Wetzel v. Wetzel, 95-2688

• Decision Date: 09 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2688,95-2688
• Citation: 671 So.2d 234
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D860 Eric Randall WETZEL, Appellant, v. Rhonda Kay WETZEL, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 234

671 So.2d 234

21 Fla. L. Weekly D860

Eric Randall WETZEL, Appellant, v. Rhonda Kay WETZEL, Appellee.

No. 95-2688.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

April 9, 1996.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County; Brian J. Davis, Judge.

Robert P. Morrow, Jr., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Francis Jerome Shea, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

WEBSTER, Judge.

Appellant (the husband) seeks review of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He asserts as error: (1) placing the primary residence of the parties' 3-year-old child with appellee (the wife); (2) awarding rehabilitative alimony to the wife; and (3) distributing inequitably the parties' assets and liabilities. We affirm the trial court's decision regarding the primary residence of the child without further discussion, because the record reveals no abuse of discretion. However, because we are unable to divine from the record the basis for either the award of rehabilitative alimony or the distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities, we are constrained to reverse those portions of the final judgment, and to remand for further proceedings.

The parties' marriage was of less than seven years' duration. Prior to the birth of the parties' child, the wife had worked full time in various clerical and secretarial positions. Since the birth of the child, she had held only part-time jobs. She expressed an interest in attending beauty school, with the intent of becoming a cosmetologist. She testified that the course lasted six months, at a cost of about $200.00 per month. She had "no idea" how much one with such training might earn, although she doubted that it would be more than a secretary. The trial court awarded lump-sum rehabilitative alimony of $500.00. In addition, it awarded to the wife, for an indeterminate period, "exclusive use and possession of the 1994 Grand Am automobile as a measure of rehabilitative alimony and child support," directing that the husband "be responsible for any indebtedness thereon." (The evidence indicated that the indebtedness on the 1994 Grand Am was $16,000.00, and the monthly payment $345.00.) The only finding supporting these awards is "that the wife's educational and employment opportunities were interrupted because of the birth of the child and ... the wife is in need of reasonable rehabilitative alimony."

Section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1993), requires that the trial court include in its final judgment "findings of fact ... supporting an award or denial of alimony." The reason for this requirement should be clear--without findings of fact, meaningful appellate review is not possible. On remand, the trial court is directed to revisit the matter of rehabilitative alimony, and to support its decision by explicit findings. Should it again award rehabilitative alimony, those findings must address the rehabilitative plan, the objective of rehabilitation, the cost of the plan and the projected period necessary for the wife to complete her rehabilitation. E.g., Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 624 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Should it again award use and possession of a marital asset as alimony, it must explain its rationale for doing so, and the duration of the award. E.g., Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So.2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

The parties' major asset is a marital home. It is clear that neither party will be able to afford the monthly mortgage payments, and that there is little, if any, equity. The wife, with whom the child's primary residence was placed, testified that she did not desire use and possession of the home during the child's minority. See, e.g., Neustein v. Neustein, 503 So.2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (request by custodial parent for exclusive use and possession of marital home during minority of children should generally be granted). Although not requested by the husband, inexplicably, the trial court awarded him use and possession of the home for an indeterminate period, and also placed on him all of the financial burden associated with the home. (The evidence indicates that, after deducting the mortgage payment, the payment on the wife's car and his child support obligation, the husband would be left with approximately $350.00 each month.) The only other marital asset specifically addressed in the judgment is the 1994 Grand Am automobile. The remaining assets and liabilities of the parties were dealt with as follows:

11. The parties shall equally divide all furnishings and other personalty acquired during the course of the marriage and shall mediate...