West v. Director of Revenue, State

Citation297 S.W.3d 648
Decision Date17 November 2009
Docket NumberNo. SD 29490.,SD 29490.
PartiesBradley Dewayne WEST, Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Richard A. Skouby, St. James, MO, for Respondent.

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Judge.

The Director of Revenue ("Appellant") revoked the driver's license of Bradley Dewayne West ("Respondent") for one year after he refused to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section 577.0411 to determine his blood alcohol content following a motor vehicle accident. Finding "all issues in favor of [Respondent]," the trial court determined that "[Respondent] was medically unable to make a decision under Section 577.041," and reversed the revocation of Respondent's license. Appellant claims on appeal that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, was against the weight of the evidence, and misapplied the law.2 We reverse.

At approximately 10:34 p.m., on January 25, 2008, Corporal Steven Childers of the Missouri State Highway Patrol ("the patrolman") responded to a report of a single-vehicle accident on a county road in Phelps County. When he arrived on the scene, he found Respondent's truck badly damaged and sitting in a ditch, with Respondent receiving treatment from emergency medical personnel. The patrolman questioned four people at the scene who had driven by shortly after the accident, but had not witnessed it. According to one of the individuals, upon their arrival, the four found Respondent sitting in a ditch. The four individuals also informed the patrolman that Respondent smelled of alcohol and had told them that he had not been driving at the time of the accident. An emergency medical technician later informed the patrolman that Respondent told him "Dave" had been driving. Upon inspection of the interior of the truck and surrounding areas, the patrolman and other emergency responders were unable to locate anyone else at the scene.

Once Respondent left the scene in an ambulance, the patrolman conducted a more thorough inspection of the truck; he found blood on the outside passenger-side door handle, the passenger window shattered but held in place by window tint film, the entire front windshield shattered, the steering wheel "pushed completely against the rear of the driver's seat," "no blood inside the truck at all," the contents of the cab strewn about, and an open beer bottle "contained a small amount of liquid and it was cold to [the] touch." Following his inspection, the patrolman went to Phelps County Regional Medical Center ("the hospital"), where Respondent was taken for treatment.

Upon his arrival at the hospital, the patrolman encountered Joy West, the wife of Respondent, in the emergency room waiting area. He asked Mrs. West if she knew "Dave" and she responded that she knew a "Dave" but did not know his last name. When the patrolman asked her how she knew "Dave," she replied that she had gone to grade school with him. The patrolman informed Mrs. West that he "was having difficulty with the story," and she "became upset and stated, `I'm not lying!'" The patrolman went on to explain that if "David" was driving, he may himself be injured and require medical attention. Mrs. West did not respond to that statement and the patrolman left the waiting room. The patrolman could not investigate the existence of "Dave" because no one would provide any further information.

When the patrolman entered treatment room four at 12:49 a.m. on January 26, 2008, where Respondent was awaiting transfer to University Medical Center in Columbia, Missouri, he detected a strong odor of intoxicants emanating from Respondent. While in the room with Respondent, the patrolman observed that Respondent's face and hands were covered in dried blood, his right eye was bandaged, his left eye was "bloodshot and glassy," and that Respondent spoke in a slurred, mumbling manner. The patrolman asked Respondent what happened during the accident, and Respondent said he did not remember. When asked who was operating the truck at the time of the accident, Respondent replied, "I don't remember who was driving." In response to further questioning, Respondent stated that he had not been ejected from the truck, and that he did not remember how he got out, only that he did.

The patrolman then informed Respondent that he had reason to believe that Respondent had been operating the truck during the accident and asked him to submit to a series of field sobriety tests. Respondent refused. At that time, the patrolman placed Respondent under arrest for driving while intoxicated based on his observations and the circumstances surrounding the accident. Following the arrest, the patrolman advised Respondent of the Missouri implied consent law pursuant to section 577.020 and requested that he submit to a blood test. Respondent replied, "no." The patrolman then read Respondent his Miranda3 rights and Respondent stated that he understood his legal rights. The patrolman then asked Respondent a series of questions from the Alcohol Influence Report (A.I.R.) form.

According to the A.I.R., during the interview Respondent answered questions regarding his occupation, when he last worked and when he last slept, and admitted drinking "probably six" beers between 6:00 and 8:00 the evening of the accident. When asked if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages since the accident, Respondent answered, "I've been here." The patrolman ended the questioning when he asked Respondent if he was under the influence of alcohol and Respondent replied, "I'm done answering questions." After the interview, Respondent was transported to University Medical Center for further treatment.

