White v. Apsley Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1907
• Citation: 80 N.E. 500,194 Mass. 97
• Parties: WHITE v. APSLEY RUBBER CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

194 Mass. 97

80 N.E. 500

WHITE v. APSLEY RUBBER CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

February 26, 1907

COUNSEL

Frank W. Knowlton and Choate, Hall & Stewart, for plaintiff.

Jas. T Joslin and Gilbert A. A. Pevey, for defendant.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

While not expressly conceded, yet upon uncontroverted evidence it is manifest that a complaint had been made under Rev. Laws c. 208, § 116, charging the plaintiff with the crime of willfully and maliciously injuring the personal property of the defendant. A warrant having been issued he was arrested at his home, and after being detained in custody for an appreciable time by the officer serving the process, he was released, while no further steps were ever taken in the prosecution of the case. Upon conflicting evidence, the weight of which was wholly for the jury they further could find that the criminal proceedings were instituted solely for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff to abandon any claim or right he might have to occupy the house as a tenant, and that when this object had been accomplished by a surrender of his tenancy, and the removal of his family and household goods he was released from arrest. Indeed, it must have been perfectly plain if either his evidence or that of his wife was accepted as substantially stating what occurred, that the criminal law was invoked, not for the purpose of vindicating justice, but to get rid of a troublesome tenant. If so found there was an abuse of criminal process, and this is sufficient to support an action against the instigator and promoter of the wrong. Wood v. Graves, 144 Mass. 365, 366, 11 N.E. 567, 59 Am. Rep. 95; White v. Apsley Rubber Co., 181 Mass. 239, 63 N.E. 885. It is strongly urged that the defendant cannot be liable as the wrong was perpetrated without its authority, or subsequent assent. But it is responsible for torts committed by its servants when acting within the scope of their employment, or by ratification may become responsible for such acts when committed in excess of their authority. Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443, 39 Am. Rep. 468; Krulevitch v. Eastern Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 573, 5 N.E. 500; Id., 143 Mass. 228, 9 N.E. 613; Fogg v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109, 12 Am. St. Rep. 583; Nims v. Mt. Hermon School for Boys, 160 Mass. 177, 178, 35 N.E. 776, 22 L. R. A. 364, 39 Am. St. Rep. 467; Commerford v. West End Street Railway Co., 164 Mass. 13, 14, 41 N.E. 59; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445, 44 L. R. A. 159, 70 Am. St. Rep. 280; Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279, 13 L. R. A. 219, 26 Am. St. Rep. 249. If, therefore, there was evidence that the prosecution was set on foot by the defendant's bookkeeper while acting as its servant in the discharge of his duties, or that his acts were subsequently ratified, the defendant must respond for the damages suffered. While the title to the premises was in a stranger, yet the defendant, as lessee, was in possession, and rented the property to the plaintiff together with the furniture which it owned, for the purpose of...