Wheir v. Dye

• Decision Date: 02 November 1937
• Docket Number: 7748.
• Parties: WHEIR et al. v. DYE et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

73 P.2d 209

105 Mont. 347

WHEIR et al. v. DYE et al.

No. 7748.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 2, 1937

Original proceeding by Frank Wheir and others, individually and as the Board of County Commissioners, County Assessor, and County Treasurer of Cascade County, against E. A. Dye and others, as the State Board of Equalization, to prohibit or restrain them in their official capacities from putting into effect the provisions of Laws 1937, c. 72, relating, in general, to the registration, licensing, and taxation of motor vehicles. On motion by the defendants to quash.

Motion sustained, and proceeding ordered dismissed.

SANDS C.J., dissenting.

Randall Swanberg, of Great Falls, Sid Stewart, of Anaconda, and W. E Keeley, of Deer Lodge, for plaintiffs.

E. G Toomey and John A. Matthews, both of Helena, for defendants.

ANDERSON Justice.

This is an original proceeding in this court by the members of the board of county commissioners of Cascade county, the county assessor, and the county treasurer, in their respective official capacities and as individuals, against the members of the State Board of Equalization, as a board, to prohibit or restrain them in their official capacities from putting into effect the provisions of chapter 72 of the Laws of 1937, relating, in general, to the registration, licensing, and taxation of motor vehicles.

It is asserted in plaintiffs' complaint that portions of the act are unconstitutional upon various grounds, which we will presently notice. The defendants have appeared by motion to quash. On the argument and in the briefs they concede the parties are proper, and that they have such an interest in the subject-matter as to entitle them to bring this proceeding.

The attack here made on the constitutionality of the act is directed against sections 1 and 9 thereof. A large part of the chapter is merely a re-enactment of existing laws, and as to these no objection is made.

The two sections above provide that all motor vehicles are assessable for the general property tax at noon on the first Monday of January, instead of at noon on the first Monday of March of each year, as heretofore provided, and at which time all other personal property is assessable. Before the owners of motor vehicles are permitted to register them or receive license plates, they must pay the property tax for that year. The tax is computed and determined upon the basis of the levy for the preceding year. Motor vehicles in the hands of dealers are assessable at the same time, as well as cars in dead storage. All except dealers must pay the property tax before operating their motor vehicles upon the highways or receiving their licenses to do so. No motor vehicles are to be taxed twice in the same year. These requirements apply to all alike, regardless of whether the taxes are a lien on real estate or not.

The result of this enactment, when considered with reference to our other taxing laws, may be stated as follows: All persons who operate motor vehicles on highways will pay the property tax on such vehicles when they secure their licenses, at the rate of taxation for the previous year. Taxes on all other personal property, including dealers' vehicles and those in dead storage, will pay at the rate for the current year. As to dealers and cars in dead storage, if secured by a sufficient lien on real estate, one-half the property tax will be paid in the month of November and the residue the following May. Section 2169.2. Rev.Codes. If they are not sufficiently secured, the assessment may be certified by the assessor and collected by the treasurer after notice, at the rate for the preceding year, with adjustments later to be made, so that the taxes conform to the current year. Chapter 200, Rev.Codes (section 2238 et seq.).

It is earnestly contended by plaintiffs that the portions of the act which we have summarized are unconstitutional as being violative of section 11, article 12 of the Constitution, which declares that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the taxing power, and that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution, section 27, article 3.

Much is said in the arguments and briefs of counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs, assailing the act upon the ground that thereby the expense of taxing motor vehicles is greatly increased, and that undue burdens are thereby laid upon the taxing authorities and the taxpayers as a result of this legislation; but all of these questions are of no concern to the courts. In Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P.2d 563, 568, we said: "The judicial tribunals of the state have no concern with the policy of legislation. That is a matter resting altogether within the discretion of another co-ordinate branch of the government. The judicial power cannot legitimately question the policy, or refuse to sanction the provisions, of any law, not inconsistent with the fundamental law of the state." See, also, State ex rel. Nagle v. Kelsey, 102 Mont. 8, 55 P.2d 685; State ex rel. State Board of Education v. Nagle, 100 Mont. 86, 45 P.2d 1041.

