Wessels v. Garden Way, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 246518.
• Citation: 689 N.W.2d 526,263 Mich. App. 642
• Parties: Frederick WESSELS and Lucinda Osborne, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. GARDEN WAY, INC., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

689 N.W.2d 526

263 Mich. App. 642

Frederick WESSELS and Lucinda Osborne, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. GARDEN WAY, INC., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Docket No. 246518.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted August 4, 2004, at Lansing.

Decided September 28, 2004, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication November 10, 2004.

Green, Green & Adams, P.C. (by Christine A. Green), Ann Arbor, and Mara E. Kent, Lansing, for the plaintiffs.

Vandeveer Garzia, P.C. (by Hal O. Carroll), Troy, for the defendant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and MARKEY and O'CONNELL, JJ.

MURRAY, P.J.

In this product liability action, defendant appeals the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Frederick Wessels on his product liability claim and plaintiff Lucinda Osborne on her loss of consortium claim. In its appeal, defendant argues that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages awarded in product liability cases applies to both of the plaintiffs' claims collectively, rather than each separately as the trial court ruled. In plaintiffs' cross-appeal, they argue that the cap on noneconomic damages is unconstitutional. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the judgment should have reflected the cap amount adjusted on the date the judgment was entered, as opposed to the day the jury rendered its verdict.

We hold that plaintiffs have not established that the statute violates any of their asserted constitutional rights, that plaintiff Osborne's loss of consortium claim is subject to the same cap as plaintiff Wessels's, and that the verdict is subject to the cap value at the time judgment is entered. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Facts And Procedural History

On July 19, 2001, the jury returned verdicts in favor of both plaintiffs. In posttrial proceedings, the trial court set forth the amounts awarded by the jury:

The above-entitled cause is a product liability action and loss of consortium claim. The case was tried by jury during the week of July 16, 2001, and resulted in a jury verdict on July 19, 2001, in favor of the plaintiffs. The jury returned the following verdict: $50,000.00 for Plaintiff Fredrick Wessels for medical expenses to date; $400,000.00 for Frederick Wessels for non-economic damages to date; $30,000.00 per year for years 2001 through and including the year 2030 for non-economic damages for plaintiff Frederick Wessels; $150,000.00 awarded to plaintiff Lucinda Osborne for non-economic damages to date; and $10,000.00 per year for the years 2001 through and including the year 2030 for non-economic damages for plaintiff Lucinda Osborne ($300,000.00 total). Additionally, the jury found that the amount of fault attributable to plaintiff Frederick Wessels was 45%, and therefore pursuant to MCL 600.6303(3), all amounts awarded by the jury verdict are to be reduced by 45%.... The non-economic damages awarded must also be reduced to the amount of limitation on non-economic damages as set forth by MCL 600.2946(a)[sic, 600.2946a].

The validity of the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs is not challenged on appeal, and consequently we need not discuss the facts underlying the lawsuit. Instead, the parties have challenged three separate pretrial and posttrial rulings, each related to the cap on noneconomic damages contained in MCL 600.2946a. In particular, during pretrial proceedings, the trial court rejected plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the cap on noneconomic damages contained in MCL 600.2946a. Regarding the reduction of damages pursuant to the cap, the court ruled that the amount of the cap would be determined by what it was on the date the verdict was rendered (July 19, 2001), as opposed to when judgment was entered on the verdict (January 15, 2003). Additionally, the court held that the cap on noneconomic damages applied separately to each plaintiff's claim. From these decisions, the parties have appealed.

II. Analysis

A. Constitutional Issues

We first address one of the issues raised in plaintiffs' cross-appeal: whether the cap on noneconomic damages violates several provisions of the Michigan and United States constitutions. Decisions regarding the constitutionality of a statute, presenting purely legal issues, are reviewed de novo. Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 464 Mich. 1, 5, 626 N.W.2d 163 (2001). The trial court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to the constitutionality of the statute, as do we.

