White v. County of San Diego

Decision Date14 April 1980
Citation608 P.2d 728,26 Cal.3d 897,163 Cal.Rptr. 640
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 608 P.2d 728 George F. WHITE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 31131.

Asaro & Keagy, Roscoe D. Keagy, Charles F. Campbell, San Diego, and Gideon Kanner, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Cameron L. Reeves, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

NEWMAN, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment denying them declaratory and injunctive relief against special assessments levied by defendant San Diego County to help pay the cost of widening and improving Mission Gorge Road, a major thorough-fare adjacent to the assessed parcels. Plaintiffs contend (1) that the assessments were not justified by any special benefits to their property, and (2) that each parcel's assessment was not in proportion to that parcel's benefits.

As explained below, well-established rules answer the first contention. The second contention presents this issue, new in this court: When a right-of-way is obtained for street widening, is the requirement of proportionality necessarily violated by a policy that fixes the part of each assessment attributable to the cost of acquisition at an amount equal to what was paid for that segment of the right-of-way acquired from the assessed parcel when (1) no similar component is included in the assessment made against parcels from which other segments previously have been dedicated without compensation, and (2) the record and judicially noticed facts are consistent with a reasonable legislative conclusion that each acquired segment is substantially proportionate in value to the front footage of the parcel from which it is taken?

The project covered 4.5 miles of Mission Gorge Road. Until widened in 1974-1975 the road covered only 40 feet of a 60-foot right-of-way; yet is was used heavily not only for commuting and other through traffic but also for access to commercial enterprises that adjoined the road, including gas stations, drive-ins, shopping centers, trailer parks, and apartment complexes. The project widened the right-of-way to 102 feet and the road to 82 feet, consisting of four 12-foot lanes divided by an 18-foot median (used for left turns) and flanked by 8-foot shoulders (used for parking). A bridge was enlarged; curbs, gutters, sidewalks, storm drains, traffic signals, and related facilities were installed.

Initiated in 1971, the project was financed partly from the county road fund and partly through an assessment district formed under the Improvement Act of 1911 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5000 et seq.). 1 The arrangement was the county's first use of Policy J-16, adopted in 1970. It deals with the financing of improvements to highways that were then designated as "Select System roads" (former §§ 186.3, 18.4, 2106). It requires that abutting owners bear the cost of acquiring the right-of-way for and constructing the improvement's "local interest portion", defined as "that portion of the road used primarily for access to adjacent land and generally consist[ing] of a travel lane and parking lane (20 feet in combined width), and concrete curb, gutter, and sidewalk on each side of the through roadway." It states that the county will bear costs of engineering, drainage, appraisal negotiations, and damage to abutting property.

The board of supervisors' resolution of March 14, 1972, which instituted assessment proceedings for the Mission Gorge project, declared that the county would "contribute ... the cost of all work abutting publicly owned property ... and the cost of all engineering, right of way acquisition (except the actual land purchase cost), construction of two travel lanes, median strip and bridge widening, installation ... of ... drainage facilities [and] traffic signals, and relocation of any utility not the responsibility of a utility company." The remaining costs were substantially those that Policy J-16 pronounced to be the responsibility of abutting owners.

On March 6 and June 5, the board adopted plans and specifications and an Assessment District Map delineating a district comprising the property fronting on the improvement. On July 10 the board resolved that the project was "of more than local and ordinary benefit to the public" and declared the new district "to be the district benefited by said work and improvement and to be assessed to pay the costs and expenses thereof." At ensuing hearings the owners, substantially all of whose property was commercial, complained that the project would mostly benefit the through traffic and thus should be paid for out of general funds or by assessing a larger district. On May 8 and June 5, 1974, the board reaffirmed its declarations of special benefit to the described district. The construction contract was awarded in July 1974; the project was completed in October 1975. Of the total cost the assessed owners contributed $649,571; the county, $2,516,009.

One hundred forty-three parcels were assessed as follows: (1) construction cost at $16.40 per front foot less credit for improvements privately constructed; (2) right-of-way costs; (3) administrative expense ($25 plus 0.56 percent of construction cost).

Plaintiffs' main objection to the apportionment of assessments involves the method of assessing right-of-way cost. As explained by county officials at the hearings, the disputed method was "based on the precept that each parcel will provide the right of way for that portion of the road upon which the parcel fronts and the benefit to the parcel is equal to the value of the strip of right of way taken." That value was fixed at either the amount paid for the land or the appraiser's estimate if that amount had not yet been determined. It did not include compensation for elements such as improvements, easements or damages. There was no right-of-way assessment for 30 parcels from which the right-of-way already had been dedicated under planning and zoning regulations, including an "Official Centerline Ordinance" that conditioned permission for private development on such dedication.

The policy of "assessing back" amounts paid for land taken, not articulated in Policy J-16, seems to have antedated this assessment proceeding. It apparently was articulated at a public meeting held in August 1971 to explain the project.

There is practically no information in the record on variations between ratios of right-of-way assessments to front footage or other parcel characteristics. From statements of protesting property owners and of officials at the hearings, however, it appears that some owners vigorously negotiated or litigated the amounts they were to receive for rights-of-way and that consequent disparities in compensation paid produced corresponding disparities in the right-of-way component of the assessments.

The board finally confirmed the assessments on January 28, 1976, and plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief on February 26 and 17. After a consolidated trial the two actions were consolidated for all purposes. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and adjudged against plaintiffs.

Did plaintiffs receive a fair hearing?

Plaintiffs concede that the county adopted the resolutions, held the hearings, and followed all other steps necessary to form the district and impose the assessments. They contend, though, that the board did not accord a fair hearing because it had prejudged critical issues. They point to Policy J-16's formulation of what improvement costs should be assessed against abutting owners and to prior formulation of the scheme that assesses owners (1) for construction costs on a front-foot basis, and (2) for right-of-way costs measured by the amount paid for the strip taken from each assessed parcel.

The contention is without merit. Policy J-16 states that "from time to time the Board may make exception when the application of the policy would result in unusual and unreasonable hardship." Plaintiffs' objections to assessment financing and to assessment policies were fully discussed. Setting up special districts is a legislative process (Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills (1976) 16 Cal.3d 676, 683, 129 Cal.Rptr. 97, 547 P.2d 1377), and a board properly may adopt policies for applying its assessing powers to recurring situations. Mission Gorge presented a familiar problem in many areas of growing population: a narrow road that became congested because of commercial strip-development and the growth of surrounding communities dependent on it for access. The general policies helped provide assurance of evenhanded treatment of similar problems throughout the county. The policies were fully explained at the hearings, and the board could have modified or rejected them had opponents' testimony been persuasive. Was the district specially benefited?

Property may be specially assessed only for improvements that provide it benefits beyond those received by the public. (City of Baldwin Park v. Stoskus (1972) 8 Cal.3d 563, 568, 105 Cal.Rptr. 325, 503 P.2d 1333.). Plaintiffs contend that the congestion on Mission Gorge Road was due wholly to its use by strangers to the abutting properties, that widening the road was not needed to provide access to those properties, and that accordingly the properties received no benefit that would justify special assessment.

The county's determination of benefit is conclusive unless absence of benefit clearly appears from the record or judicially noticed facts. (Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, supra, 16 Cal.3d 676, at 685, 129 Cal.Rptr. 97, 547 P.2d 1377; Larsen v. San Francisco (1920) 182 Cal. 1, 15, 186 P. 757.) The record shows that the project did improve access to the abutting properties, all of which were commercial, by reducing congestion, improving traffic...

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