Wells v. Great Dane Trailers
| Decision Date | 28 October 1999 |
| Parties | <!--5 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.App.-Houston 1999) IN RE: ESTATE OF GARLAND FREDDERICK WELLS, DECEASED, SAMETRIUS WELLS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF DENZEL WELLS, A MINOR CHILD, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF GARLAND FREDDERICK WELLS, Appellant V. GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC., Appellee NO. 14-97-00596-CV In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Panel consists of Chief Justice Murphy and Justices Hudson and Sears.*
O P I N I O N
Appellant, Sametrius Wells, individually and as next friend of Denzel Wells, a minor child, and as adminstratrix of the estate of Garland Fredderick Wells ("Wells"), appeals the rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Great Dane Trailers, Inc. ("Great Dane"). After the decedent, Garland Fredderick Wells, was killed in an automobile accident, Wells sued Great Dane alleging in her first amended original petition that the Great Dane trailer involved in the accident was defectively manufactured, designed and/or marketed due to a lack of sufficient "conspicuity" and was in an unreasonably dangerous, defective condition. Great Dane moved for summary judgment on Wells's claims contending they were expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law. The trial court subsequently granted Great Dane's motion and it is from this decision that Wells now appeals.
On October 11, 1990, the decedent was killed in an multi-vehicle collision after the tractor-trailer rig traveling immediately in front of him jack-knifed, and the decedent's vehicle struck the side of the Great Dane platform trailer. The decedent's wife and child who were traveling with him were also injured in the accident.
The decedent's wife, his child, and the decedent's estate filed suit against Great Dane, the manufacturer of the trailer, alleging theories of negligence and products liability. In her first amended original petition, Wells contended the Great Dane trailer was defectively manufactured, designed and/or marketed because it lacked sufficient reflective devices and, therefore, suffered from inadequate "conspicuity."1 Great Dane filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Wells's conspicuity claims were expressly and impliedly preempted under federal law because the Great Dane trailer was equipped with the lighting and reflective equipment required under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard Act. The trial court granted Great Dane's motion and Wells perfected her appeal.
In her sole point of error, Wells contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Great Dane because her claims are not preempted by federal law.
In 1966, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("the Act") which is implemented under the authority of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). The Act's explicit purpose is "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 15 U.S.C. 1381 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30101). In order to accomplish that purpose, Congress empowered the Secretary of Transportation to adopt motor vehicle safety standards. See id. 1392(a) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30111(a)). The Act contains an express preemption clause that provides:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.
15 U.S.C. 1392(d) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)). The Act also contains a savings clause providing that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." Id. 1397(k) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30103(e)).
One of the standards promulgated by NHTSA is the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108 ("FMVSS 108") which "specifies requirements for original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment." 49 C.F.R. 571.108S1 (1988). FMVSS 108 was promulgated in response to the need "for signaling and for the safe operation of motor vehicles during darkness and other conditions of reduced visibility." Id. Although FMVSS 108 was amended in 1993 to require additional reflective equipment, the standard in effect at the time the trailer at issue was manufactured required only a three-light, three-reflector configuration on each side of the trailer. Wells contended that "Great Dane should have supplemented the basic requirements of a minimum standard that had remained essentially unchanged from 1967 through 1993." However, Great Dane asserted that because it fully complied with the minimum requirements of FMVSS 108, any claim based upon the failure to provide supplemental lighting and reflectorization is preempted under federal law. Thus, the issue before us is whether the Act and FMVSS 108 preempt Wells's common law claims that the trailer was defectively manufactured, designed and/or marketed due to insufficient conspicuity.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States entitles federal legislation and regulations to preempt state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,505 U.S. 504 (1992); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). A federal law may expressly preempt state law. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. In addition, preemption may be implied if the scope of the statute demonstrates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the field exclusively or when state law actually conflicts with federal law. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)). A state law is in actual conflict with federal law when "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287 (); Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Tex. 1994). There is a well-established presumption against preemption, the purpose of which is to ensure that the "'federal-state balance' . . . will not be disturbed unintentionally or unnecessarily by the courts." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). This presumption is nowhere stronger than where the states have exercised primary authority in matters involving the public health and safety of their citizens. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985). We note that a common law personal injury action based upon negligence and products liability does, in fact, involve the state's power to regulate health and safety matters. See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 249 (citations omitted). As the trial court did not specify whether it granted Great Dane's motion for summary judgment on the basis of expressor implied preemption, we will analyze the issue under both theories. The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 974 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1998) is controlling authority in this case.
In Hyundai, Mario Alvarado and his parents brought a products liability and negligence action against Hyundai Motor Company, Hyundai Motor America, Inc., and Port City Hyundai, Inc. ("Hyundai"), alleging that its two-point passive seat belt system, which did not include a lap belt, was defectively designed. See Hyundai, 974 S.W.2d at 2. Hyundai moved for partial summary judgment asserting the Alvarados' claims were preempted by the Act and its implementing regulations. See id. The trial court subsequently granted the motion and the Alvarados appealed the decision. See id. The court of appeals did not reach the preemption issue,2 and Hyundai sought review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the court of appeals to allow it to consider the issue of federal preemption. On remand, the court of appeals held there was no express or implied preemption of claims and reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Hyundai's application for writ of errorchallenging the appellate court decision.
The preemption clause of the Act prohibits states from imposing "any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle . . . which is not identical to the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. 1392(d) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)). As in the present case, the manufacturer in Hyundai contended the Act's preemption clause extends to common law damage claims. See Hyundai, 974 S.W.2d at 2. In its analysis of the issue of express preemption, the Hyundai court stated that "[i]n determining whether Congress evinced a clear intent in the Safety Act to preempt common-law actions . . . , we look first to the preemption clause's language, as well as to its statutory context." Id. at 6. The court considered the writings of one scholar, who noted that federal "motor vehicle safety standards" refer exclusively to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, and not to state law tort claims or other civil damages actions, except in the context of the savings provision of 1397(k).3 The article concluded that it was highly unlikely that the Act would use the term "standard" narrowly with respect to federal action and broadly with respect to state action. See id. The Hyundai court reasoned...
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