West Lewinsville Heights Citizens v. Bd. of Sup'Rs, 042274.

• Decision Date: 16 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 042274.,No. 042326.,042274.,042326.
• Citation: 618 S.E.2d 311
• Parties: WEST LEWINSVILLE HEIGHTS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, et al. v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, et al. Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 311

618 S.E.2d 311

WEST LEWINSVILLE HEIGHTS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, et al. v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, et al.

Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, et al.

No. 042274.

No. 042326.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

September 16, 2005.

William A. Marr, Jr. (Jeffrey S. Danzig, Washington, on briefs), for appellants in No. 042274.

Brian M. McCormack (Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson, Fairfax, on briefs), for appellant in No. 042326.

Jan L. Brodie, Senior Asst. County Atty. (David P. Bobzien, County Atty.; J. Patrick Taves, Deputy County Atty.; R. Scott Wynn, Senior Asst. County Atty., on brief), for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

KEENAN, Justice.

These appeals present two major issues. The first issue, which is procedural in nature, is whether a petition for a writ of certiorari from a decision of a board of zoning appeals was timely when it was filed within 30 days after a letter sent from the board's clerk stating the board's final decision. The second issue, involving the merits of the case, is whether a zoning ordinance permitted a county park authority to allow a private institution regular use of a field in a public park without altering the park's public use classification.

Lewinsville Park (the Park) is a public park of about 38 acres located in a residential zoning district (the R-3 district) in Fairfax County. The Park is owned and operated by the Fairfax County Park Authority (the Park Authority) and provides a variety of recreational facilities. Included among these facilities is a lighted rectangular field, known as Field # 2.

The Park currently is classified as a "public use." In the R-3 district in which the Park is located, "public uses" are permitted by right. See Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance) § 3-302. Certain other uses, such as "[c]olleges [or] universities," and "[s]ports arenas [or] stadiums," are permitted in an R-3 district only by special exception. Zoning Ordinance § 9-301.

In January 2003, the Park Authority entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (the Agreement) with McLean Youth Soccer, Inc. (MYS), a private, non-profit organization that operates several youth soccer leagues in Fairfax County. Under the Agreement, MYS agreed to finance and install a synthetic turf playing surface and other related improvements to Field # 2, at a cost not to exceed $800,000. In exchange, the Park Authority agreed to allocate to MYS approximately 3,187 hours per year of reserved playing time on Field # 2. The Agreement had an initial term of five years, with an automatic renewal provision for an additional five-year term.

In the Agreement, the Park Authority also authorized MYS to assign to Marymount University (Marymount), a private institution located in neighboring Arlington County, the right to use Field # 2 for up to 300 hours of MYS's total yearly allocation. Marymount, in turn, was required to contribute up to one half the cost of the purchase and installation of the synthetic turf. Marymount uses the improved Field # 2 for intercollegiate soccer and lacrosse matches and practices. During the hours not allocated to MYS or Marymount, Field # 2 is available for advance reservation or "walk on" use by the general public.

In April 2003, the West Lewinsville Heights Citizens Association, and several nearby property owners (collectively, the residents), sent a letter by counsel to Jane W. Gwinn, Fairfax County Zoning Administrator (the Zoning Administrator), requesting a written opinion whether Marymount's proposed use of the Park required a special use permit or special exception under the Zoning Ordinance. The Zoning Administrator issued a decision stating that Marymount did not need a special use permit or special exception for the activities Marymount is allowed to conduct under the Agreement.

In May 2003, the residents appealed the Zoning Administrator's decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County (the BZA). The residents argued that Marymount's proposed use of Field # 2 would transform it into a "college athletic facility," which would require a special exception under the Zoning Ordinance.

After a public hearing on September 16, 2003, the BZA unanimously voted to overturn the Zoning Administrator's decision. The BZA concluded that Marymount's use of the Park was not "exclusively for public purposes" and required a special exception for a college or university facility under Zoning Ordinance § 9-301(1).

