Wheeler v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2D05-5493.,2D05-5493.
• Citation: 956 So.2d 517
• Parties: Justin Chad WHEELER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

956 So.2d 517

Justin Chad WHEELER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D05-5493.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 4, 2007.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 2007.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Lisa Lott, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Judge.

Justin Chad Wheeler appeals his convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of oxycodone, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting an officer without violence, and possession of a firearm. Because the trial court erred in denying Wheeler's motion to suppress, we reverse the convictions.

Wheeler moved to suppress the contraband found inside his house, alleging that it was the fruit of an illegal search of his person and his home. The testimony at the suppression hearing disclosed that three Polk County Sheriff's deputies received a dispatch message regarding a battery in progress at a residence in Lakeland. The only information in the dispatch was that a man was battering a female in the driveway of the residence. As the deputies, who were all in separate patrol cars, responded to the call, a second dispatch message was received, advising that the individuals had gone into the house at the designated address. The dispatch did not provide the source of the information or any further description of the persons involved.

Upon arriving at the designated address, two of the deputies approached a male working on a car in the driveway. The man denied knowing anything about the reported battery; however, he indicated that there were persons inside the residence. The third deputy approached the next-door residence, where an unidentified male denied seeing anything related to the alleged battery.

One deputy then remained with the male working on the car while the other two deputies approached the front door of the subject residence. Wheeler answered the door and stepped outside. One deputy advised Wheeler of the sheriff's dispatch and the purpose of their presence. Wheeler denied any knowledge of the alleged incident but did indicate that a female had left. When the deputy asked for Wheeler's name and identification, Wheeler backed up and stepped back inside the residence. The testimony of the deputies conflicted at this point. The deputy who was talking with Wheeler said that Wheeler just backed up without saying anything. Accordingly, the deputy believed that Wheeler was refusing to answer further questions and intended to retreat inside the residence and "slam the door on us." The other deputy testified that Wheeler advised that his identification was inside and that he would retrieve it.

When Wheeler stepped back, the first deputy immediately followed him, grasping him by the arm and placing him in handcuffs. The deputy testified that this occurred inside the residence and that he was detaining Wheeler for "obstructing my investigation." Once he had secured Wheeler, the deputy who was inside the residence observed an ashtray with an object that he recognized as a marijuana bud. He then took Wheeler outside and searched his person, finding a packet of methamphetamine in his pocket.

While the deputy stood with Wheeler outside the house, the other two deputies searched the residence, looking for the female. They did not find anyone in the house but did see evidence of other contraband. After obtaining a search warrant, the deputies searched the home and seized the contraband.

Wheeler argued that the search of his person was performed without probable cause and that the initial search of his home was improper as the deputies did not have a search warrant at that time. He further argued that the subsequently obtained search warrant was invalid because the information that served as the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant had been illegally obtained by the prior warrantless search of the home.

In its written order denying the motionto suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact: (1) that the deputies were dispatched pursuant to a "911 telephone call reporting domestic violence" and (2) that when Wheeler answered his front door, he stepped outside and closed the door. The trial court also made the following findings:

The defendant subsequently attempted to flee back in the residence and did not cooperate with the officers. The officers fearing that the victim may have been hurt and held against her will inside and that the defendant may have been retreating for a weapon, attempted to stop the defendant. However, they ended up inside the residence. Officers made a sweep of the residence to locate the victim. They observed in plain view drug scales on the kitchen table and discovered an outstanding warrant for the arrest of the defendant. Drugs were found on the defendant. Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant for the residence where drugs, drug paraphernalia, and other drug related items were found.

Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that the deputies had a "reasonable belief" that their search would reveal an injured person and that they had a legal duty to investigate and "locate any injured person." Accordingly, the trial court determined that based on this exigent circumstance, the deputies did not need a search warrant to enter and search Wheeler's home. Furthermore, since the deputies discovered the existence of the outstanding warrant after they entered the residence,¹ the seizure of the contraband was "inevitable" due to Wheeler's arrest on the warrant.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 198, 166 L.Ed.2d 162 (2006). The trial court's factual findings must be affirmed if supported by competent, substantial evidence, Caso v. State, 524 So.2d 422 (Fla.1988), while the trial court's application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Here, the findings of fact as recited in the trial court's order are supported by competent, substantial evidence, except for two specific findings. First, the determination that the dispatch was based on a 911 call is not supported by the record. There is no testimony in the record as to the nature of the communication with the dispatcher except for a reference by one deputy that "an anonymous caller had called."² Similarly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the call was related to a domestic violence report.³ Rather, the deputies testified that the report advised of a man beating a woman in front of the residence at the given address.

There are thus two issues before this court: (1) whether these facts provided the deputies with a reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed that justified their warrantless entry into Wheeler's residence and (2) whether these facts supported application of the inevitable discovery theory.

"A warrantless search of a home is per se unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Seibert, 923 So.2d at 468. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has observed that such a search is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is aimed. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). "At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, one of the few recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement exists where someone inside the home requires medical aid or assistance. Seibert, 923 So.2d at 468 ("One exception is the presence of an emergency situation which requires the police to assist or render aid."). Under this exception, the police may enter a home without first obtaining a warrant if they have an "objectively reasonable basis . . . to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests." Id.

To invoke this exception, the State must rebut the presumption that the search is unreasonable by showing a "`grave emergency' that `makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community.'" Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla.2005) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). The Florida Supreme Court in Riggs went on to define "imperative" to mean that the State can show a "`compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.'" 918 So.2d at 279 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

Our analysis turns on whether the State was able to demonstrate that the deputies faced a grave emergency that made entry into Wheeler's home imperative. We conclude that the State has not met this burden. First, the record shows that the dispatch consisted of an anonymous report that a male was battering a female in the driveway of the designated residence. It was reasonable for the deputies to infer that the report was made by an eyewitness, especially after the dispatch was later updated to report that the individuals involved had gone inside the residence. However, the report contained no other details. There was no description of either of the persons involved, no description of the nature of the battery, and no indication that anyone appeared injured. Upon arrival, the deputies found nothing to corroborate the report of a battery. They saw no physical evidence indicating...