That same day, Appellant issued Respondent a notice that his driver's license would be revoked for one year. Respondent availed himself of the right to have the revocation reviewed in the circuit court pursuant to section 577.041. At the review hearing, Appellant relied on the testimony of the patrolman and offered a certified copy of the Notice of Revocation and the A.I.R. as evidence. Respondent did not offer any rebuttal evidence or testimony, but was granted leave to file medical records with the court at a later time. The patrolman's testimony set forth the facts as stated above and Respondent later filed medical records with the court. After reviewing the records, the court found all issues in favor of Respondent, determined he had been medically unable to refuse to submit to testing, and ordered Appellant to reinstate Respondent's driver's license.

At a revocation hearing, the court below determines three issues: (1) whether the person was stopped or arrested (2) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated state; and (3) whether the person refused to submit to a chemical test. Hinnah v. Director of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing Section 577.041.4). This Court will overturn the judgment of the court below if there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or the court erroneously declared or applied the law. Id. There is no requirement that a refusal be knowing; where there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that a person did not objectively refuse to take a test, a trial court's finding to the contrary is unsupported by substantial evidence and must be reversed. Fick v. Director of Revenue, 240 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Mo. banc 2007).

Here, the court resolved all issues in favor of Respondent. The fact that Respondent was arrested was uncontested, so we turn to the issue of whether the record supports a finding that the patrolman lacked reasonable grounds to believe Respondent was driving while intoxicated. The relevant inquiry is not whether Respondent was actually driving, but whether the patrolman had reasonable grounds to believe he was doing so in an intoxicated condition. Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 621-22. "`Reasonable grounds is virtually synonymous with probable cause.'" Id. at 620 (quoting Hawkins v. Director of Revenue, 7 S.W.3d 549, 551 (Mo.App.E.D.1999)). Probable cause exists where an officer's knowledge of the facts and circumstances is sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe a suspect has committed an offense. Guhr v. Director of Revenue, 228 S.W.3d 581, 585 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2007).

The record demonstrates that the patrolman had ample reason to believe Respondent was driving while intoxicated. The patrolman arrived on the scene of a single-vehicle accident and found Respondent to be the only one receiving treatment. Upon further search of the surrounding area, the patrolman and other emergency responders were unable to locate anyone else whom may have been involved. Upon inspection of the truck, the patrolman found blood on the outside of the passenger-side door handle, but no blood in the passenger compartment, and the passenger-side window shattered but intact. In addition, the steering wheel was pressed against the back of the driver's seat. This information led the patrolman to believe that the driver must have been ejected from the vehicle, and being unable to find any other accident victims, that Respondent must have been driving. Respondent's wife did not provide any helpful information that might be used to locate the supposed driver, which also gave the patrolman reason to believe Respondent had been driving. While the record contains testimony from the patrolman and information in the patrolman's report that no one witnessed Respondent driving and that Respondent claimed someone else had been driving at the time of the accident, that evidence does not refute the patrolman's probable cause to believe otherwise.

The patrolman also had probable cause to believe that Respondent was intoxicated while driving....

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4 cases
  • Warren v. Dir. Revenue
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 11, 2013
    ...presumption of validity of the Director's uncontroverted evidence, which was rejected in White, 321 S.W.3d at 307.West v. Dir. of Revenue, 297 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo.App.2009); Ethetton v. Dir. of Revenue, 182 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App.2006); Swanberg v. Dir. of Revenue, 122 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Mo.Ap......
  • Downs v. Dir. of Revenue
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 2, 2011
    ...and FRANCIS, J. Concur. 1. Respondent did not submit a brief in this appeal, nor was he required to do so. West v. Dir. of Revenue, 297 S.W.3d 648, 650 n. 2 (Mo.App. S.D.2009). “There is no penalty for a respondent failing to file a brief, however, this Court is forced to adjudicate the Dir......
  • Bieker v. Dir. of Revenue, SD 30466.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 14, 2011
    ...probable cause. White, 321 S.W.3d at 305 n. 6. 3. Bieker did not submit a brief, nor was he required to do so. West v. Dir. of Revenue, 297 S.W.3d 648, 650 n. 2 (Mo.App. S.D.2009). “There is no penalty for a respondent failing to file a brief, however, this Court is forced to adjudicate the......
  • Andrews v. City of Glendale, ED 93219.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 17, 2009
    ... ... CITY OF GLENDALE, Employer/Respondent, and ... Treasurer of the State of Missouri, as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent ... No ... ...

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