West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 03 August 1961
• Citation: 364 P.2d 295,15 Cal.Rptr. 119,56 Cal.2d 407
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 364 P.2d 295 WEST PICO FURNITURE COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Callfornia IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Pacific Finance Loans, Real Party In Interest. L. A. 26171.

Page 119

15 Cal.Rptr. 119

56 Cal.2d 407, 364 P.2d 295

WEST PICO FURNITURE COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Callfornia IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Pacific Finance Loans, Real Party In Interest.

L. A. 26171.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 3, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1961.

Ralph H. Winkler, Ellis J. Horivitz, Los Angeles, and Ted T. Ward, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton and Frank Simpson, III, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

PETERS, Justice.

This is a proceeding in mandate seeking to compel respondent court to set aside its order sustaining objections to certain interrogatories propounded by petitioner to Pacific Finance Loans, the real party in interest (hereafter referred to as 'Pacific'). The order was made in a pending action brought by petitioner against Pacific alleging that certain transactions between the parties in the form of sales were in reality loans to petitioner at usurious rates of interest. Pacific denied and cross-complained, alleging that, by reason of default by the vendees on a large number of conditional sales contracts purchased by it from petitioner, a substantial sum of money was owed to it. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging a violation by Pacific of the Personal Property Brokers Law (Fin.Code, § 22000 et seq.). Pacific answered some of the interrogtories, and filed objections to the balance. On the hearing, the respondent court overruled a portion of the objections and sustained the objections to interrogatories 4, 6a through 6g, inclusive, 6j, 6k, and 7. The portion of the order sustaining the objections is here under attack. Before considering petitioner's attack on the order, consideration should first be given to certain arguments advanced by Pacific in support of the order.

Pacific first contends that, when an order made under the provisions of section 2030 of the Code of Civil Procedure comes before an appellate court for review, the party who filed and relied on objections in the trial court may urge new and additional objections not urged below. ¹ This contention is based on the general rule that an order or judgment of a trial court will be sustained, without regard to the reasons given by that court, if adequate grounds existed for the making of that order or judgment. This is undoubtedly sound law. But to invoke that rule the grounds relied on must have existed at the time the order was made in the trial court. This condition precedent does not here exist. This is so because section 2030 provides that a party upon whom interrogatories have been served must serve and file answers under oath within 15 days after service unless he has, within 10 days after such service, filed written objections thereto together with a notice of hearing. ^1a There is no provision for the subsequent filing of onbjections. When Pacific filed its objections and noticed the same for hearing, and 10 days from the date of original service had elapsed, it could not, in the absence of a showing of good cause for relief from default, file further objections. It follows that the only grounds that existed at the time the trial court made its order, and on which it could then predicate the same, were the grounds stated in Pacific's objections as originally filed. This court may not consider the objections to the several interrogatories which Pacific has raised for the first time in this proceeding. ²

The second general contention made by Pacific is that petitioner has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion, and therefore is not entitled to relief. Undoubtedly, as pointed out in the Greyhound case, supra, the trial court has considerable discretion in matters pertaining to discovery. It is equally true that such discretion will not be set aside in the absence of abuse. The proper rule was stated in Ryan v. Superior Court, 186 Cal.App.2d 813, 9 Cal.Rptr. 147, 150, as follows:

'One of the prime purposes of the Discovery Act is to expedite the trial of the action. This purpose will be defeated if appellate courts entertain petitions for prerogative writs by which a review of the orders of trial courts in discovery proceedings are sought and which do not clearly demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court where discovery is denied, or a violation of privilege or of the provisions of section 19 of article I of the Constitution of this state where discovery is granted. This court will hereafter refuse to entertain petitions for prerogative writs in discovery matters which do not allege facts which would entitle the petitioner to the relief sought under the principles we have set forth.'

This quoted language does not require a petitioner seeking to show an abuse of discretion to allege specifically that the trial court has committed such abuse. It is sufficient to allege, as pointed out in the last sentence of the quotation from the Ryan case, supra, the facts that show such abuse. In issuing the alternative writ this court indicated its belief that petitioner had alleged sufficient facts to show, prima facie, an abuse of discretion. Later in this opinion there will be considered the question as to whether, in view of the entire record, including Pacific's answer to this petition, an abuse of discretion has been shown.

Pacific next contends that the petitioner failed to file its petition for hearing in this court ³ within the time provided by the Rules on Appeal, in that such petition was not filed within 10 days of the denial, without opinion, as required by Rule 28(b). This contention was impliedly rejected at the time this court granted the hearing, and properly so. The tenth day after such denial was a Sunday, a legal holiday. Section 12a of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in such event the time is extended to the next day. The petition was filed on such next day, and was, therefore, filed in time.

We pass now to a consideration of the specific interrogatories to which objections were made and sustained by the trial court.

Interrogatory No. 4 requests the names and addresses of all employees who participated in the various transactions between the parties, together with the duties performed by each, and the period of time during which each such employee participated. Read against the pleadings, the transactions referred to in this interrogatory are the transactions to which the parties have referred in their respective pleadings. Pacific objected to this interrogatory on the several grounds that: (a) it is burdensome and oppressive, both in regard to the names of the employees and to the periods during which they participated; (b) it is irrelevant to the issues of the case; and (c) it calls for the opinions and conclusions of the answering party, both as to the duties of the employees and as to the periods of time during which each participated.

It is apparent that the information requested in this interrogatory is 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' (Subd. (b) of § 2016.) From a list of the names of Pacific's employees who handled the transactions, together with some indication of dates and duties, petitioner will be placed in a position so that it can select one or more such employees for the purpose of taking depositions, Frequently in discovery cases it is argued, with some merit, in the appellate courts that the party seeking information in his adversary's possession should not make such a request until he has learned, by deposition, sufficient facts so that he can properly identify the information desired. But as a necessary corollary it must follow that such a party must not be prevented from first seeking (through an otherwise proper vehicle of discovery) sufficient information to enable him to take depositions. Moreover, other grounds of relevancy to the subject matter of the action are readily apparent.

Pacific's claim that the interrogatory is not relevant to the 'issues' has been disposed of in the Greyhound case, supra, and is without merit.

Pacific's contention that the interrogatory calls for its opinions and conclusions is unsound. Obviously the names and duties of one's own employees, and the dates on which they performed specific duties, is not a matter of opinion. Possibly Pacific means that it maintains no specific records from which it may readily obtain such names, and that as a consequence it does not have readily available this source of information, but, if so, such contention goes to the question of burden and oppression. Moreover, even if it be conceded that the question does call for an opinion and conclusion, that fact, of itself, is not a proper objection to an interrogatory. Such objection may be proper when the answer is intended to have probative value, but it may not be utilized on discovery as a means of preventing a party from obtaining information that will lead him to probative facts (Greyhound Corporation v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266.)).

The last objection of Pacific to interrogatory No. 4 is that it is burdensome and oppressive. In support of that objection Pacific filed, in the trial court, the declaration of the manager of its commercial operations and administration department, alleging that the information requested could only be obtained by a search of the records of 78 of its branch offices. Other specific requirements were also set forth, but no estimate was made of the total man hours required to accomplish the task. Certainly that declaration indicated some burden would be imposed on Pacific to answer the interrogatory, but the extent thereof was not specifically set forth. But the declaration did not indicate any evidence of oppression. Oppression must not be equated with burden. The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required,...