Acosta v. San Diego County

• Citation: 126 Cal.App.2d 455,272 P.2d 92
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 07 July 1954
• Parties: ACOSTA v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al. Civ. 4821.

Page 92

272 P.2d 92

126 Cal.App.2d 455

ACOSTA v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al.

Civ. 4821.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

July 7, 1954.

James Don Keller, Dist. Atty., and County Counsel, by Olney R. Thorn, Deputy Dist. Atty., San Diego, for appellants.

Robert A. Estes & Richard P. MacNulty San Diego, for respondent.

Felix S. Cohen, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Washington, D. C., of counsel, Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Lee B. Stanton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Rita Singer, Sacramento, of counsel, amici curiae, for respondent.

GRIFFIN, Justice.

This is an action for declaratory relief. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff, and defendant County of San Diego appealed. The sole question here presented is whether or not the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County has a duty, under sections 200 and 2500 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, to provide relief to the plaintiff, a needy Indian, and other Indians in like circumstances living on government reservations in said county, or whether said county is only required to provide emergency relief to such persons under the provisions of section 2501 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Section 200, supra, provides generally that 'Under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law, and in addition to jurisdiction and powers otherwise conferred, the boards of supervisors in each county may provide for the care and maintenance of the indigent sick or dependent poor of the county, and for that purpose may levy the necessary property or poll taxes, or both'. Section 2500 provides that 'Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by State hospitals or other State or private institutions.' Section 2501 provides that 'Every county may give such emergency relief to dependent nonresidents as the respective boards of supervisors deem necessary.'

The facts are not in dispute. It is conceded that plaintiff is a needy person within the meaning of section 2500, supra, but defendant contends that reservation Indians are not residents of the county for the purpose of obtaining direct county relief under the code sections involved.

Prior to April 13, 1951, the District Attorney of San Diego County, observing the lack of uniformity existing in this state between the counties as to extending direct county indigent relief to reservation Indians, requested the attorney general for his opinion as to the duty of the county to provide such relief. On August 22, 1951, the attorney general expressed his opinion that there was such a duty. 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 88. On November 30, 1951, the district attorney advised the Board of Supervisors that he could not agree with the opinion of the attorney general and that it was his belief that such an expenditure of county funds would be illegal and a violation of Article IV, sec. 31 of the Constitution of California. Relying upon the opinion of the attorney general, the Indian Bureau, on July 1, 1952, refused to provide direct relief to Indians residing on reservations in this State, although certain relief is given to reservation Indians residing in some other states. It appears from the record that at all times since July 1, 1952, the plaintiff has been relieved by payments from the County of San Diego under the Emergency Relief section, which provides that the county may give emergency relief to dependent non-residents. Both prior and subsequent to the first day of July, 1952, a contract existed between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the County of San Diego under the 'Joint Powers Agreements Act', Government Code, Secs. 6500-6512, whereby any medical or hospital services needed by the plaintiff or other Indians in like circumstances are provided for at the San Diego County General Hospital, the cost of which shall be paid to the county by warrant from the United States government. It has always been the policy of the county to treat any Indian living off of a reservation as an ordinary citizen of the county, and such Indians have always been given direct county relief when the need for such relief was established. Furthermore, by a contractual relationship between the state and the United States whereby this state is allowed to participate in the distribution of federal funds under the Old Age Security program, the Aid to Needy Blind program, and the Aid to Needy Children program, Indians living on reservations have been given their full benefits under such programs when their eligibility has been established.

The Pala Indian Reservation, upon which plaintiff, a Mission Indian, has resided since her birth, consists of approximately 1100 acres of land held in trust by the United States for the Pala Indians. Some of these Indians have been allotted some of this acreage in severalty, but none own the fee patent title. Plaintiff is a registered voter in the Pala precinct, which includes the Pala Indian Reservation.

It is therefore argued by appellant: (1) That the jurisdiction of the federal government over Indians while residing on Indian reservations is exclusive; that consequently, such Indians, while they are on the reservations, cannot be controlled nor governed by the laws of the state within which the reservations are located, citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820; and 27 Am.Jur., Indians, p. 572, Sec. 47, and cases cited. (2) That reservation Indians are 'wards of the Nation' under the guardianship of the United States government, and the Superior Court is without power to declare a termination of this relationship, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S.Ct. 216, 47 L.Ed. 299, 305; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738; and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228; that a reservation Indian may become subject to the burdens and obligations of state jurisdiction in two distinct manners: (a) he may abandon his residence upon the government reservation by moving onto nonreservation land within the state and county, or (b) the Congress of the United States, having exclusive jurisdiction over the Indians residing on reservations, may relinquish part or all of this jurisdiction to the states; that in the absence of such express reliquishment of exclusive jurisdiction by the federal government the California Reservation Indian today still stands in the position of a ward of the United States, not subject to the jurisdiction of the laws or courts of the State of California while he remains on the reservation. (3) It is contended that the Reservation Indians are not subject to the burdens or obligations of the laws of the County of San Diego or of the State of California and therefore are not entitled to the benefits of such laws while remaining on the reservations because they are not subject to taxation by either county or state authorities while residing thereon, citing United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 23 S.Ct. 478, 47 L.Ed. 532; and United States v. Pearson, 8 Cir., 231 F. 270; that neither state nor county had jurisdiction over crimes committed on reservation lands by Indians on the day here in question, and had no right to pass any laws governing such Indians thereon in reference to their lands, nor to exercise the power of eminent domain over such property without the express consent of Congress, citing People v. Carmen, 265 P.2d 900 [Rehearing granted by the Supreme Court]; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643; that California Indians owe no allegiance to the State of California and receive no protection from such state, citing United States v. Kagama, supra; and Plummer v. Hubbard, 207 App.Div. 29, 201 N.Y.S. 747; that an Indian reservation may compare with a military reservation within the State boundaries with respect to the jurisdiction of the State of California and, according to 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 176, 178, the persons stationed upon the premises become isolated, both territorially and as respects their civil relations, and the land is no longer a part of the soil of the state 'nor are the occupants inhabitants of the state'; and it is contended that this principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the United States has been recognized repeatedly by the courts of this state, citing United States v. Watkins, 9 Cir., 22 F.2d 437; Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 19 Cal.2d 818, 123 P.2d 442; Consolidated Milk Producers For San Francisco v. Parker, 19 Cal.2d 815, 123 P.2d 440.

In connection with the above contentions defendant concedes that Congress, by the adoption on August 15, 1953, of Public Laws 277, 280-281, 83rd Congress Chaps. 502, 505 and 506, First Session, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1157, 1161, 1162, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 and note, in conformance to a House Concurrent Resolution No. 108, 67 Stat. B132, has consented to a limited state jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over Reservation Indians in California and intends to adopt legislation concerning the future right of taxation of their property by the state, and that 'for all practical purposes the basic duty of law enforcement and criminal jurisdiction has been transferred from the federal government to the State of California' thereby, but contends that by the terms of this enactment, the United States Government still remains in the position of guardian to its Indian wards residing upon reservation land, citing Memorandum Opinion of Commissioner of Indian Affairs dated August 24, 1953, commenting on the provisions of Public Laws 277 and 280, supra. It is defendant's argument that the removal of this restriction clearly indicates that the criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians residing on the reservations was exclusively in the United States...