Weston v. State
| Decision Date | 27 July 1999 |
| Citation | 2 S.W.3d 111 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) Eric L. Weston, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. WD56329 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Hon. Randall R. Jackson
Opinion Summary: Eric L. Weston appeals from the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
AFFIRMED.
Court holds:
A victim's statement at sentencing is not imputed to the State. A victim's statement to the court at sentencing is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.
Appellant, Eric L. Weston appeals from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. He had pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and armed criminal action. He claimed in the motion that his guilty plea was involuntary because his plea counsel failed to inform him that the State could indirectly advance a request for the imposition of consecutive sentences through the presentation of a victim impact statement. He now claims the motion court "clearly erred" in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing. Because we find that a victim's statement at sentencing is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, we affirm.
On August 15, 1997, Appellant was charged by information with murder in the second degree and armed criminal action. On October 23, 1997, Appellant pled guilty to both charges. Prior to his plea hearing, Appellant signed a "Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty" in which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State's promise that it would not file a murder in the first degree charge or other additional charges, and that it would not argue for or request that the sentences imposed for the charges against Appellant run consecutively.
On October 23, 1997, Appellant's plea hearing was held. Appellant was examined by the court at the guilty plea hearing. The following colloquy took place:
Court: You further understand that if your plea is accepted to both counts that whatever sentence the Court found for each count appropriate in your case could be made to be served one after the other was [sic] completely finished or consecutive ?
Appellant: Yes, your honor.
Court: Now, as I understand, there's been a discussion concerning that with the State. And what did you advise Mr. Weston concerning that ?
Counsel: That the State would not, per se, request a consecutive sentence, but the decision as to whether the sentences would run concurrent or consecutive would [sic] left to Your Honor's discretion.
Court: Did you make that clear to your client then that [sic] agreement is not a plea agreement ?
Counsel: It's not.
Court: And the Court would not be in any way bound to follow that or allow a withdrawal of a plea of not guilty if I did not, if I determined it ought to be consecutive.
Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Okay. You understand what all that meant, Mr. Weston ?
Appellant: Yeah.
Court: That it's totally up to the Court ? That although the State's indicated they're not going to specifically request consecutive sentences, that that's not a plea agreement presented to the Court which would be in any way binding on the Court's determination. It's totally up to me.
Appellant: Yes, Your Honor.
Appellant: Yes, your honor. Appellant stated that he understood the consequences of his plea. He stated that he understood the range of punishment for murder in the second degree and armed criminal action, and that he understood the sentences could run either concurrently or consecutively. Appellant also indicated that he understood all of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. Appellant was also asked by the court whether he had any complaints about his attorney. Appellant stated that he did not. The trial court determined that Appellant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
Appellant's sentencing hearing was held on December 18, 1997. The State presented a victim impact statement from the victim's father, Richard D. Sherman, which provided in part:
Second degree murder carries a maximum penalty of 30 year in prison. Armed criminal action carries a penalty of three years to life. I ask you in the name of righteousness and justice to impose the maximum penalty allowed by both offenses, both to run consecutively and without parole. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the second degree and 10 years for armed criminal action, the sentences to run consecutively.
On February 2, 1998, Appellant filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. Appellant's appointed counsel subsequently filed an amended motion. On July 22, 1998, the motion court denied Appellant's motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal ensued.
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a post-conviction movant must: (1) allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts alleged must raise matters not refuted by the files and records in the case; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Reynolds v. State, 1998 WL 609735, 1. "In determining whether this standard is satisfied, it must be kept in mind that where, as here, movant has pleaded guilty, he has waived all errors regarding ineffective assistance of counsel except those that affect 'the voluntariness and knowledge with which the pleas of guilty were made.'" Johnson v. State, 941 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Mo. App. 1997) (quoting, Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 1992)). Therefore, if the claim of involuntariness is conclusively refuted by the motion and record, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Id. (citations omitted). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will defer to the trial court's determination that the Appellant's guilty plea was voluntary. Redeemer v. State, 979 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. App. 1998).
To obtain relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must establish: (1) that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that he was thereby prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, a defendant challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must allege facts showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting, Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 474 U.S. 52, 88 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The movant bears the burden of proving his or her grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Redeemer, 979 S.W.2d at 569; Rule 24.035.
Appellant claims in his sole point on appeal that the trial court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing because his plea counsel failed to inform him that the State could indirectly advance a request for the imposition of consecutive sentences through the presentation of a victim impact statement, without violating its representation that it would not argue for or request the imposition of consecutive sentences if Appellant pleaded guilty.
"Victims who testify at the sentencing of a defendant appear on their own behalf, not on behalf of the state, and their statements do not present views of the prosecutor or the State." Rick v. State, 934 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Mo. App. 1996). The State does not breach a "stand silent" agreement when a victim or victim's family requests a specific punishment at sentencing. Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Mo. App. 1995). "[P]rosecutions are undertaken and punishments are sought by the state on behalf of the citizens of the state, and not on behalf of particular victims or complaining witnesses." State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 308 (Mo. 1998). Article I, section 32.1(2) of the Missouri Constitution states that crime victims have the right to be informed of and heard at sentencings. However, Article I, section 32.1(2) in no way binds the judge's or jury's determination of punishment. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d at 308. Therefore, a victim's statement is not imputed to the State.
A Victim's Right To Request A Specific Punishment At Sentencing Is A
The trial court ruled that trial counsel had an obligation to inform his client only of the direct consequences of his conviction, and that the right of a victim's family to address the court is a collateral consequence.
Counsel has an obligation to inform his client of the direct consequences of conviction. White v. State, 957 S.W.2d...
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