Western Elec. Co. v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1960
• Citation: 163 N.E.2d 154,340 Mass. 190
• Parties: WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Inc. .v DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY and others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 154

163 N.E.2d 154

340 Mass. 190

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Inc. .v DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY and others.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Oct. 8, 1959.

Decided Jan. 4, 1960.

Melville F. Weston, Boston (John J. Ryan, Jr., Haverhill, with him), for Western Electric Co., Inc.

Phillip Lemelman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Frederick A. Harkins, Boston, with him), for Director of Div. of Employment Security.

Arthur P. Foster, Methuen, for claimants.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

The question is whether these eighty-five claimants who were employed by Western Electric Company, Inc., hereinafter called Western, are entitled to unemployment benefits under G.L. c. 151A. The director of the division of employment security determined that all the claimants were entitled to benefits and this decision was affirmed by the board of review after a hearing. G.L. c. 151A, § 41. The decision of the board was in turn affirmed by a judge of a District Court, and Western appealed (§ 42).

Although there are eighty-five claimants, it was agreed at the hearing before the board that the basic facts in all the cases were essentially the same. The relevant facts concerning employment, leaves of absence and the reasons therefor, and refusal to reemploy are not in dispute.

During the period of their employment by Western all the claimants were members of a union (Communications Workers of America, A. F. L.-C. I. O.) which was their certified bargaining agent. During this period there were two collective bargaining agreements in effect, the pertinent provision of each being identical. Article 25 of these agreements provides that '[f]or purposes of protecting term of employment, maternity leaves of absence shall be granted to employees' subject to certain conditions. Under this section maternity leaves ordinarily are to commence when the employee reaches the sixth month of her pregnancy, but in certain instances they may commence earlier. Article 25 also provided that 'The granting of a leave of absence is not a guarantee of remployment.' Pursuant to art. 25 the claimants applied for, and were granted, maternity leaves of absence. 'No services were performed by, and no wages were paid to, any of the claimants * * * during the periods of the leaves.' At the termination of their leaves the claimants applied to Western for remployment. Upon applying they 'went through normal hiring procedure, including physical examination by * * * [Western's] physician.' They were not remployed, however, 'for the reason that no work was available.' Because of Western's denial of their applications the claimants claimed unemployment benefits under G.L. c. 151A.

General Laws c. 151A, § 25, provides in part: 'No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid * * * under this chapter for * * * (e) The period of unemployment next ensuing and until the individual has had at least four weeks of work * * * after he has left his work (1) without good cause attributable to the employing unit * * *.' ¹ The pivotal question is, At what point in time have the claimants 'left * * * [their] work'? If it can be said that they 'left' at the start of their respective maternity leaves they are not entitled to benefits, because the leaving would be for a cause not 'attributable to the employing unit.' Moen v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N.E.2d 779, 781, 8 A.L.R.2d 429. But if they can be said to have 'left' at the end of their respective leaves, when Western denied their applications for remployment, they would be entitled to benefits, for the cause of their unemployment would be 'attributable to the employing unit.'

Since the decision of the board must be affirmed unless '[u]nsupported by substantial evidence' (G.L. c. 151A, § 42; G.L. c. 30A, § 14[e]), we turn to the record to see if we can find support for the board's decision. Unlike many cases under c. 151A, the case does not turn on the belief or disbelief of witnesses but depends for the most part on documentary evidence, especially the contracts between the union and Western. We are of opinion that these contracts and the procedure followed with respect to maternity leaves indicate that the employment relationship of the claimants and Western continued during such leaves. The application signed by each employee includes a statement that the leave is granted '[w]ith the expectancy but with no guaranty of reinstatement' (emphasis supplied); that the applicant will ask for 'reinstatement' as soon as home conditions...