Wells v. State

• Decision Date: 30 October 1985
• Citation: 130 Misc.2d 113,495 N.Y.S.2d 591
• Parties: Wayne WELLS, Plaintiff, v. The STATE of New York and Mario Cuomo, Governor, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 591

495 N.Y.S.2d 591

130 Misc.2d 113

Wayne WELLS, Plaintiff, v. The STATE of New York and Mario Cuomo, Governor, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Steuben County Trial Term.

Oct. 30, 1985.

Colin J. Kenneally, Albany, for plaintiff.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany, for defendants State of N.Y., Dept. of Law; James P. King, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, of counsel.

George D. Levine, Albany, for amicus curiae State Senator Norman J. Levy.

Wayne Wells, Cameron Mills, pro se.

MYRON E. TILLMAN, Justice.

The Court has before it a motion made by the Attorney General for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action.

The Plaintiff herein was issued a traffic citation in the City of Corning, New York, for failure to wear his seat belt while operating his motor vehicle in violation of Section 1229-c of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, commonly known as the "Seat Belt Law." Upon appearance in Corning City Court, the Plaintiff asked for and received a stay of prosecution in order to pursue this declaratory judgment action.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the "Seat Belt Law" exceeds constitutional limitations. Specifically, that his right to privacy and those rights guaranteed by the IV, IX, X and XIV Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated. In addition, the complaint alleges that the law "is beyond the power granted the legislature by Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of New York."

Plaintiff, in his affidavit in opposition to this motion, and his counsel, in oral argument, submitted that there are triable issues of fact. They argue that this Court must explore the intent of the legislature by ordering a hearing. Their argument contends that this Court cannot assume that the generally articulated intent of the legislature was to promote the health, safety and welfare of the people. Plaintiff's counsel questioned the "hidden intent" or the "political intent" of individual lawmakers in passing this bill (i.e., reference to the number of times similar legislation had been introduced, but failed to pass).

It is well established in the law that the granting of a summary judgment motion constitutes a drastic remedy. The cases stating this concept are so well known and so numerous as to make their citation unnecessary. This concept, however, does not preclude the granting of summary judgment where there is no triable issue of fact. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff herein must do more than submit arguments based upon surmise, conjecture and suspicion. Gray Mfg. Co. v. Pathe Industries, Inc., 1969, 33 A.D.2d 739, 305 N.Y.S.2d 794, affd. 26 N.Y.2d 1045, 312 N.Y.S.2d 200, 260 N.E.2d 821; Dabney v. Ayre, 1982, 87 A.D.2d 957, 451 N.Y.S.2d 218. An affidavit of an attorney lacking personal knowledge of the facts is without probative value and should be disregarded. Starbo v. Ruddy, 1978, 66 A.D.2d 950, 411 N.Y.S.2d 707.

Plaintiff, by means of his own affidavit, uses conjecture and surmise to pose questions as to the individual intents of the lawmakers. A Court may not inquire into the motives of the State Legislature. There is a well established presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. People v. Pace, 1981, 111 Misc.2d 486, 444 N.Y.S.2d 529. Every legislative enactment carries with it a presumption that there existed the necessary factual support for its provisions. Betty-June School, Inc. v. Young, 1959, 195 N.Y.S.2d 16, mod. on other grounds, 10 A.D.2d 648, 197 N.Y.S.2d 760; Gail Turner Nurses Agency, Inc. v. State, 1959, 17 Misc.2d 273, 190 N.Y.S.2d 720. The presumption that the determination of the legislature is supported by facts known to it obtains unless facts judicially known or proved preclude that possibility. Mid-States Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bates, 1952, 200 Misc. 885, 111 N.Y.S.2d 568, affd. 279 App.Div. 451, 111 N.Y.S.2d 578, affd. 304 N.Y. 700, 107 N.E.2d 603, reh. den. 304 N.Y. 788, 109 N.E.2d 82 and cert. den. 345 U.S. 908, 73 S.Ct. 648, 97 L.Ed. 1344. The fact that legislation of a similar nature has been introduced but failed to pass on many occasions is not one that persuades the Court that it may explore the area of legislative intent. There is little question that what motivates one legislator to propose or make a speech urging the passage of a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672. If under any possible state of facts an act would be constitutional, the Courts will not make a separate investigation of the facts or attempt to decide whether the legislature has reached a correct conclusion with respect to them. The legislature is presumed to have investigated and found the necessary facts. ¹ Judicial restraint in this regard is an important recognition of the separate powers of our three governmental branches.

