Wensley v. Scott
| Decision Date | 15 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 04-245J.,Civ.A. 04-245J. |
| Citation | 459 F.Supp.2d 388 |
| Parties | Glenda M. WENSLEY and Kenneth Wensley, Plaintiffs, v. Daniel D. SCOTT and Wm. L. Nofziger & Sons, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Danielle M. Mulcahey, Wright & Reihner, Scranton, PA, Susan D. O'Connell, Law Office of Twanda Turner-Hawkins, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.
John W. Jordan, IV, Gaca, Matis, Baum & Rizza, Richard L. Rosenzweig, AAI Law Firm, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Medical Bills (Document No. 22).
The Plaintiffs wish to introduce and the Defendants seek to exclude evidence of Plaintiffs' medical bills related to the vehicular accident alleged in the case sub judice. The medical bills at issue include the amount of medical bills paid by the Plaintiffs' insurance carrier, the amount paid by the Plaintiffs and the amount of medical bills still owed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants wish to preclude use of this evidence at trial and rely upon laws of Pennsylvania, New York and Indiana as being possibly applicable, and argue that under any of these laws, evidence of medical bills must be excluded. As presented by the Defendants, the laws of these three states appear to differ in their potential resolution of this issue.
The Plaintiffs have set forth that Plaintiff-husband has had approximately "$7,200 in medical benefits" paid by his insurer, that he "owes approximately $18,300 in outstanding medical bills to various medical providers", Plaintiff-wife's insurer "has paid approximately $14,100 in medical benefits" and she "owes approximately $10,400 in outstanding medical bills to various medical providers, and she has paid out-of-pocket medical expenses of approximately $2,500." Plaintiffs' Brief (Document No. 25), p. 2. At the pretrial conference in this matter Defendants stipulated to these amounts, after previously representing them to be different amounts.
The Plaintiffs first object to the Defendants' motion by arguing that the evidence of medical bills is already present in the record through the deposition of Dr. Kenneth Gentilezza as he referred to them and that the Defendants did not object at that time and may not object now after stipulating that objections should be made at the time of the deposition, as this deposition was to be used at trial. The Plaintiffs are incorrect. The Defendants may raise this objection by means of the present motion in limine in that objections to the admissibility of depositions may be made at the time of trial for any reason that may require exclusion of evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(b). Rule 32(b) is subject to the related subsection (d)(3) of the same rule which indicates that objections as to relevancy and materiality are not waived for failure to make them at the time of deposition "unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time." FED.R.CIV.P. 32(d)(3)(A).
The Court does not believe that had the Defendants objected at the time of Dr. Gentilezza's deposition regarding his reference to medical bills, that the ground for the present motion could have been "obviated." As will be evident from the discussion within, the need for a legal analysis of possible conflicts of law is necessary to resolve this issue and any objection at the time of deposition would only have served to bring this issue to light earlier, but would not have facilitated its resolution. The motion in limine will not be denied based upon this objection by Plaintiffs. The Court will therefore continue its analysis.
In consideration that the thrust of the parties' briefs concerns which substantive law of the aforementioned states will apply to this issue, the Court must first conduct a choice of law analysis. Original jurisdiction for this matter is vested in this Court based upon diversity of citizenship of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "It is well established that a district court in a diversity action will apply the choice of law rules of the forum state in determining which state's law will be applied to the substantive issues before it." Shuder v. McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir.1988)(citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477, 1480 (1941)). Pennsylvania abandoned the lex loci delicti rule for evaluating conflicts of law many years ago and since then has followed a hybrid analysis for choice of law issues combining the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws approach and an "interest analysis." See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 21-22, 203 A.2d 796, 805-806 (1964) and Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir.1991). As stated in Myers v. Commercial Union Assurance Companies, 506 Pa. 492, 485 A.2d 1113, 1115-1116 (1984) and as recognized in Carrick v. Zurich-American Insurance Group, 14 F.3d 907, 909-910 (3d Cir.1994), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has summarized its choice of law analysis as follows:
This Court in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., held that in resolving a potential conflict between the application of state laws we must consider the policies and interest underlying the particular issue before the court. Id. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805. As further explained in McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966), we must analyze the: extent to which one state rather than another has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of its rule of law. Id. at 94, 215 A.2d at 682. Furthermore, in evaluating the interests of one jurisdiction over another, we must view the factors qualitatively as opposed to quantitatively, Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
However, before the Court begins an analysis of a true conflict of laws, the Court must confirm that a true conflict of laws presents itself in the case sub judice. The Court must first evaluate the interests underlying "the policies of all interested states" in oilier to "characterize the case as a true-conflict, false conflict, or unprovided-for case." Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Id. (citations omitted). A review of the policies behind the state laws at issue in the case sub judice establish that this matter is in fact a false conflict, not a true conflict. Compare Cipolla (true conflict) and McSwain (false conflict), infra.1
A false conflict is presented where an analysis of the policies or interests serving as the bases for the competing state laws results in a conclusion that the application of one state's law would not further the interests or policies of the other state's competing law and, additionally application of the other state's competing law would not adversely affect the interests or policies of the first state's law. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Company, et al., 932 F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir.1991)(citing Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 623-624, 222 A.2d 897, 899-900 (1966) and Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 565, 267 A.2d 854, 855 (1970)) See also McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 91-97, 215 A.2d 677, 680-683 (1966). This concept can be more easily understood through use of an example. For instance, in the false conflict situation in McSwain, a vehicular accident occurred in Colorado where an infant died and the wife/mother sued the husband/father (all Pennsylvania domiciliaries) on behalf of the deceased infant. In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Pennsylvania law to bar the suit as Pennsylvania law prevented intraspousal suits, a bar established to further the state interest of prevention of "friction between spouses." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the applicable Colorado law did not further this interest protected by the immunity and that Pennsylvania's interest in applying this bar to a suit involving Pennsylvania domiciliaries was a sufficient basis upon which not to apply Colorado law; the Court also recognized that Colorado's interests in deterring negligent acts and ensuring payment to a local creditor for any services rendered because of the motor vehicle accident would not be affected adversely by the application of the Pennsylvania law barring the suit.2 McSwain at 94-97, 215 A.2d at 682-683.
In comparison, in the true conflict situation, Cipolla addressed the situation where a Delaware driver, operating a Delaware registered vehicle, was transporting a Pennsylvania passenger home when a collision occurred in Delaware; Delaware's law prohibited tort recovery under a guest statute while Pennsylvania permitted recovery by injured guest passengers. Cipolla at 564-565, 267 A.2d at 855. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a true conflict existed because the state laws were in direct conflict with each other in that Pennsylvania had a "plaintiff-protecting rule" and Delaware had a "defendant-protecting rule." Cipolla at 565, 267 A.2d at 855-856.
To put it in other words, in a false conflict, only one state is a "concerned jurisdiction" that is, the state is "truly concerned with the result." Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 624, 222...
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