Weyant v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 03 August 1994 |
| Citation | 616 N.Y.S.2d 428,162 Misc.2d 132 |
| Parties | Michael WEYANT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK and Gregory Guest, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Sullivan & Liapakis, P.C., New York City (Vito A. Cannavo, of counsel), for plaintiff.
O. Peter Sherwood, Corp. Counsel, New York City, Kenneth E. Pinczower, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for defendant the City of New York.
Rivkin, Radler & Kramer, Uniondale (Bruce A. Bendix, of counsel), for defendant Gregory E. Guest.
1. Does the removal of a seat belt from a firetruck constitute negligence on the part of the City absent a statutory duty to provide seat belts in emergency vehicles?
2. Does the "fireman's rule" preclude recovery where the fire truck was traveling to a relocation when it was involved in an accident?
Defendants, Gregory E. Guest (hereinafter, "Guest") and the City of New York (hereinafter, "City"), move, after a jury trial, to set aside the verdict as a matter of law, (CPLR § 4404); alternatively ordering a new trial on both liability and damages; or reducing the amount of the verdict as excessive.
Plaintiff, a city firefighter was in a fire truck relocating to another firehouse. An intersection accident ensued. Plaintiff was seated in a rear jump seat which was not equipped with a seat belt.
The jury found that both parties were negligent in the operation of their vehicles but could not determine which of the vehicles passed the red light. Further, the jury found that the 1979 model year fire vehicle was originally equipped with seat belts, as were all other Fire Department vehicles ordered since the early 1970's. The seat belts had been removed leaving only the seat belt mounts in this vehicle. Additionally, the jury found that the vehicle was not engaged in an emergency operation; also that the seat belt removal was the cause of 100% of plaintiff's injuries.
The City moves to set aside the verdict as a matter of law, contending that VTL § 1229-c(4) 1 exempts fire trucks (VTL § 101) from the mandatory seat belt requirements precluding a common law duty.
This Court upholds a jury finding of negligence for the violation of an assumed duty in the face of a statutory exemption, see, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955).
At trial, the jury heard evidence of the then general custom and practice of the installation of safety belts in fire trucks as standard safety equipment. The internal rules of the Fire Department require a firefighter to use seat belts when available, 2 despite VTL § 1229-c.
New York courts have held that failure to provide seat belts in vehicles is negligence as a matter of law, VTL § 383; McMahon v. Butler, 73 A.D.2d 197, 426 N.Y.S.2d 326 (3rd Dept., 1980). In the instant case, there cannot be a finding of negligence, as a matter of law, because of the statutory exemption provided to emergency vehicles in VTL § 1229-c, see, Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974) (). 3
In a California case, similar to the case at bar, a passenger injured in a two-car collision brought suit against the vehicle's driver/owner alleging that she was negligent in removing automobile seatbelts. The Court held that there existed a triable issue of fact of whether the driver/owner breached her duty to exercise due care in the safe operation and maintenance of her vehicle when she removed the seatbelts, precluding summary judgment in her favor, Twohig v. Briner, 168 Cal.App.3d 1102, 214 Cal.Rptr. 729 (1985). The California law provides that an operator of a motor vehicle has a common law duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent increasing the danger of injury to a passenger, or others, from operating or maintaining the automobile.
Thus, in California, the City would have been negligent as a matter of law. In Twohig, the Court makes clear that while it is conceded that no statute requires a private owner/operator to provide belts in a motor vehicle, as in the case at bar, the owner/operator had a common law duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent increasing the dangers of injury to passengers.
While New York does not have this statutory requirement for fire department vehicles, the internal rules and regulations reveal that the Fire Department recognizes the established common law principle that an employer has a general duty to protect the health and safety of its employees, including providing a reasonably safe place to do their work, see, New York State Labor Law § 200. A jury may regard a violation of a work rule as some evidence of the employer's negligence, Warren v. New York State Thruway Authority, 51 A.D.2d 679, 378 N.Y.S.2d 530 (4th Dept.1977). See also, Horan v. Cold Spring Construction Co., 109 Misc.2d 1034, 441 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1981). A jury may also regard a failure to prohibit a dangerous situation as possible evidence of employer's negligence, Danbois v. New York Central Railroad Co., 12 N.Y.2d 234, 238 N.Y.S.2d 921, 189 N.E.2d 468 (1963).