Judicial inquiry into legislative intent is only appropriate as an aid to statutory interpretation, and then only when the statute in question is so ambiguous that the Court must consult the legislative purpose in order to determine whether the statute applies to the particular case. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan, 1961, 9 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729, 174 N.E.2d 71; Mosley v. Gorfinkel, 1965, 81 Misc.2d 999, 1001, 367 N.Y.S.2d 155.

Plaintiff relies on Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-op, Inc. v. Wickham, 25 A.D.2d 413, 270 N.Y.S.2d 184, for his contention that summary judgment is precluded where the issue of the constitutionality of a statute is involved. This reliance is misplaced. Wickham, supra, raised the question of whether or not appellant's activities involved transactions in interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const., Art. 1, Section 8, cl. 3), which would, if proved, inhibit the power of the State to regulate those activities. This was clearly a factual issue which precluded summary judgment.

In the case at bar there is no factual issue before this Court which would preclude the Court from entertaining the motion before it.

Plaintiff, in his complaint, claims that enactment of the "Seat Belt Law" is beyond the power of the legislature. In oral argument before the Court, Plaintiff was emphatic in his view that the limits of the police power should be restricted and jealously guarded.

The sovereign power, which rests in all of the States of the Union, is that legislative function which has not been limited by the Federal or State Constitutions. The legislative function is unlimited and practically absolute. ² This inherent sovereign power is commonly referred to as the police power. The definition of the police power has proved elusive, but the approach to individual cases has been pragmatic, making this a gradual growing body of the law in the best tradition of the common law. In spite of the breadth of the police power and the total uncertainty of limitations from any standpoint of firm definition or established rigidity, it is undeniably subject to both specific and general constitutional provisions. ³

The complaint herein expands the concept that the "Seat Belt Law" is beyond the power of the legislature to enact by declaring that the law "deprives Plaintiff of his right to make an intelligent decision which pertains solely to his person and his personal safety."

The amicus curiae brief before the Court took the view that Plaintiff relied on the constitutional and philosophical limitation of governmental power (the philosophy enunciated by the nineteenth centry British philosopher, John Stuart Mill). The amicus brief attempts to demonstrate how this philosophy (the concept that the individual is not accountable to society for this actions insofar as these acts affect no person but himself) has been rejected by authoritative judicial precedents. The United States Supreme Court has rejected Mill's maxim as a measure of State legislative power. Specifically, they point out that it would prevent prosecutions for obscenity, suicide, self-mutilation, adultery, and gambling, among other offenses (See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 1973, 413 U.S. 49, 68 and n. 14 and 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2641 and n. 14 and 15, 37 L.Ed.2d 446.

Counsel for Plaintiff, in oral argument, discussed the concept of individual liberty and relied upon the maxims of Thomas Jefferson, in particular that the liberty of the individual should be jealously guarded. He declared that the "Seat Belt Law" set a dangerous precedent infringing basic individual liberty and personal freedom. Counsel gave the Court examples of the extremes to which this governmental act by way of precedent could take us if this "Seat Belt Law" was not found unconstitutional (example: legislative prohibition of smoking).

Ultimately, all social legislation affects someone's "freedom"; competing interests have to be carefully weighed and a reasonable and rational relationship to the purpose for which the police power has been exercised must be demonstrated. Plaintiff views this statute as a confrontation between the right of the individual to determine his own fate and the power of the State to interfere with this determination. This argument ignores the democratic concept of the consent of the people. In a democracy the government governs with the consent of the governed. The State's police power is ill defined and often vulnerable to abuse. In a representative government the people must be vigilant and exercise their power. They must change their elected representatives if they disagree with their collective legislative acts. If the liberty of the individual is the only criteria one has, then the logical extension of that concept, in the extreme, is anarchy. As Winston Churchill said, "Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government,...