M. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The police had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to make a lawful investigative stop.
2. The police had probable cause to seize and search a pouch in defendant's possession where the pouch was properly seized under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
3. Defendant's incriminating statements made during custodial interrogation are admissible where the state shows by a fair preponderance of the evidence that they were made voluntarily and defendant fails to
present evidence to rebut the state's showing.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Ann McCaughan, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, St. Paul, Todd Webb, Clay County Attorney, Scott G. Collins, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, for Respondent.
Considered and decided by RANDALL, P.J., and SHORT and FORSBERG *, JJ.
Appellant G.M. was arrested and charged as an extended jurisdiction juvenile with controlled substance crime in the first and second degrees. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and to suppress incriminating statements made during custodial interrogation. We affirm.
On January 25, 1995, Gary Pederson, a narcotics agent with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), was in Moorhead, Minnesota, investigating possible activities involving illegal drugs. He was working in cooperation with the Clay County Sheriff's Department, the Moorhead Police Department, and a confidential informant. For a period of two to three months prior to that day, the informant had provided the Moorhead Police Department on several occasions with information that led to the arrest of persons possessing illegal drugs. At the time, the prosecutions of those arrests were still pending.
On that day, the informant and an unknown companion were standing in a parking lot located at 1929 18th Avenue South in Moorhead. The informant was wired with a radio transmitter. Agent Pederson was parked across the street, where he was observing the informant and his companion and was picking up the radio transmissions being sent by the informant.
The informant's companion was standing near three males and a brown car. He learned that some cocaine was either in the car or in the personal possession of the three males. The companion passed this information on to the informant, who radioed this information along with a description of the car, the license plate number, and the number and gender of the car's occupants to Agent Pederson. Agent Pederson observed the car exit the parking lot and transmitted all of the relevant information to the Clay County Sheriff's Department, which in turn sent this information to the Moorhead Police Department.
Moorhead Police Officers Carlson and Jaeche received the information and approached the intersection of 20th Street and 18th Avenue South. They noticed a car matching the description and license plates pull into a parking lot at 1929 18th Avenue South. The officers then drove into the parking lot, saw the car, and observed three males walking away from the car.
Officer Jaeche told the three males to stop and come forward, which they did. Appellant was among the three males. Officer Carlson asked the three suspects whether they were carrying weapons. Appellant replied no, but that he had a pouch in his possession that he found on the street and that he did not know what was inside the pouch. Officer Carlson could see a portion of the purple pouch sticking out from appellant's sweatshirt pocket. He took the pouch out of appellant's pocket, handed it to Officer Jaeche, and proceeded to conduct a patdown search of the three suspects. Officer Carlson testified that he took the pouch and conducted the patdown search to find and remove possible weapons from the three suspects. The officers subsequently looked inside the pouch and found small bags containing a white powdery substance. The officers then arrested all three males, including 17-year- old appellant and his 20-year-old brother, Edward.
At the Moorhead Police Department, Detective Thorsen first interviewed Edward, who made several statements that incriminated appellant. After this interview, appellant and his brother spoke alone for about 12 minutes. Because appellant's father was deceased and his mother was living in Texas, Detective Thorsen asked Edward to act in a parental capacity for appellant. After reading appellant his Miranda rights, Detective Thorsen interrogated appellant in his brother's presence. Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and waived them. During the interrogation, appellant admitted that he was knowingly in possession of the cocaine.
The contents of the pouch were examined by the BCA and found to be 15.1 grams of cocaine. On January 26, 1995, appellant was charged by petition as an extended jurisdiction juvenile with one count of controlled substance crime in the first degree, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (1994) (), and one count of controlled substance crime in the second degree, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(1) (1994) ().
Appellant moved to suppress the cocaine and his incriminating statements made during custodial interrogation. On February 21, 1995, after a suppression hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. The trial court determined that the police lawfully detained appellant and had probable cause to believe the pouch contained contraband. The trial court also determined that appellant voluntarily made the incriminating statements.
On March 14, 1995, the state agreed to dismiss count one of the petition and appellant stipulated to facts under count two. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court found appellant guilty of one count of controlled substance crime in the second degree.
1. Did the police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop appellant?
2. Did the police have probable cause to seize and search the purple pouch in appellant's possession?
3. Did the state prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that appellant's incriminating statements were made voluntarily?
Appellant argues that he was unlawfully detained because the police officers had no reasonable basis to suspect that he was engaged in criminal activity. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a police officer may stop and frisk a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior on less than the traditional probable cause for arrest if he is "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Cavegn, 294 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017, 101 S.Ct. 580, 66 L.Ed.2d 477 (1980).
An informant's tip may be adequate to support an investigative stop if it has sufficient indicia of reliability. Cavegn, 294 N.W.2d at 721. Further, the grounds for making the stop can be based on the collective knowledge of all investigating officers. Id.; State v. Radil, 288 Minn. 279, 283, 179 N.W.2d 602, 605 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921, 91 S.Ct. 910, 27 L.Ed.2d 825 (1971).
Here, the police received a recent report from a reliable informant. Narcotics had been seized in the past based on information provided by the informant. The informant described with reasonable accuracy the number of people involved, the car they were using, and its location. He also stated that the three individuals were in possession of cocaine. The two police officers dispatched to find the car observed it driving into a parking lot. When the officers pulled into the same parking lot, they observed the three individuals walking away from the car.
We conclude that based on the tip from the informant and the narcotics agent's own observations of the vehicle the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to make a lawful investigative stop of appellant.
Appellant argues that even if the police lawfully detained him, the police officers exceeded the scope of a protective search for weapons. We disagree.
As appellant points out, a Terry frisk is a protective search "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. at 1882. However, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant under the "plain view" doctrine. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); State v. Lembke, 509 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn.App.1992). An object's "incriminating character is immediately apparent" if the police have probable cause to believe that the object in plain view is contraband without conducting further search of the object. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 2137; Lembke, 509 N.W.2d at 184.
The Supreme Court has upheld the plain view seizure in the context of a Terry stop. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2136. Here, the police officers lawfully detained appellant for an investigative Terry stop and the purple pouch was in Officer Carlson's plain view at the time of the stop. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the police had probable cause to believe the pouch contained contraband at the...
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Welfare of G.M., Matter of
...court, holding that the evidence was in plain view during a lawful stop and that G.M.'s statements were voluntary. In re Welfare of G. (NMN) M., 542 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.App.1996). G.M. appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress both the evidence seized and his statements, and his......
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