West v. Koehler
| Decision Date | 13 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. RDB-11-3051 |
| Parties | BRIAN G. WEST, Plaintiff, v. LEE N. KOEHLER, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Brian G. West, proceeding pro se, initially brought this action against Defendant Lee N. Koehler, individually and as the surviving director and trustee of Koehler & West, Chartered, a forfeited Maryland corporation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland on July 29, 2011. The Complaint alleges claims for breach of contract (Count I), promissory estoppel (Count II), quantum meruit (Count III) and failure to provide an accounting1 arising out of Plaintiff's allegation that he is entitled to payment for his representation of Defendant in a civil matter. Defendant later removed this action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.
parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (ECF No. 14) to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County is DENIED. Defendant Lee N. Koehler's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, specifically it is DENIED as to Counts II and III but GRANTED as to Plaintiff's accounting claim.
Plaintiff Brian G. West ("West" or "Plaintiff") is a resident of Baltimore County, Maryland. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ 2, ECF No. 2. At all times relevant to this case, Plaintiff was licensed to practice law in the State of Maryland until his disbarment by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in October of 2009. Id. at ¶ 2, 25. Defendant Lee N. Koehler ("Koehler" or "Defendant") is a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 3. He is licensed to practice in the State of Maryland and practices law from an office located at 409 Washington Avenue, Suite 625, Towson, Maryland 21204. Id.
In the Complaint, West alleges that West and Koehler's law partnership began in 1991 3 with the formation of Koehler & West, Chartered, a Maryland professional corporation ("K&W"). Id. at ¶ 4. According to West, both parties were to share the profits equally until the end of the partnership on July 31, 2008. Id. at 5. The State Department of Assessments & Taxation ("SDAT") records, however, reflect that Koehler & West,Chartered was placed in forfeiture status on October 2, 1997. Decl. of Brian G. West in Supp. of Mot. for Remand 6, Ex. 1, ECF No. 14-2.
West alleges that Koehler individually held interest in a number of business ventures, notably two hotel resorts and a private club. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ 7-9. West further alleges that these businesses failed causing the Bank of Bermuda and its affiliates to bring lawsuits against Koehler and his business associates for defaulting on their loans. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. At the same time and through 2010, West claims that Koehler brought actions against the Bank of Bermuda and his business associates concerning the failure of these businesses. Id. at ¶¶ 11-19. West also alleges that "throughout the process of the numerous legal actions brought by or against Koehler, Koehler utilized the resources, both monetary and staff, of K&W to cover the costs of the actions." Id. at ¶ 19.
Despite the forfeiture of K&W, West claims that he continued to assist and represent Koehler in these litigations. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶¶ 7-31. Specifically, West contends that "[c]ommencing in 1997, [he] actively assisted Koehler in the prosecution of the litigation matters . . ., acting as lead counsel on most of the cases, and presenting arguments before the various courts . . ." Id. at ¶ 23. West also claims that upon realizing the financial cost of these actions to West, Koehler and West elected to enter into an Agreement by which West would receive one third of "all sums received by Koehler on the various actions undertaken to satisfy the Maryland Judgment." Id. at ¶ 21. The term Maryland Judgment as used in the Complaint refers to the default judgment awarded to Koehler in 1992 against one of his business associates (Dodwell) in litigation in this Court captioned Koehler v. Dodwell, et al, WDQ-92-2982. Id. at ¶ 13. It is important to note that West is listed as Koehler's leadattorney on this case's docket.4 In 2004 and pursuant to the Agreement, Koehler paid West one third of the $475,000 judgment he obtained in garnishment proceedings against Dodwell. Id. at ¶ 22. Additionally, West alleges that even after being disbarred in October of 2009 and thereby ceasing to provide legal assistance to Koehler on these matters, he nevertheless continued to communicate with Koehler's new attorney and to provide the latter with copies of the filings to assist him in his representation of Koehler. Id. at ¶ 25-26.
In January 2011, West became aware that Koehler had dismissed all pending actions with the Bank of Bermuda. Id. at ¶ 27. As such, West assumed that Koehler would have collected on the judgments and sought to obtain his share as well as information concerning the reasons for the dismissal. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Koehler, however, allegedly refused to provide him with this information or any compensation for his efforts. Id. at 28. West, therefore, filed this breach of contract action against Koehler on October 25, 2011 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. Id. at 1, ¶¶ 32-40. West also asserts claims of promissory estoppel (Count II) and quantum meruit (Count III) and requests an accounting. Id. at 8-11. On the same day, Koehler immediately removed this action to this Court based on diversity of jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Now pending before this Court is Plaintiff West's Motion for Remand (ECF No. 14) alleging that K&W's status as a Maryland corporation defeats complete diversity. Also pending is Defendant Koehler's Motion for a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12) requesting that this Court dismiss Counts II and III of Plaintiff's Complaint.
Except as otherwise provided by law, a defendant may remove a state civil action to a federal court where the action is one "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2009). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal, and because of the "significant federalism concerns" implicated by divesting a state court of jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction is strictly construed. Mulcahy v. Columbia Organic Chemils Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). On a motion to remand, a court must "strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court." Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 700, 701-02 (D. Md. 1997) (citation omitted). "If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary." Mulcahy, 29 F.3d at 151; see also Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2004).
A defendant in a state civil action may remove the case to federal court only if the federal court can exercise original jurisdiction over at least one of the asserted claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(c) (2006). Federal courts have original jurisdiction over two kinds of civil actions—those which are founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and those where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different States. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(2006).
Federal courts are obliged to carefully scrutinize challenges to jurisdictional authority,and must "do more than simply point jurisdictional traffic in the direction of state courts." 17th Street Associates, LLP v. Markel Int'l Ins. Co. Ltd., 373 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (E. D. Va. 2005). The federal remand statute provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In other words, "a district court should be cautious in denying defendants access to a federal forum because remand orders are generally unreviewable." Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (D. Md. 1997); see also In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) (). "§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), . . . only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d)." Ritter v. Ritter, 396 Fed. Appx. 30, 32 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)). "A remand order based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, whether sua sponte or not, falls within the scope of § 1447(c), and is therefore not reviewable by a court of appeals." Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings any time after the pleadings are closed, as long it is early enough not to delay trial.5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The legal standard governing such a Motion is the same as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,243 (4th Cir. 1999); Booker v. Peterson Cos., 412 F. App'x 615, 616 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2011); Economides v. Gay, 155 F. Supp. 2d 485, 488 (D. Md. 2001). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, this Court assumes as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint, but does...
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