As recently as 1991, the Second Department has recognized the right to proceed under a theory of liability that the City failed to provide "proper and adequate equipment", Assante v. City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 430, 570 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dept., 1991). The court did not dispute the jury's province to consider whether the City was negligent in failing to provide plaintiff with proper and adequate equipment, in failing to properly inspect the equipment and in failing to take proper safety measures, cf., McCormack v. City of NY, 172 A.D.2d 357, 568 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1st Dept.1991).
Cases involving the failure of common carriers to provide seat belts have addressed the issue of whether the jury could find that this amounted to negligence. In Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal.App.2d 241, 53 Cal.Rptr. 851 (1966), plaintiff employee was thrown from the railroad's truck which was not equipped with seat belts. The Court held that whether the railroad's failure to provide seat belts amounted to negligence was a jury question. Similarly, in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.3d 356, 83 Cal.Rptr. 343 (1970) the Court held that the jury was to decide whether the carrier's failure to provide seat belts amounted to negligence; Montgomery v. Midkiff, 770 S.W.2d 689 (Ky.App.1989) () reversed on other grounds sub nom. Transit Auth. v. Montgomery, 836 S.W.2d 413; Benson v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393 (1975) (); Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819 (Iowa 1970) ().
The higher standard of care that these cases require reflect nation-wide responses to the increases in highway fatalities and personal injures of the 1960's. 4 It is a matter of common knowledge that safety belts are effective in reducing fatalities and minimizing injuries in motor vehicle collisions. "The seat belt ... offers the single best protection available to the automotive occupant exposed to an impact," Synder, Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 Marq.L.Rev. 211. "Studies overwhelmingly indicate that the seat belt fulfills its primary purpose of restraining the automobile occupant during and immediately after the initial impact; in doing so, it significantly reduces the likelihood of ejection and frequently prevents 'second collision' of the occupant with the interior portion of the vehicle," Spier v. Barker, supra.
The state is empowered to enact legislation designed to promote the health, safety, welfare and morals of its inhabitants. In 1984, Governor Cuomo signed the nation's first mandatory seat belt use law (MUL) codified at VTL § 1229-c, see Benguerel, Mandatory Seat Belt Legislation: Panacea For Highway Traffic Fatalities? 36 Syracuse L.Rev. Vol. 36:1341 (1986). Despite the statutory exemptions for emergency vehicles, approval of MUL was clearly intended to address the " 'national tragedy' resulting from automobile accidents and unrestrained drivers and passengers." 5
In light of the intent of this legislation, the City contends that the § 1229-c(4) exemption creates absolute immunity. "It is not for this Court to decide whether the legislature should not have made the exclusion from its regulation so long as exemptions bear reasonable relation to the desired legislative purposes." People v. Weber, 129 Misc.2d 993, 997, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1985) citing Matter of Mayflower Farms v. Baldwin, 267 N.Y. 9, 15, 195 N.E. 532 (1935) rev'd on other grounds 297 U.S. 266, 56 S.Ct. 457, 80 L.Ed. 675 (1936). VTL § 1229-c(4) may have been designed to protect municipalities from the violation provisions of that Section and to limit their responsibility in terms of its penal aspects, however, it would be illogical to assume that the legislature would relieve the City of any responsibilities for injuries suffered on an emergency vehicle. Thus, the City seeks to expand the scope of inherent risks to firefighters to matters so routine as to exonerate themselves from any negligence claims. This application of VTL § 1229-c does address the concerns of the state.
The state has a compelling interest in saving lives, but in addition to this, the State has an interest in promoting the welfare of its citizens. In Wells v. State, 130 Misc.2d 113, 119, 495 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), the court explained that:
The cost to society of the results of death or severe injuries is enormous. The long term care, often extending to lifetime care, of paraplegics, quadraplegics, and patients on life-support system devolves on the...
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