Westside Mothers v. Olszewski

• Decision Date: 17 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-1669.,05-1669.
• Parties: WESTSIDE MOTHERS; Families on the Move, Inc.; Michigan Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics; Michigan Chapter, American Association of Pediatric Dentists; K.E., by her next friend Tina E.; Ja. E., by her next friend Deana H.; Je. E., by her next friend, Deana H.; J.C., by his next friend, Monica C.; and J.T., by his next friend, Veda T., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Janet OLSZEWSKI, in her official capacity as Director of the State of Michigan Department of Community Health; and Paul Reinhart, in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the State of Michigan Medical Services Administration, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

454 F.3d 532

WESTSIDE MOTHERS; Families on the Move, Inc.; Michigan Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics; Michigan Chapter, American Association of Pediatric Dentists; K.E., by her next friend Tina E.; Ja. E., by her next friend Deana H.; Je. E., by her next friend, Deana H.; J.C., by his next friend, Monica C.; and J.T., by his next friend, Veda T., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Janet OLSZEWSKI, in her official capacity as Director of the State of Michigan Department of Community Health; and Paul Reinhart, in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the State of Michigan Medical Services Administration, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-1669.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 9, 2006.

Decided and Filed: July 17, 2006.

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ARGUED: Jennifer R. Clarke, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellants. Morris J. Klau, State of Michigan, Department of Attorney General, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jennifer R. Clarke, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Arnon D. Siegel, Laura E. Robbins, Dechert LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Morris J. Klau, Luttrell D. Levingston, State of Michigan, Department of Attorney General, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MERRITT and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

This suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that the State of Michigan has failed to provide services required by the Medicaid program. Plaintiffs, Westside Mothers, other advocacy and professional organizations, and five named individuals, allege that Janet Olszewski, director of the Michigan Department of Community Health, and Paul Reinhart, deputy director of the Michigan Medical Services Administration, did not provide the early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment ("EPSDT") services mandated by the Medicaid Act.

The Medicaid program, created in 1965 when Congress added Title XIX to the Social Security Act, provides federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for the poor, elderly, and disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (2000 & Supp.2005); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). "Although participation in the program is voluntary, participating States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the Act and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services." Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990). At issue here is the requirement that participating States provide "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services ... for individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (defining such services). The required services include periodic physical examinations, immunizations, laboratory tests, health education, see § 1396d(r)(1) eye examinations, eyeglasses, see § 1396d(r)(2), teeth maintenance, see § 1396d(r)(3), diagnosis and treatment of hearing disorders, and hearing aids, see § 1396d(r)(4).

In 1999, plaintiffs filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against any person who under color of state law deprives an individual of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. They alleged that the defendants had refused or failed to implement the Medicaid Act, its enabling regulations, and its policy requirements by: (1) refusing to provide, and not requiring participating HMOs to provide, the comprehensive examinations required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(r)(1) and 42 C.F.R. § 441.57; (2) not requiring participating HMOs to provide the necessary health care, diagnostic services, and treatment required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5); (3) not effectively informing plaintiffs of the existence of the screening and treatment services, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43); (4) failing to provide plaintiffs the transportation and scheduling help needed to take advantage of the screening and treatment services, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(B) and 42 C.F.R. § 441.62; and (5) developing a Medicaid program that lacks the capacity to deliver to eligible children the care required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(30)(A), and 1396u-2(b)(5). (J.A. at 40-48.)

In March 2001 the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Mich.2001). In a detailed and far-reaching opinion, the district court held that Medicaid was only a contract between a State and the federal government, that spending-power programs such as Medicaid were not supreme law of the land, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Michigan was the "real defendant, and therefore possess[ed] sovereign immunity against suit," id. at 553, that in this case Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), was unavailable to circumvent the State's sovereign immunity, and that even if it were available § 1983 does not create a cause of action available to plaintiffs to enforce the provisions in question.

Plaintiffs appealed and, in an opinion dated May 15, 2002, a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed all of these rulings. See Westside Mothers v. Haveman ("Westside Mothers I"), 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir.2002). Although our earlier decision focused predominantly on the jurisdictional grounds for the district court's dismissal, we also considered "[w]hether there is a private right of action under § 1983" for alleged noncompliance with the Medicaid Act. Id. at 862-63. We held that the "district court erred when it did not apply [the test set out in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997),] to evaluate plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 863. We then applied the Blessing test to determine whether the screening and treatment provisions of the Medicaid Act create a right privately enforceable against state officers through § 1983:

First, the provisions were clearly intended to benefit the putative plaintiffs, children who are eligible for the screening and treatment services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). "[I]t is well-settled that Medicaid-eligible children under the age of twenty-one ... are the intended beneficiaries of the [screening and treatment] provisions." Dajour B. v. City of New York, 2001 WL 830674, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001); accord Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.1993). We have found no federal appellate cases to the contrary. Second, the provisions set a binding obligation on Michigan. They are couched in mandatory rather than precatory language, stating that Medicaid services "shall be furnished" to eligible children, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (emphasis added), and that the screening and treatment provisions "must be provided," id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), see also 42 C.F.R. § 441.56 (mandatory language). Third, the provisions are not so vague and amorphous as to defeat judicial enforcement, as the statute and regulations carefully detail the specific services to be provided. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r). Finally, Congress did not explicitly foreclose recourse to § 1983 in this instance, nor has it established any remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant § 1983. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346-47, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569.

Plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 1983 for alleged noncompliance with the screening and treatment provisions of the Medicaid Act.

Id.

On remand, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' second motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), the district court reconsidered whether the specific provisions of the Medicaid Act that plaintiffs identified in their amended complaint create enforceable rights under § 1983. The district court concluded that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10) create enforceable rights under § 1983, but that plaintiffs failed to state a claim that defendants had not discharged their obligations to provide medical assistance under §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10). The district court further concluded that § 1396a(a)(43) creates enforceable rights under § 1983, that plaintiffs stated a cause of action for violations of § 1396a(a)(43)(B) to the extent that they alleged that the state of Michigan has a policy or practice of not providing the EPSDT services to eligible children who have requested them, but that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violations of § 1396a(a)(43)(A). The district court also dismissed plaintiffs' claim for violations of § 1396a(a)(30) for failure to state a claim, reasoning that § 1396a(a)(30) "does not unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under § 1983." (J.A. at 525.)

This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part and affirm in part but modify the district court's order.

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir.2003). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations [of the plaintiff] as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Id. at 451-52. Our function is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.1997), but rather to examine the...