On September 24, 2003, Kathleen A. Knoth, Deputy Clerk of the BZA, stated in a letter to counsel for the residents:

At its September 16, 2003 meeting, the Board of Zoning Appeals took action to OVERTURN the determination of the Zoning Administrator for the above-referenced appeal application. The final decision date is September 24, 2003.

On October 24, 2003, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, the Park Authority, and William E. Shoup, Gwinn's successor as Zoning Administrator (collectively, the County), filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court seeking review of the BZA's decision. The County alleged that the BZA was plainly wrong and applied erroneous principles of law in overturning the Zoning Administrator's determination. The County asserted that the Park continues to be used "exclusively for public purposes" under the Agreement because the Park Authority continues to "own, operate, and regulate all of the activities of the public" at the Park.

The residents and the BZA opposed the County's petition for a writ of certiorari. The BZA also filed a plea in bar, arguing that the County's appeal should be dismissed because it was not filed within 30 days of the BZA's "final decision," as required by Code § 15.2-2314. The BZA argued that the "final decision," within the meaning of the statute, was the BZA's unanimous vote on September 16, 2003, overturning the Zoning Administrator's decision. The BZA argued that, therefore, the County's petition was filed eight days after expiration of the 30-day appeal period fixed by Code § 15.2-2314.

The circuit court denied the BZA's plea in bar, granted the County's petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed the BZA's decision. The court concluded that the BZA's decision became final on September 24, 2003, as stated in Knoth's letter to counsel and pursuant to the BZA's by-laws. Thus, the court concluded that the County filed its petition within the 30-day time limit required by Code § 15.2-2314.

The circuit court further held that the BZA was plainly wrong and applied erroneous principles of law in concluding that Marymount's use of Field # 2 changed the nature of the Park's public use and required a special exception under the Zoning Ordinance. The residents and the BZA (the residents) appeal from the circuit court's judgment.

The residents argue that the circuit court erred in denying the BZA's plea in bar, because the County's petition for a writ of certiorari was filed more than 30 days after the meeting at which the BZA voted to overturn the Zoning Administrator's decision. The residents assert that the BZA's vote was the "final decision" for purposes of the 30-day appeal period set forth in Code § 15.2-2314, because the statute no longer requires the BZA to "file" its decision with the office of the board before the BZA's decision becomes final.

In response, the County argues that the circuit court correctly held that the County's petition was timely filed, because Code § 15.2-2314 does not specify when a decision of a board of zoning appeals becomes final but only states that the 30-day appeal period begins to run from the date of the final decision. The County contends that the BZA may determine for itself when its decisions become final, and that the BZA has done so by enacting Article VII, paragraph 8, of its by-laws. The County asserts that its position is supported by the action of the BZA's own deputy clerk, who stated in writing to the parties that "[t]he final decision date is September 24, 2003," rather than the date of the BZA vote on September 16, 2003. We disagree with the County's arguments.

Established principles govern our interpretation of the statutory, ordinance, and by-law provisions relevant to this issue. These principles also direct the order of priority to be given the provisions of the different enacting bodies.

We employ the plain and natural meaning of the words contained in the enactments before us. Capelle v. Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005); Lee County v. Town of St. Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348, 568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002); Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Rockingham County, 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996). However, when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the General Assembly, in amending a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law. Virginia-American Water Co. v. Prince William County Serv. Auth., 246 Va. 509, 517, 436 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (1993); Dale v. City of Newport News, 243 Va. 48, 51, 412 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1992). Further, we assume that the General Assembly's amendments to a statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary. AAA Disposal Servs. v. Eckert, 267 Va. 442, 446, 593 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2004); Virginia-American Water Co., 246 Va. at 517, 436 S.E.2d at 623; Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985).

County and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the Commonwealth. Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55, 63, 540 S.E.2d 869,...