Weston v. Fuller

• Decision Date: 30 June 1937
• Citation: 297 Mass. 545,9 N.E.2d 538
• Parties: WESTON v. FULLER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

297 Mass. 545

9 N.E.2d 538

WESTON

v.FULLER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

June 30, 1937.

Proceeding by Harold J. Weston, administrator of the estate of Lydia L. Atwell, deceased, against Alberta C. Fuller and others. From decrees and from an order dismissing his claim of appeal, administrator appeals.

Appeal from order dismissing claim of appeal dismissed and decrees affirmed.Appeals from Probate Court, Plymouth County; L. E. Chamberlin and Poland, Judges.

Morton Collingwood, of Plymouth, for petitioner.

R. M. Fletcher, of Brockton, for respondents.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

These appeals relate to the estate of Lydia L. Atwell, late of Kingston in this Commonwealth, deceased, intestate. The pertinent facts and proceedings are these: Harold J. Weston was duly appointed administrator of the estate of the intestate upon a petition which as originally filed contained the name of one heir at law, and as amended contained the names of twelve additional persons as heirs at law. The administrator is not an heir at law. The administrator filed his first account of receipts and disbursements coverning the period from the time of his appointment until April 7, 1935, showing a balance in cash in his hands of $3663.96. After citation, that account was allowed by decree entered on November 1, 1935. On June 19, 1935, the administrator filed a petition (dated April 12, 1935) for distribution of the balance in his hands as shown by his account. The schedule of heirs at law of the intestate set forth in this petition comprised the heirs at law already named and in this petition designated as second cousins and one other designated as a first cousin. Citation issued on this petition for distribution. On October 21, 1935, appearances were filed in behalf of the personal representatives of two deceased persons, late residents of Iowa, alleged to have been first cousins of the intestate. On November 12, 1935, a decree was entered ordering distribution by the administrator of the balance of the estate of the intestate to three persons, one third to each. On November 29, 1935, the administrator filed a motion to revoke or amend the decree of distribution entered on November 12, 1935, ‘so that he will be authorized to pay * * * additional counsel fees incurred since June 1st, 1935 because of an exhaustive examination of the genealogy of the family of the decedent and an investigation was necessary to ascertain the correct’ distributees. After hearing, this motion was denied on December 17, 1935. On November 30, 1935, the administrator filed a claim of appeal from the decree of distribution entered on November 12, 1935. One of the distributees filed a motion on December 11, 1935, that this claim of appeal be dismissed for divers specified reasons. One of the reasons was that the administrator was not entitled to appeal. Touching these matters, on December 17, 1935, there was entered an order or decree to the effect that after hearing it had been found that the administrator was ‘not a person aggrieved by the decree from which the appeal is claimed’ and that ‘the appeal is dismissed.’ On January 3, 1936, the administrator claimed an appeal (1) from the order or decree of December 17, 1935, denying his motion to revoke or amend the decree of distribution of November 12, 1935, and (2) from the order or decree of December 17, 1935, dismissing his claim of appeal.

The record is somewhat complicated. Several technical questions arise involving probate procedure and accounting and the inquiries whether the administrator was a person aggrieved by any order or decree from which he undertook to appeal and whether jurisdiction to decide that point is vested in the probate courts. All of those questions need not be considered because, since in any event the administrator cannot prevail, there seems to be no objection to stating the grounds of substantive law which support that result. Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 48, 140 N.E. 255, 29 A.L.R. 483;Grant v. Pizzano, 264 Mass. 475, 478, 163 N.E. 162.

The administrator presses all three of his appeals in argument before this court. No evidence is reported concerning any one of them. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 215, §§ 9, 12; c. 214, §§ 24, 25. No report of material facts was made by the trial judge. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 11. The entry of each decree imported the finding of all facts necessary to support that result. Such finding in each instance must be accepted as final, since we have no means of revising it. It is plain that there is nothing in the record to indicate error in the decree of distribution. No ruling of law was made. The issues raised appear to have related wholly to questions of fact. The decree was within the scope of the petition.

The denial of the motion to revoke or amend the decree of distribution presents no question of law. Probate courts have inherent power to correct an error in accounts already settled. Stetson v. Bass. 9 Pick. 27, 30;Foster v. Foster, 134 Mass. 120, 122;Dodd v....