Plaintiffs' argument is that the cap violates their rights to a jury trial, to the equal protection of the law, is violative of the separation of powers, and is illegal special legislation. Recognizing that our Court recently rejected these same arguments regarding this exact statute in Kenkel v. Stanley Works, 256 Mich.App. 548, 665 N.W.2d 490 (2003), plaintiffs ask us to invoke the conflict resolution provisions of MCR 7.215(J)(2). We decline to do so for several reasons. First, we agree with the reasoning and result in Kenkel. Second, our Supreme Court has recently upheld caps on noneconomic damages against similar constitutional challenges, Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 470 Mich. 415, 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004), as did our Court in addressing similar constitutional challenges to the caps under the medical malpractice statute, Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 254 Mich.App. 50, 657 N.W.2d 721 (2002). It is therefore abundantly clear that the cap set forth in MCL 600.2946a(1) does not violate plaintiffs' right to a jury trial, to the equal protection of the law, does not violate the separation of powers, and does not constitute illegal special legislation. See Jenkins v. Patel (On Remand), 263 Mich.App 508, 688 N.W.2d 543 (2004), in which our Court, on the basis of the precedent of Zdrojewski and Phillips, rejected the arguments that MCL 600.1483 violated the right to a jury trial, the separation of powers, and equal protection guarantees. As such, and for the reasons set forth in Kenkel and Phillips, we reject plaintiffs' argument to the contrary.

We now turn to two interesting issues of statutory construction, both of which appear to be issues of first impression.

B. Statutory Issues

In reviewing the following issues involving the application and meaning of statutes, we must first examine the words actually contained in each statute, for "[t]hat language is the best indicator of the Legislature's intent." Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109, 129, 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004). Grossman v. Brown, 470 Mich. 593, 598, 685 N.W.2d 198 (2004), recently reiterated how this Court is to read statutory language:

Statutory language is read according to its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. If the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we assume the Legislature intended its plain meaning; therefore, we enforce the statute as written and follow the plain meaning of the statutory language. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135-136, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996).

1. Are Plaintiff Osborne's Damages Subject To A Separate Cap?

Defendant argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that under the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 600.2946a(1) and MCL 600.2945(f), the cap applies to the combined noneconomic damages awarded to both plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, successfully argued to the trial court that each plaintiff's noneconomic damage award was subject to a separate cap. In agreeing with plaintiffs on this point, the trial court held that, because plaintiff Osborne's loss of consortium claim was a distinct cause of action and because the Legislature did not utilize the same specific language in this statute as it did under the medical-malpractice cap statute, her award was subject to its own cap under the statute:

Lickfeldt v. Dept. of Corrections, 247 Mich.App. 299, 636 N.W.2d 272 (2001)[,] indicates that where the Legislature deliberately chooses to use different phraseology, it is presumed that it intends a different result. The Court is satisfied that the wording of the statute which indicates that the cap applies to "an action for product liability" applies to each separate action and that in this case the consortium claim is a separate and distinct cause of action which is entitled to its own separate cap. The Court therefore finds that each Plaintiff is entitled to have a separate cap applied to the non-economic damages awarded thereto by the jury and that the amounts awarded should not be combined and one cap applied.

As is evident from the above, the trial court's decision was premised on two factors: (1) that a loss of consortium claim is a separate cause of action and (2) that the cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice claims, MCL 600.1483(1), was more precise in limiting the cap to all plaintiffs' claims than was the statute at issue, thus evidencing legislative intent not to have a single cap for the total noneconomic damages awarded in a product liability case.

There is no doubt that loss of consortium is a separate cause of action, for that has been the law in Michigan since at least 1960. See, e.g., Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 431 Mich. 26, 30, 427 N.W.2d 488 (1988) ("loss of consortium is a separate cause of action"); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 49, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Berryman v. K Mart Corp., 193 Mich.App. 88, 94-95, 483 N.W.2d 642 (1992); Milnikel v. Mercy-Mem Med. Ctr., Inc., 183 Mich.App. 221, 223, 454 N.W.2d 132 (1989) ("Michigan has long recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium in favor of spouses."). As the Berryman Court stated, however, "[a] claim of loss of consortium is derivative and recovery is contingent upon the injured spouse's recovery of damages for the injury." Berryman, supra at 94, 483 N.W.2d 642. But concluding that there exists a separate cause of action for the derivative claim of loss of consortium does not answer the question presented, for the language of the statutes determine how the cap is to be applied. We, therefore, turn to MCL...