Western Baptist Home Mission Bd. v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 08 November 1967
• Citation: 248 Or. 204,433 P.2d 252
• Parties: The WESTERN BAPTIST HOME MISSION BOARD of the General Baptist Convention of the West, Incorporated, an Oregon corporation, Appellant, v. D. H. GRIGGS, individually, and D. H. Griggs, trustee, Evelyn B. Griggs, Respondents, The unknown heirs of Lucille Slaughter, individually, and the unknown heirs of Lucille Slaughter, trustees, the Antiock Baptist Church of Eugene, Oregon, an unincorporated association, John Doe Tenant, whose real and true name is unknown and also all other persons and parties unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in the real property described herein, Defendants.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 252

433 P.2d 252

248 Or. 204

The WESTERN BAPTIST HOME MISSION BOARD of the General Baptist Convention of the West, Incorporated, an Oregon corporation, Appellant, v. D. H. GRIGGS, individually, and D. H. Griggs, trustee Evelyn B. Griggs, Respondents The unknown heirs of Lucille Slaughter, individually, and the unknown heirs of Lucille Slaughter, trustees, the Antiock Baptist Church of Eugene, Oregon, an unincorporated association, John Doe Tenant, whose real and true name is unknown and also all other persons and parties unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in the real property described herein, Defendants.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 1967.

Decided Nov. 8, 1967.

Harold A. Lewis and Lewis B. Hampton, Beaverton, argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Myatt, Bolliger & Lewis, Beaverton.

Steve A. Tyler, Junction City, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.

Before PERRY, C.J., and SLOAN, GOODWIN, HOLMAN and WOODRICH, JJ.

WOODRICH, Justice Pro Tempore.

This is a suit to declare the defendant a trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, to terminate the alleged trust, to reform a deed and quiet title to certain real property located near Eugene, Oregon. Plaintiff appeals from a decree dismissing its suit. Prior litigation between the plaintiff and the defendant Griggs involving the ownership of the same real property had terminated in a decree in favor of the defendant Griggs. The principal question on appeal is the effect of the prior litigation on the instant case.

Plaintiff is a corporation formed to assist new Baptist churches in their efforts to acquire church property. It was the purpose and practice of plaintiff to take title to new church property until the new church (also called a mission church) was able to become self-supporting. When the mission church became self-supporting, it was plaintiff's practice to deed the church property to the mission church.

For some time defendant Griggs had been president of plaintiff and plaintiff's predecessor, an unincorporated association. After defendant Griggs was voted out of office and membership in the plaintiff, a dispute arose over the ownership of the church property in Eugene. The property in question had been purchased in 1952 on contract from Russell F. and Clara M. Yockey. The vendee named in the contract was 'Reverend D. H. Griggs, Pastor, General Baptist Convention of the West, Home Mission Board.' Except for the last instalment the purchase price was ultimately paid from Griggs' personal funds or funds solicited by Griggs. In March 1961 vendors Yockey executed and delivered a deed to plaintiff on the representation of plaintiff's agent that plaintiff was entitled to the deed. The deed named as grantee the 'Western Baptist Home Mission Board, and Oregon Corporation.' Approximately one month later Yockeys executed and delivered a second deed to the same property. This second deed named as grantee the defendant Griggs, 'Pastor, General Baptist Convention of the West, Home Mission Board.'

Litigation ensued in Lane county circuit court wherein the plaintiff in the instant case sued defendant Griggs and others seeking to be declared legal owner of the property by reason of the March 1961 deed from Yockeys to plaintiff, seeking to have defendants declared to have no estate in the property, and seeking that defendants be forever barred from asserting any claim adverse to plaintiff's claim. Defendant Griggs cross-complained in the first suit and sought to be declared the only true and lawful owner of the property, and further sought the cancellation of plaintiff's deed. This litigation will be referred to as the 'first suit.'

The first suit was terminated by a decree dated October 22, 1963, 'That the defendant, D. H. Griggs acquired fee simple title to * * *' the disputed property by the deed from Yockeys 'to Reverend D. H. Griggs, Pastor, General Baptist Convention of the West, Home Mission Board,' and 'That plaintiff has no interest in the above described real property except a lien created by this decree in the sum of * * * ($479.65) * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The problem in the instant case arises from the following additional facts. In January 1962 D. H. Griggs and wife executed and delivered a deed to the disputed property to 'General Baptist Convention, Home Mission Board, D. H. Griggs and Lucille Slaughter, trustees.' ¹ The decree in the first suit contained the following provision:

'III

'No determination is made of the effect of the deed from D. H. Griggs and Evelyn B. Griggs, husband and wife, to D. H. Griggs and Lucille Slaughter, trustees.'

Plaintiff in the instant suit claims ownership as the beneficiary of a trust. ² Plaintiff claims that the trust arises, among other things, out of the trust language in the January 1962 deed, contributions alleged to have been made by plaintiff toward the purchase price of the disputed property, and by the similarity to the name of the plaintiff of the named grantee in the deed from defendant Griggs dated January 26, 1962. Defendant contends that plaintiff's claim was adjudicated in the first suit.

The doctrine of res judicata applies when a subsequent action is brought by one party against another party to a prior suit. If the two cases involve the same 'claim, demand, or cause of action,' then the judgment in the first suit not only bars all matters actually determined, but also every other matter which might have been litigated and decided as incident to or essentially connected therewith either as a claim or a defense. Wagner v. Savage, as Adm'r, 195 Or. 128, 147, 244 P.2d 161 (1952); Jarvy v. Mowrey, 235 Or. 579, 385 P.2d 336 (1963). If the two cases involve different claims, demands, or causes of action, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel may apply. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the issue must have been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the first action before the judgment in the first suit operates as a bar. ORS 43.160; State of Oregon v. Dewey, 206 Or. 496, 504, 292 P.2d 799 (1956); Ira v. Columbia Food Co. et al., 226 Or. 566, 360 P.2d 622, 86 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1961).

Both res judicata and collateral estoppel require that the parties to both actions be the same. ³ However, an identical alignment of the parties is not required. ORS 43.150 provides that the parties are the same when those between whom the evidence is offered were adverse in the former case and a judgment could have been made between them alone, though other parties were joined. Thus, the deletion of a party or parties from the prior suit or the addition of parties to the second suit will not defeat the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See First Nat. Bank of Burns v. Buckland, 130 Or. 364, 280 P. 331 (1929); Neppach v. Jones, 28 Or. 286, 39 P. 999, 42 P. 519 (1895). Here, the only real controversy in both suits was between the plaintiff and the defendant Griggs. The identity of parties requirement is met in the instant case.

One test as to whether two suits are based on the same cause of action is whether the second action is based upon the same transaction and the evidence needed to sustain the second action would have sustained the first. See Restatement, Judgments § 61 (1942); Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purposes of the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 21 Or.L.Rev. 319 (1942). Here, the evidence necessary to sustain plaintiff's second suit would have proved legal title in defendant subject to a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff in the first suit.

Thus, had plaintiff prevailed in its second suit it would have proved legal title in the defendant, the opposite of plaintiff's contention in the first suit. The evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have defeated, rather than sustaining plaintiff's first suit; hence,...