White v. Bateman
| Decision Date | 23 January 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 7219,7219 |
| Citation | 89 Ariz. 110,358 P.2d 712 |
| Parties | Laurence WHITE, Appellant, v. Jay BATEMAN, David C. Davis et al., Appellees, and Coy DeArman, Intervenor. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Harry Bagnall, Coolidge, for appellant.
Estes D. McBryde, County Atty. of Pinal County, Casa Grande, for appellees.
Powers & Rehnquist, Phoenix, for intervenor.
The basic question presented in this appeal is whether the provisions of A.R.S. Title 16, chapter 6, which is entitled 'Nomination Other Than By Primary Election,' apply to a person who has run in the preceding primary election and has been defeated therein. The facts as stipulated to by the parties may be briefly stated as follows: Laurence White (hereinafter referred to as 'appellant') and Coy DeArman (hereinafter called 'intervenor') were both candidates for sheriff of Pinal County in the Democratic Primary held on September 13, 1960. The appellant was nominated in the primary on the Democratic ticket and subsequently, within the time prescribed by law, intervenor secured the placing of his name on the general election ballot by complying with the provisions of A.R.S. Title 16, chapter 6. Upon the canvass by the appellees--Board of Supervisors of Pinal County--intervenor was declared the elected sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona.
On November 17, 1960, appellant filed suit in the Superior Court of Pinal County for an injunction to prevent the Board of Supervisors from issuing a certificate of election to intervenor and for final judgment declaring that placing of the name of intervenor on the ballot be declared illegal, that his subsequent election be declared illegal and that appellant be declared the duly elected sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona, for the term beginning the first Monday in January, 1961. Upon hearing the temporary injunction, the trial court granted intervenor's motion to intervene and dismissed the complaint on motion duly filed. From the order granting the motion to dismiss this appeal was taken. It should be noted that our ruling in Cavender v. Board of Supervisors of Pima County, 85 Ariz. 156, 333 P.2d 967, 969, was relied upon by the Board of Supervisors in placing intervenor's name on the general ballot and by the trial court in dismissing the complaint.
The appellant contends that the provisions of A.R.S. Title 16, chapter 6, are not applicable or available to a person who has been defeated in a primary election to have his name placed on the subsequent general election ballot for the same office for which he ran in the primary election because such action would be violative of the provisions of Article 7, section 10, Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S. This identical contention was presented to us in the case of Cavender v. Board of Supervisors, supra, wherein we stated:
'* * * appellees claim section 16-601, supra [A.R.S. Title 16, chapter 6], is in some manner violative of article 7, section 10, Constitution of Arizona. We are unable to perceive even the slightest merit to this contention. As a matter of fact the constitutional proviso merely contains a mandate: 'The Legislature shall enact a direct primary election law, which shall provide for the nomination of candidates for all elective State, county, and city offices, including candidates for United States Senator and for Representative in Congress.' Art. 7 Sec. 10, Const. of Ariz.
'Obviously this was not intended to make of the primary election statutes enacted pursuant thereto the exclusive method of nominating candidates. * * * Since there is no limitation in article 7, section 10, supra, upon the power of the legislature to provide for 'nomination other than by primary election', we hold the powers of the legislature upon the subject are plenary.
(Citing cases.)
Is Cavender v. Board of Supervisors sufficiently determinative of the question before us that we may rest it upon the rule of stare decisis? The rule of stare decisis is most frequently applied where to overrule a prior decision would affect property and vested rights, but it is also of great importance in matters where the rights of the public as a whole are concerned. State ex rel. La Prade v. Cox, 43 Ariz. 174, 30 P.2d 825. It is grounded on public policy that people should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not...
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