West v. West, No. 2002-IA-01158-SCT (MS 8/12/2004), 2002-IA-01158-SCT.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002-IA-01158-SCT.,2002-IA-01158-SCT. |
| Parties | DEBORAH GAYLE THORNTON WEST v. CHARLES TIMOTHY WEST. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: PATRICK F. McALLISTER, WILLIAM B. PEMBERTON, II.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES A. BECKER, JR., JOHN V. ESKRIGGE, EDWARD L. CARLISLE.
BEFORE WALLER, P.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.
¶1 This family law case concerns a property settlement agreement ("PSA") between former spouses. Many years after the PSA was approved by the court, it was found to be ambiguous and void. The wife sought an interlocutory appeal which this Court granted.
¶2 Charles Timothy West ("Tim") and Deborah Gayle Thornton West ("Debbie") were married on July 28, 1979. Three children were born during their marriage. Tim and Debbie were divorced in November 1994, after filing a Joint Complaint for Divorce that incorporated a property settlement agreement. Nine years after the divorce, Tim stopped paying what was due pursuant to the PSA. Debbie then filed a contempt proceeding. Tim argued that provisions in the PSA were ambiguous.1
Before ruling on the matter, the chancellor wrote to counsel informing them of his initial thoughts on the case. He stated:
1. The Property Settlement Agreement in this case can only be described as "An Invitation to Litigation." It is ambiguous and contradicts itself in certain respects.
2. Mrs. West's claims that she is entitled to alimony based upon K-1 filings where no actual cash distribution was received by Mr. West is ludicrous and will not be sustained by the Court.
3. As to division of "marital assets," the Agreement fails to define what they are. The term "marital assets" is now clearly defined by Ferguson and Hemsley and their progeny. Prior to those cases, Mississippi was a "title state."
4. Assuming that Mrs. West became vested with an equitable interest in 50% of Mr. West's ownership of stock or other interest in the family business as a marital asset, I question whether she could claim entitlement to a sum greater than the value of those interests as of the date of the agreement. Any enhanced value after the date of that agreement would not constitute a "marital asset."
5. Although the alimony provision of the agreement mentions business income, it goes on to specify salary or wages, bonus and director fees as the specific items to be included. As a general rule of contract construction, specific language controls and limits general language within a contract.
6. Although the Court has not yet seen the specific restrictions on transfer of Mr. West's stock in the family business, the Court is very familiar with those type restrictions. And if those restrictions are as broad as some I have prepared as a lawyer, Mrs. West will never realize anything out of that stock ownership unless those businesses are sold by consent of all the stockholders.
¶3 Following its letter to counsel, the chancery court entered its judgment, finding that the agreement was conflicting and confusing, that it was unable to resolve the differences, that there was no meeting of the minds between the Wests as to the alimony provision of the agreement, and that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the issue should be presented anew to the court. Tim filed a motion for amendment to judgment, to make additional findings, and for a new trial on certain issues. Debbie then filed a motion for entry of findings and conclusions, to alter or amend judgment, alternatively, for a new trial. Debbie then filed a motion for certification pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b), alternatively, for leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to M.R.A.P. 5. The chancery court issued an interlocutory order denying Debbie's Motion for Rule 54(b) certification, denied her motion for interlocutory appeal, and also denied Tim's motion for a new trial. We granted Debbie's petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order. See M.R.A.P. 5.
¶4 Our standard of review for all appeals involving domestic relations matters is limited. We will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was "manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Miss. 2001) (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 759 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Miss. 2000)).
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VOIDING THE ALIMONY AND DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS PROVISIONS OF THE PSA.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ALIMONY AND DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ASSETS PROVISIONS OF THE PSA ARE AMBIGUOUS, UNCONSCIONABLE AND CONTAIN ILLEGAL ESCALATION CLAUSES.
¶5 Debbie argues that the PSA is part of the judgment of the court. She contends that Tim's attempt to avoid the alimony and division of marital property provisions is an attempt to void the judgment that became final in 1994. She states that M.R.C.P. 60(b) allows a party to obtain relief from a judgment under some limited circumstances, but none of those circumstances are present in the case sub judice. Tim argues that there was a mistake in the drafting of the PSA and that Rule 60 does not apply to the present situation.
