Western Lunatic Asylum v. Petitioner
| Citation | 29 W.Va. 326 |
| Parties | Western Lunatic Asylum v. Miller et al. |
| Decision Date | 05 February 1887 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Public corporations, whether municipal or simple agencies of the State, when clothed with pie capacity to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, to take and hold property and transact business, are governed by the same laws and rules and subject to the same regulations and limitations that natural parties are, except 80 far as they may be exempted by positive law. (p. 829.)
The statute of limitations runs against such corporations in the same manner as it does against private corporations, (p. 329.)
The rights and immunities of a sovereign State belong to her within her own jurisdiction and territory, and when she becomes a suitor in the courts of a foreign State, she is treated as a foreign private corporation, (p. 329.)
A sister State suing upon a private claim in another State is not exempted from the operations of the statute of limitations of the lex feri. (p. 329.)
Where a cause of action accrues to the estate of a decedent at the time of his death, and not before, and no one qualifies as administrator until more than five years thereafter, the law conclusively presumes that an administrator qualified on the last day of said five years and the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the estate of the decedent from that time, whether or not there is, in fact, any administrator of the estate, (p. 330.)
Where the plaintiff in a suit is not entitled to any relief there can be no decree between co-defendants, nor any recovery by one defendant against another defendant, (p. 332.)
F. Brown for appellant,
B. Brown and J. W. Ferguson for W. C. Miller, appellee.
J. II. Me Cue for Asylum.
Z. T. Vinson, for Irby's Heirs.
Alfred Caldwell, Attorney General, for State. Snyder, Judge:
In the year 1850, William Irby, a lunatic from Cabell county, was taken to the Western Lunatic Asylum, at Staunton, Virginia, where he remained as a patient until his death in the year 18(38. Peter C. Buffington was appointed committee of the estate of Irby, and in 1854 brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cabell county for the sale of his ward's lands in that county, alleging in his bill that the lands were unproductive and a sale and investment of the proceeds would be advantageous to the estate, and also that a portion of said proceeds were necessary to pay the debts and the expenses of his ward at the asylum. The presumptive heirs of Irby were made defendants to the bill. Under decrees in said suit the lands were sold and the sales confirmed. A small part of the proceeds was applied to the payment of debts, $950.00 was paid to the asylum on account for the support of Irby and the residue, $905.00, was placed in the hands of W. C. Miller, as the general receiver of the court, who was by decree entered September 1, 1859, ordered to " continue to invest the same in some safe stock or loan until the further order of the court." In November, 1868, an order was entered directing deeds to be made to the purchasers of the lands, which concludes with the words:" and this cause is filed away." This is the last order or proceeding had in this cause, so far as the transcript before us discloses.
In January, 1878, the Western Lunatic Asylum, styling itself a corporation created and existing under the laws of Virginia, and doing business at Staunton in that State, brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Cabell county against W. C. Miller, the general receiver of said court, and the administrator and heirs of Irby to recover $2,383.45 balance alleged to be due to the plaintiff from the estate of Irby for his board, clothing, &c, furnished at the asylum from November, 1850, to March, 1863; and to obtain a decree against said Miller as receiver for the aforesaid $905.00 and the interest thereon.
George F. Miller, the administrator of Irby, pleaded the statute of limitations, and filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill asking for a decree in his favor for said $905.00.
W. C. Miller, the receiver, answered alleging that he had paid over the $905.00 placed in his hands to the heirs of Irby and exhibited receipts showing that he had so paid over a part of said fund; and he also pleaded the statute of limitations and the lapse of time as a bar to any recovery against him.
In March, 1884, the State of West Virginia filed her petition claiming said fund as the assignee of Virginia under the act of February 3, 1863, passed by the reorganized government of Virginia. Acts 1862-3, p. 58.
The cause was referred to a commissioner, who reported the balance in the hands of the general receiver, after deducting the amounts paid by him to the heirs of Irby, to be $1,106.84, as of May 7, 1882, To this report there was no exception,
The court, on August 19, 1884, entered a decree in favor of the admr. of Irby against W. 0. Miller, the receiver, for the balance reported by the comr. in his hands, and then decreed, that said admr., after paying the costs of this suit, should pay the residue of said fund to the plaintiff on its claim against the estate of Irby, which with the interest thereon to the date of the decree was ascertained and fixed at $5,023.41 and found to be the only indebtedness of said Irby's estate. From this decree Geo. F. Miller, admr., obtained this appeal.
The first question presented is, whether or not the plaintiff's demand is barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff is a Virginia corporation with perpetual succession, capacity to sue and be sued, a common seal, and the power to take and hold real and personal property. (Chap. 15, Acts 1841, p. 38; sec. 182, chap. 85, Code Va. of 1849, p. 389.)
If this is simply a public charitable institution, and not a part of the government itself, then the statute of limitations applies to it in the same manner that it does to individuals. The maxim, mullum tempos occurrit regi, applies to sovereignty alone. (Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36; Forsyth v. Wheeling, 19 Id. 318.
Public corporations, whether they are municipal or mere agencies of the State, are all more or less branches of the government and necessarily clothed with attributes and incidents of sovereignty; yet when they are clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, to take and hold property and transact business, they are governed by the same laws, rules and regulations and subject to the same limitations that natural persons are, except so far as they may be exempted or relieved by positive law. (Tompkins v. The Kanawha Board, 19 W. Va. 257.)
But conceding as claimed by the plaintiff, that this corporation and the Commonwealth of Virginia are one and the same, and that it must be treated here as possessing all the attributes and immunities which belong to the sovereign Commonwealth of Virginia, still, when Virginia seeks redress and becomes a suitor in the courts of this State and beyond her territorial limits, she must lay aside her attributes and immunities of sovereignty and assert her demands as private individuals or corporations assert theirs in those courts, subject to the same laws and limitations.Sovereignty, though supreme within its own jurisdiction and territory, does not extend beyond these; and when a sovereign State enters the courts of a foreign State, she does so with no other, rights and immunities than those which pertain to private corporations or individuals. (Esley v. People, 23 Kan. 202.) The lex fori governs in the limitation of actions. (Johnson v. Anderson, 76 Va. 766.)
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