State v. Rasheed

• Decision Date: 12 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. ED 94226.,ED 94226.
• Citation: 340 S.W.3d 280
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent,v.Jameel RASHEED, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

340 S.W.3d 280

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Jameel RASHEED, Appellant.

No. ED 94226.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

April 12, 2011.Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied May 24, 2011.

Application for Transfer Denied

June 28, 2011.

Andrew Zleit, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., James B. Farnsworth, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., Presiding Judge.

Introduction

Jameel Rasheed(Rasheed) appeals from a sentence and judgment of conviction for drug trafficking in the second degree and possession of a controlled substance.He asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his guilty plea in federal court to the same charges, in overruling his objection to a statement by the State during closing arguments, and in overruling his motions to suppress statements and evidence.We affirm.

Background

Rasheed was charged as a prior and persistent offender with the class A felony of trafficking cocaine base (crack) in the second degree, and the class C felony of possession of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy).Before the state-court trial, Rasheed was charged in federal court with possession and intent to distribute a controlled substance, stemming from the same facts.He pleaded guilty to the federal charges in March 2008.

Before the November 2009 state-court trial, Rasheed moved to suppress both the drugs seized at his arrest and his confession.The motion to suppress the evidence was taken with the case, and, after a hearing, the motion to suppress the confession was denied.At trial, the State read excerpts from Rasheed's federal plea and plea transcript into the record.The jury convicted Rasheed on both counts.Rasheed moved for acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial.The trial court sentenced Rasheed to 10 years imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently with each other and the federal sentence.This appeal follows.

Discussion

Point I

In his first point on appeal, Rasheed argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Rasheed's guilty plea in federal court stemming from the same acts, because the trial court did not have enough evidence before it to counter his assertions that the federal plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.Specifically, he asserts his counsel in federal court was ineffective for failing to inform him that his plea could be used against him in state court.We disagree.

This court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision of whether to admit evidence.State v. Dennis,315 S.W.3d 767, 768(Mo.App. E.D.2010).A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.Id.A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.Ferry v. Ferry,327 S.W.3d 599, 602(Mo.App. E.D.2010).

“A voluntary plea of guilty is a solemn confession of the truth of the charge to which it is entered, and proof of such a plea would ordinarily be competent as an admission of the accused in any subsequent proceeding in which it might be relevant and in which the occasion for reference to it might arise.”State v. Hadley,249 S.W.2d 857, 860(Mo.1952);see alsoUnited States v. Holmes,794 F.2d 345, 349(8th Cir.1986)(“[a] guilty plea is admissible in a subsequent collateral criminal trial as evidence of an admission by a party opponent”).The key test for admissibility of a previous guilty plea is whether the plea was voluntary.State v. Long,324 Mo. 205, 22 S.W.2d 809, 813(1929).

For a plea to be voluntary, the defendant must be made aware of the direct consequences of the plea.Reynolds v. State,994 S.W.2d 944, 946(Mo. banc 1999)(citingBrady v. United States,397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747(1970)).A defendant does not, however, have the right to be informed of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea.¹Johnson v. State,318 S.W.3d 313, 317(Mo.App. E.D.2010)(citation omitted);see alsoGeorge v. Black,732 F.2d 108, 110(8th Cir.1984).

Direct consequences are set forth in Mo. R.Crim. P. 24.02(b) and include the nature of the charges, the maximum possible and mandatory minimum penalties, the right to be represented by an attorney, the right not to plead guilty, and the defendant's waiver of all trial rights if he pleads guilty.Mo. R.Crim. P. 24.02(b)(1)–(4);Copas v. State,15 S.W.3d 49, 54–55(Mo.App. W.D.2000)(Rule 24.02(b) provides list of direct consequences; no error when court did not inform defendant of right not included in Rule or developed case law);see alsoFed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(before court accepts plea of guilty, court must inform defendant of certain consequences of plea, including all above listed).

