Western North Carolina R.R. v. Deal
| Citation | 90 N.C. 110 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
| Decision Date | 28 February 1884 |
| Parties | WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD v. M. S. DEAL. |
CIVIL ACTION tried at Spring Term, 1884, of CATAWBA Superior Court, before Shipp, J.
The defendant railroad company brought this suit to test its right to remove a house built for a depot, the defendant refusing to allow the same, and setting up a claim thereto upon the ground that it was a fixture.
The facts were agreed upon, and are in substance as follows: The defendant company constructed its railroad to the town of Newton, in the county of Catawba, about the year 1860, and erected near the track at Newton a brick depot, which it continued to use in its business operations until the fall of 1881.
The company took possession of the land where the depot was located, both under its charter and the verbal license of the defendant's ancestor, and continued in possession of the same, until, by an act of assembly directing it, the line of the road was changed so as to approach the town of Newton by a different route. Accordingly, the company moved its iron rails and cross-ties to the new line, about the fall of 1881, and abandoned the use of the former line.
The land on which the depot was erected had in the meantime come into the possession of the defendant--one-half by descent and the other half by purchase; and two years after the abandonment of the old line the defendant entered and took possession of the depot, without plaintiff's permission.
The company claims that the depot is not a fixture, and demanded of the defendant, before this suit was brought, that it be allowed to remove the same a few hundred yards to the side of its track upon the new line, and the defendant refused.
Thereupon the court below adjudged that the plaintiff company have the right to remove the depot, and the defendant appealed.
Messrs. D. Schenck and M. L. McCorkle, for plaintiff .
Messrs. Armfield & Armfield and G. N. Folk, for defendant .
The general rule of law is, that buildings and other structures erected on land for the better enjoyment of it, become identified with, part of, and go with the land, and the tenant has no right at any time to remove them. Anciently the law was more strict in respect to making things erected upon, and attached to the land, directly or indirectly, a part of the freehold, than in more modern times. As civilization has advanced, and trade, the mechanic arts, and other industries have multiplied and increased in development, and correspondingly, in their necessities and wants of reasonable convenience, there has been a growing relaxation of the strict rule of law mentioned in their favor.
It is the policy of the law to encourage trade, manufactures, and transportation, by affording them all reasonable facilities. Buildings, fixtures, machinery, and such things, certainly intended and calculated to promote them, are treated, not as part of the land, but distinct from it, belonging to the tenant, to be disposed of or removed at his will and pleasure. Hence if a house, or other structure, is erected upon land only for the exercise of trade or the mixed purpose of trade and agriculture, no matter how it may be attached to it, it belongs to the tenant, and may be removed by him during his term, and in some classes of cases, after it is ended; though the tenant, after his term is over, would, in going back upon the land to get his property, be guilty of a trespass in going on the land, and only in that respect, the property would remain his.
The exceptions to the general rule pointed out above are well settled, and the practical difficulty in any case arises in pointing out when the general rule, or the exception, applies. The exception does not depend upon the character of the structure or thing erected, or whether it is built of one material or another, or whether it be set in the earth or upon it, but whether it is for the purposes of trade or manufacture, and not intended to become identified with and part of the land; this is the test. Pemberton v. King, 2 Dev., 376; Moore v. Valentine, 77 N. C., 188; Clives v. Mowe, 2 Smith's, L. C., 99, and notes; Van Ness v. Packard, 2 Pet., 137; Taylor on L. and T., §§ 544, 545, 546; Arch. L. and T., 366.
The defendant's counsel insisted in the argument, that if the plaintiff might have removed the building in controversy while it was in its possession, it certainly would not have the right to do so after it had gone out of possession of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Haywood v. Briggs, 737.
...that principle in favor of the interveners. Haflick v. Stober, supra; Jones v. Shufflin, supra. In Western North Carolina R. Co. v. Deal, 90 N.C. 110, the right of the Railroad, after abandonment of right of way, to remove a depot building, as against the claim of the owner of the land, was......
-
Haywood v. Briggs
...such as to invoke that principle in favor of the interveners. Haflick v. Stober, supra; Jones v. Shufflin, supra. In Western North Carolina R. Co. v. Deal, 90 N.C. 110, the right of the Railroad, after abandonment of right of to remove a depot building, as against the claim of the owner of ......
-
Dep't of Transp. v. Adams Outdoor Adver. of Charlotte Ltd.
...the erection was made, must all be considered in determining whether it became a part of the freehold or not." (quoting W. N.C. R.R. v. Deal , 90 N.C. 110, 113-14 (1884) )).Here the trial court found, inter alia :32. Because of the permanent nature of the Billboard's construction including ......
-
Hatton v. Kansas City, Clinton & Springfield Railway Company
... ... Ingalls v. Railroad, 39 Minn. 479; Western North ... Carolina Railroad v. Deal, 90 N.C. 110; ... ...