¶6 "[S]ettlement agreements entered into by divorcing spouses and judicially approved under our Irreconcilable Differences Divorce Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 93 5 2 (Supp.1990), become a part of the decree and enforceable as such as though entered by the court following contested proceedings." Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 844 (Miss. 1990). When the Irreconcilable Differences Divorce Act has been complied with, the custody, support, alimony and property settlement agreement becomes a part of the final decree for all intents and purposes. Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 845 (Miss. 1984). If the agreement is sufficient to comply with the statute, that is enough to render it a part of the final decree of divorce the same as if the decree including the same provisions as may be found in the property settlement agreement had been rendered by the chancery court following a contested divorce proceeding. Id. at 846. As a matter of law, a PSA that complies with the statute can never be a document extraneous to the final decree. Id. However, where ambiguities may be found in the agreement, it should be construed much as is done in the case of a contract, with the court seeking to gather the intent of the parties. Id. at 846.
¶7 Debbie argues that M.R.C.P. 60 does not allow Tim to challenge the chancery court's judgment nine years after it was entered. Tim argues that Rule 60 does not apply to the present case because it is not one of a motion for relief from judgment or order. He argues that he paid alimony based on the only specific clear language in the alimony provisions of the PSA, and that only after Debbie filed her complaint did the issue of the clarity of the PSA come into dispute. We find that Rule 60 is not applicable to the present case because the complaint was not a motion for relief from a judgment or order.
¶8 Both parties make numerous arguments about whether the agreement is ambiguous. Debbie argues that the parties agreed to divide equally Tim's business and employment income so that both parties would receive the same annual net income. Tim argues the PSA provisions are ambiguous. He offers as an example of the ambiguity the provision that, upon the divorce of the parties, the periodic alimony will change to lump sum installment alimony; yet the amount of the lump sum is not specified. He also argues that lump sum alimony is inconsistent with the inserted language that payments to the wife are to be apportioned.
¶9 In Mississippi there are four types of alimony: (1) periodic, (2) lump sum, (3) rehabilitative, and (4) reimbursement. Guy v. Guy, 736 So. 2d 1042, 1046 (Miss. 1999); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So. 2d 124, 130 (Miss. 1995); Smith v. Little, 834 So. 2d 54, 57 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Periodic alimony is monthly alimony awarded on the basis of need. See Cunningham v. Lanier, 589 So. 2d 133, 136-37 (Miss. 1991). It automatically terminates at the death of the payor spouse or the remarriage of the recipient spouse. McDonald v. McDonald, 683 So. 2d 929, 931 (Miss. 1996); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 766 So. 2d 123, 129 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Periodic alimony becomes vested when the payment becomes due. In re Estate of Hodges, 807 So. 2d 438, 442 (Miss. 2002). On the other hand, lump sum alimony is an irrevocable and fixed amount. Lump sum alimony is "not considered to be in the nature of continuing support, but rather a property transfer which is vested in the recipient spouse at the time said alimony is awarded." McDonald, 683 So. 2d at 931. "The fact that payments of lump sum alimony are often paid in installments may give said payments a superficial similarity to payments of periodic alimony, but said fact does not change the vested, non-modifiable nature thereof." Id. Lump sum alimony is "a final settlement between husband and wife, unaffected by the remarriage of the payee spouse." Cunningham v. Lanier, 589 So. 2d at 137. "It is fundamental that alimony which `substitutes' as a division of property is lump sum rather than periodic alimony, which by contrast is associated with maintenance and support of the former spouse." Id. at 136-37.
¶10 "[P]roperty settlement agreements are contractual obligations." In re Estate of Hodges, 807 So. 2d at 445 (citing Prine v. Prine, 723 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)). "The provisions contained within a `property settlement agreement executed prior to the dissolution of marriage, `purporting to resolve the parties' property rights, are `interpreted by the courts as any other contract.'" Id. at 445. As stated in East...
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