In addition, case law reveals that direct consequences are ones that “definitely, immediately, and largely automatically” follow the entry of a plea of guilty.Johnson,318 S.W.3d at 317;Weston v. State,2 S.W.3d 111, 115–16(Mo.App. W.D.1999);see alsoGeorge,732 F.2d at 110.By contrast, collateral consequences are those that do not follow automatically from the guilty plea.Pettis v. State,212 S.W.3d 189, 193–94(Mo.App. W.D.2007);see also Black's Law Dictionary 255 (7th ed.1999)(collateral consequences are penalties in addition to those included in criminal sentence).The question here, then, is whether using a federal-court guilty plea in a subsequent state-courtprosecution stemming from the same offense is a direct or collateral consequence.

We find the analysis set forth in United States v. Williams,104 F.3d 213(8th Cir.1997) persuasive, and we conclude that the subsequent use of a guilty plea is a collateral consequence.In United States v. Williams, Williams was prosecuted in state and federal courts for the same incident of drug and weapon activity.Id. at 214.He challenged the district court's admission of his state-court guilty plea, asserting that his plea was involuntary because he had not been informed that it might be used against him in a subsequent federal prosecution.The Williams court found that the subsequent use of his state-court plea was not a direct consequence, and thus his plea was voluntary and admissible.Id. at 216–17.Williams looked to United States v. Long,852 F.2d 975(7th Cir.1988), for the concept that “state and federal systems are separate and distinct, and the defendant need only be informed of the direct consequences he may face within the particular system.”Williams,104 F.3d at 216–17(quotingLong,852 F.2d at 979).Therefore, one court is not obligated to inform the defendant about his potential liability in a separate judicial system.²Williams,104 F.3d at 216–17.

Because the possibility that one's guilty plea may be used in a subsequent prosecution in a different jurisdiction is a collateral consequence, Rasheed's federal counsel did not have a duty to inform him that his plea could be used in state court.Without this duty, Rasheed's counsel was not, in this regard, ineffective.Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687–92, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984)(setting forth two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel);see alsoAnderson v. State,196 S.W.3d 28, 33(Mo. banc 2006).We cannot find that Rasheed has asserted any other grounds for ineffectiveness, and we limit our analysis accordingly.Further, the record does not show that Rasheed has challenged his guilty plea in federal court.SeeFed. R.App. P. 4(b);28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Our review of Rasheed's federal plea reveals that he was informed of the direct consequences of his plea, and that his plea was voluntary.The federal plea was entered pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he acknowledged his admission to St. Louis detectives that he was in possession of crack and ecstasy, and that he intended to distribute the crack to another person.Likewise, at Rasheed's federal plea hearing, the district court accepted Rasheed's guilty plea after conducting a full Rule 11 colloquy in which the court confirmed: (1) that Rasheed understood, inter alia, the perjury implications of his plea, his right to plead not guilty, that his plea waived his right to a jury trial with all its attendant rights, his right to be represented by counsel, the nature of the charges against him, the maximum penalties, and the mandatory minimum penalty; (2) that the plea was voluntary, in that he had read and discussed the plea agreement with his attorney and he had not received any promises or threats; and (3) that there was a factual basis for the plea.SeeRule 11(b)(1)(A)–(N), (2), (3).

Because Rasheed was informed of the direct consequences of his plea in federal court, we see no evidence establishing that his plea was involuntary or that his counsel was ineffective.Reynolds,994 S.W.2d at 946.Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Rasheed's plea.Dennis,315 S.W.3d at 768.

Point denied.

Point II

In his second point on appeal, Rasheed asserts that the trial court plainly erred in overruling defense counsel's objection to a statement made by the State during closing argument.We disagree.

Rasheed concedes that because he failed to raise this argument in his motion for new trial, that our review is for plain error.Under the plain-error standard, we will reverse only if a plain error affecting a substantial right results in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.Mo. R.Crim. P. 30.20.It is a defendant's burden to demonstrate manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.State v. Irby,254 S.W.3d 181, 192(Mo.App. E.D.2008).We will grant relief on a claim of plain error in closing argument only if the challenged statement had a “decisive effect on the jury.”State v. White,...