White v. Califano

• Decision Date: 12 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. CIV76-5031.,CIV76-5031.
• Citation: 437 F. Supp. 543
• Parties: Georgia WHITE, etc. v. Joseph CALIFANO et al. and Richard Kneip et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

437 F. Supp. 543

Georgia WHITE, etc. v. Joseph CALIFANO et al. and Richard Kneip et al.

No. CIV76-5031.

United States District Court, D. South Dakota.

September 12, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anita Remerowski, Terry Pechota, S. D. Legal Services, Mission, S. D., for plaintiff.

William Janklow, Atty. Gen., State of South Dakota, Pierre, S. D., David V. Vrooman, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGUE, District Judge.

I.

The allegations of Plaintiff and the procedural history of this case are set out in an earlier Memorandum Opinion of this Court. 420 F.Supp. 882. The parties have stipulated to the material facts and now seek a resolution of the controversy by means of a summary judgment.

Plaintiff has sued two groups of defendants; the first group consists of state and county officials and the second consists of federal officials. We will first consider the legal questions arising from the suit against the state officials ("state officials" hereinafter refers to both state and county officials).

II.

Plaintiff and State Defendants have stipulated to the following facts:

1. Florence Red Dog is an indigent Indian member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe residing on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, Shannon County, South Dakota.

2. On April 13, 1976, J. W. Brantley, an Indian Health Service psychiatric social worker determined that Florence Red Dog was mentally ill and in such condition that immediate treatment was necessary for her protection from physical harm and for the protection of others.

3. On or about April 14, 1976, J. W. Brantley placed phone calls to Martin Farrell, Chairman of the Fall River County Board of Mental Illness and Roland Grosshans, state's attorney of Fall River County, informing them that he wanted to file a petition before the Fall River County Board of Mental Illness for the emergency commitment of Florence Red Dog to the Human Services Center. Brantley was informed by both Farrell and Grosshans that the Fall River County Board of Mental Illness had no jurisdiction over Florence Red Dog as she was an Indian residing on an Indian reservation. For this reason they refused to entertain, accept or act upon a petition by Brantley.

4. On April 15, 1976, Judge Steven Hawk, an Oglala Sioux Tribal Court Judge presided over a hearing without transcription on the necessity for the emergency commitment of Florence Red Dog to a mental hospital. That at that hearing the evidence presented to him consisted of the petition and verified affidavit of J. W. Brantley, a true and correct copy of which is attached and incorporated herein and the affidavit of Dr. John Rogers, a true and correct copy of which is attached and incorporated herein. That based on this evidence he found Florence Red Dog to be mentally ill and as a result thereof, to be of imminent danger to herself and others. That he then ordered Florence placed in the custody of Mr. J. W. Brantley, her psychiatric social worker, for commitment to the Human Services Center. A true and correct copy of this order is attached and incorporated herein.

5. On April 15, 1976, preceding the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, Anita Remerowski (plaintiff's counsel) spoke with Roland Grosshans, State's Attorney for Fall River County and William Janklow, Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, informing them that the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court had authorized Florence Red Dog's transportation to the Human Services Center. They indicated Mr. Grosshans' position and that of the Board remained firm on the refusal to entertain a petition by Mr. Brantley.

6. That the policy of the Fall River County Board of Mental Illness and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of South Dakota is that the Fall River County Board of Mental Illness does not have the jurisdiction to entertain, accept or act upon petitions filed for the involuntary commitment to the South Dakota Human Services Center of Indian persons who are located within the boundaries of any Indian Reservation and within "Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, including the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, and therefore, will not entertain, accept or act on such petitions. (Docket entry number 72, filed Oct. 4, 1976.)

III.

Plaintiff's legal theory is that the refusal of state and county officials to commit Florence Red Dog to the Human Services Center in Yankton, South Dakota, violates her right to equal protection of the laws. The logic of her argument is compelling.

