Welfare of J.W.K., Matter of

• Decision Date: 27 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. CX-97-1696,CX-97-1696
• Citation: 583 N.W.2d 752
• Parties: In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.W.K., Child.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 752

583 N.W.2d 752

In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.W.K., Child.

No. CX-97-1696.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 27, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

Assuming the police exceeded the scope of the suspect's consent in using his blood sample in connection with their investigation of a different crime than the one contemplated when the consent was obtained, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of the incriminating evidence obtained as a result of the analysis of the sample because the police inevitably would have obtained a blood sample from the suspect for the use in question.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Robert A. Stanich, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Boyd A. Beccue, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, for Appellant.

Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, for Respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

This is a state's pretrial appeal from a suppression order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile's attorney successfully argued in the district court that the court should suppress both the DNA test results on a blood sample linking the suspect to the crime scene and a confession he gave after being confronted with the identification evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the police needed additional consent or, failing that, a new sample obtained pursuant to a search warrant, before using the youth's blood sample in connection with their investigation of what was a different crime than the one contemplated when consent was obtained. In the Matter of the Welfare of J.W.K., Child, 574 N.W.2d 103 (Minn.App.1998). We conclude that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence because even if the police exceeded the scope of the suspect's consent in using his blood sample in connection with the investigation of a different crime, the police inevitably would have obtained a blood sample from the suspect for the use in question. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's suppression order and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

On October 17, 1996, some golf carts were taken from the Little Crow Country Club in New London and destroyed. Investigators found a stool sample on the scene and a juvenile's detention slip that had been used as toilet paper. Detectives Burns and Friedrich of the sheriff's office, suspected J.W.K. was involved. They went to the boy's residence and asked for permission to draw blood from the boy so that they could test it against the stool sample apparently left by one of the people involved in the destruction of the golf carts. J.W.K. and his mother both consented to the drawing of the blood. The detectives provided them with a written consent form. The language inserted on the form limits the consent given to the removal of blood to use "to compare against evidence found where one of the golf carts was stored for a short time." The detectives took the boy to a local clinic, where a medical professional removed a sample of blood from him.

Approximately two hours later, one of the suspects in the golf cart incident confessed to being the person who defecated near the golf carts. This person also gave the names of two other individuals who were with him, neither of them being J.W.K. At that point the detectives decided they did not need to use J.W.K.'s blood in their investigation of the golf-cart incident.

Detective Burns held on to the blood sample for awhile and then, upon learning that Detective Hartog was interested in it in connection with an earlier burglary, signed the sample over to him. This earlier burglary had occurred the previous spring. Specifically, on May 27, 1996, the sheriff's department had received and investigated a report of a burglary at a residence on Highway 23 near New London. Among the items recovered from the scene was a blood-spattered mat. Detective Hartog, to whom the case was assigned, had focused his suspicion on J.W.K. after another suspect, S.M., told him J.W.K. was involved. S.M. also told the detective that J.W.K. had a cut on his hand. Subsequently, the deputy also had spoken with a person who wished to remain anonymous, who said that R.S. and J.W.K. committed the burglary along with another individual. The detective then had spoken with J.W.K., who denied involvement in the burglary.

Upon receiving the blood sample from Detective Burns, Detective Hartog sent the sample to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension crime lab. On March 27, 1997, the bureau reported that the blood sample taken from J.W.K. matched the blood found at the scene of the first burglary.

On April 14, 1997, Detective Hartog, after obtaining the mother's permission, spoke with J.W.K. at the boy's house. The boy at first again denied participating in the burglary. However, after reading the BCA report, which the detective showed him, the boy confessed. He refused to identify the others who were with him.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Burns, the officer who obtained the consent for the removal of the blood, testified that his intent in obtaining the sample was to use it to see if the boy was the source of the stool sample found in connection with the golf-cart incident. Asked, "And is that it?" the detective answered, "And that's it." Both the boy and the mother testified at the suppression hearing that it was their understanding, based presumably on talking with the officer and the clear limiting language on the form, that the blood sample was needed to clear the boy of the golf-cart incident. The boy and the mother agreed that there had been no discussion about possible use of the blood sample for anything else.

The district court reasoned that the consent given by the boy was limited consent and that the police did not have the authority to use the blood sample obtained from the boy to compare it with blood found at the scene of the earlier crime. The court concluded that the boy's confession was the suppressible fruit of the unauthorized, illegal testing of the boy's blood for comparison with the blood found at the scene of the first crime.

The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the police needed additional consent or, failing that, a new sample obtained pursuant to a search warrant, before they compared the blood with the blood found at the other burglary scene. In the Matter of the Welfare of J.W.K., Child, 574 N.W.2d at 105.

A preliminary question is whether the Fourth Amendment applies, a question clearly answered by the Untied States Supreme Court's decisions in, among other cases, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Skinner, which dealt with the reasonableness of regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of covered railway employees following certain train accidents or incidents, the Court stated:

Our precedents teach that where, as here, the Government seeks to obtain physical evidence from a person, the Fourth Amendment may be relevant at several levels. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 [93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67] (1973). The initial detention necessary to procure the evidence may be a seizure of the person, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-95 [93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900] (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 [89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676] (1969), if the detention amounts to a meaningful interference with his freedom of movement. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 [104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247] (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, [466 U.S. 109, 113, n. 5, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ]. Obtaining and examining the evidence may also be a search, see Cupp v. Murphy, supra, at 295 ; United States v. Dionisio, supra, at 8, 13-14 , if doing so infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, see, e.g., California v. Grenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 [108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30] (1988); United States v. Jacobsen, supra, at 113 .

We have long recognized that a "compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content" must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 [86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908] (1966). See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 [105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662] (1985). In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests. Cf. Arizona v. Hacks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 [107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347] (1987). * * *

[C]hemical analysis * * * of blood [ ] can reveal a host of private medical facts about [a person], including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.

489 U.S. at 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402.

In the context of a criminal investigation, the general rule is that police, absent consent, may not subject a detained person to the forced removal of blood for scientific testing in the absence of probable cause and either a search warrant authorizing the intrusion or exigent circumstances excusing the need for a search warrant. In Schmerber, supra, police investigating an automobile accident developed probable cause to believe that the driver was drunk at the accident scene. The police directed a physician to take a blood sample from the driver despite his refusal on advice of counsel. Subsequently, the results of chemical analysis of the blood, which indicated intoxication,...