In Rider v. Cooney, 94 Mont. 295, 23 P.2d 261, 264, we said: "The Legislature is presumed to act, so far as mere questions of policy are concerned, with full knowledge of the facts upon which its legislation is based, and its conclusions on matters of policy are beyond judicial consideration. Chicage, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 20 S.Ct. 336, 44 L.Ed. 417."

In State ex rel. Tipton v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P.2d 227, 228, we said: "In the determination of the question of the constitutionality of any act, a statute, if possible, will be construed so as to render it valid. Hale v. County Treasurer, 82 Mont. [98] 105, 265 P. 6. It is presumed to be constitutional, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of its validity if it is possible so to do. State ex rel. Toomey v. Board of Examiners, 74 Mont. 1, 238 P. 316, 320. The invalidity of a statute must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt before the court will declare it to be unconstitutional. Herrin v. Erickson, 90 Mont. 259, 2 P.2d 296. And a statute will not be held unconstitutional unless its violation of the fundamental law is clear and palpable. Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann.Cas.1917E, 210."

This court has upheld the right of the Legislature to classify property for the purposes of taxation in the very able opinion in the case of Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146, 182 P. 477. That case has been followed and approved by this court unto the present day.

We laid down the fundamental rules underlying the classification of property in the case of Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, 93 Mont. 291, 19 P.2d 885, 887, wherein we said:

"The use to which the property is devoted and its productivity constitute the measuring stick in determining its proper classification. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Powell County, 76 Mont. 596, 247 P. 1096; Hilger v. Moore, supra; 1 Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.), § 335, p. 717; McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 666, 18 S.Ct. 242, 42 L.Ed. 614; State v. Leonardson, 51 Idaho, 646, 9 P.2d 1028.

The basis for classification of the thing classified need not be deducible from its nature. Watson v. State Comptroller of New York, 254 U.S. 122, 125, 41 S.Ct. 43, 65 L.Ed. 170; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 144, 45 S.Ct. 424, 69 L.Ed. 884, 44 A.L.R. 1454.

Discrimination merely is not inhibited, for it is recognized that there are discriminations which the best interests of society require. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 255, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237.

A classification is not open to objection unless it precludes the assumption that the classification was made in the exercise of legislative judgment and discretion. Stebbins v. Riley, supra.

Any classification is permissible which has a reasonable relation to some permitted end of government action. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra; Watson v. State Comptroller of New York, supra.

When there is a difference between various properties, it need not be great or conspicuous in order to warrant classification. Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 331, 33 S.Ct. 833, 57 L.Ed. 1206; Keeney v. [Comptroller of State of] New York, 222 U.S. 525, 536, 32 S.Ct. 105, 56 L.Ed. 299, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1139.

For the purposes of classification of property, there is a difference in the doing of business and its results. Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, supra.

It makes no difference that the facts on which the classification is based may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinions of serious strength. It is not within the province of the courts to arbitrate any such contrariety. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357, 36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann.Cas.1917B, 455; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra."

It is contended that the Legislature has classified property for purposes of taxation by section 1999, Revised Codes, placing motor vehicles in the hands of individuals and corporations in class 2 along with many other articles of personal property, and without express amendment has singled out motor vehicles for special consideration. Also, it is urged that motor vehicles in the hands of dealers are assessed at a rate different from those in the hands of individuals and corporations. By both contentions it is urged that unlawful discriminations result.

Under classifications acts we have held that two identical articles of personal property in the hands of different owners, when applied to different uses and consequent productivity, may be placed in different classes, and, therefore, subject to a different burden of...