Florence Red Dog is a citizen of South Dakota, and as a citizen she can rely upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect her from abuses or neglect by state officials even though she is an Indian person residing in Indian country. The equal protection clause provides that she has the right to vote in state and county elections. Little Thunder v. State of South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (1975). A state court has held that an Indian person living on a reservation has an equal right to county welfare services.¹ Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 Cal.App.2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954). Courts that have considered the issue have held that reservation Indians are entitled to the full use of state courts.² E. g. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).

The South Dakota legislature has provided special protection for mentally ill persons. S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. 27A-7 (1967). Plaintiff contends that she is seeking this state protection for her mentally ill and indigent sister. Because state officials have refused to provide this protection on account of Florence Red Dog's race and place of residence, a violation of the equal protection clause is obvious, from Plaintiff's viewpoint, and state officials ought to be permanently enjoined from pursuing such a blatantly discriminatory policy.

State Defendants contend that Plaintiff's argument rests upon an erroneous assumption; namely, that the state officials have jurisdiction to provide the protection demanded for Florence Red Dog. The State Defendants' argument has internal consistency.

The argument begins with the premise that South Dakota has no criminal or civil jurisdiction over Indian persons residing in Indian country. See South Dakota Enabling Act, S.D.Comp.Laws Ann., Vol. 1 at 183 (1967); also e. g. Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F.Supp. 133 (D.C.S.D.1971). South Dakota courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over civil suits that involve an Indian person and arise in Indian country. Smith v. Temple, 82 S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547 (1967). The county sheriff cannot serve process in Indian country where Florence Red Dog resides. Jordan v. O'Brien, 70 S.D. 393, 18 N.W.2d 30 (1945).

State Defendants contend, therefore, that Plaintiff erroneously assumes that county officials can exercise their power where federal law clearly precludes such action. From this viewpoint, there can be no violation of the equal protection principle in this case because the demands made upon state officials could only be met if these officials acted beyond their legally defined powers by assuming jurisdiction over a civil matter having its origin in Indian country and involving an Indian person. From the viewpoint of State Defendants, an equal protection analysis cannot be reached in this case because federal law requires that Florence Red Dog be treated differently than other South Dakota citizens precisely because she is an Indian person residing in Indian country.

The issues appear to be as follows:

(1) Whether county and state officials have the power to order the involuntary commitment of an indigent, mentally-ill Indian person residing in Indian country to a state facility; and

(2) If said power exists, whether failure to make the commitment on account of race and residency within Indian country violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

IV.

There was a time when jurisdiction was a territorial concept closely linked with the concept of sovereignty. Having jurisdiction meant having exclusive power over a defined geographical area. This territorial concept of jurisdiction lay at the heart of Chief Justice Marshall's views on the powers of states vis-a-vis the powers of the Indian nations. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). Indian nations were viewed as "dependent sovereignties" that existed in some instances within the boundaries of states of the Union but were free from the powers of any state.

If this territorial principle of jurisdiction were viable today, then the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation would be for all practical purposes a foreign state within the boundaries of South Dakota. We deem it to be clear, however, that the Marshallian view of the Indian tribes and their place in our federal system of government has yielded to social and political pressures of the last one-hundred fifty years. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). The territorial concept of jurisdiction has given way to a more flexible doctrine.

V.

In Williams v. Lee, supra, the Supreme Court set a limit beyond which a state cannot constitutionally extend its powers in dealing with reservation Indians. Williams contains also implicitly a recognition that a state can extend its powers into Indian country to a limited degree. Williams is, therefore, a recognition of the fact that the territorial concept of jurisdiction is no longer viable. The Indian tribes have vestiges of sovereignty which must be guarded carefully, but reservations are not analogous to foreign states.

The recurring problem since Williams is to determine when and to what degree state power can penetrate Indian country. That is, in essence, the nature of the problem now before this Court. The resolution of this problem can only be accomplished by applying the test...