White v. Duke Energy Ky., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:12–CV–00633.,1:12–CV–00633. |
| Citation | 1 F.Supp.3d 808 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
| Parties | Eric D. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. DUKE ENERGY KENTUCKY, INC., Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John H. Forg, III, Law Office of John H. Forg, West Chester, OH, for Plaintiff.
Richard L. Moore, Gerron Lavon McKnight, Frost Brown Todd, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 16), Plaintiff's Response (doc. 19), and Defendant's Reply (doc. 28). For the reasons indicated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
Plaintiff Eric White (“White”) worked for Defendant Duke Energy for over twenty-one years, rising to a management position in early 2007 (doc. 19). White is an African–American, and the only African American in a management position at Defendant's East Bend Station power-generating facility ( Id.).
On November 23, 2011, White observed two employees, Duane Doyle (“Doyle”) and Daryl Duty (“Duty”), engaging in a heated argument and White intervened to break them up ( Id.). It was the end of White's shift, at 4:00 P.M. the day before the Thanksgiving holiday (doc. 16). White collected his things to go, and while leaving, Duty stopped White, asking White to ensure that Doyle would not damage Duty's car in the parking lot ( Id.). In the parking lot, White asked Doyle about the argument, and Doyle informed White that immediately before the yelling match, Duty had pushed Doyle down, and that Doyle was hurt in the process ( Id.). White returned to the building to tell Duty nothing had happened to Duty's car, and to ask Duty for his version of the altercation ( Id.). Duty said Doyle had kicked a garbage can at him and then the two started wrestling ( Id.). White observed that Duty's pants were torn and he saw what he thought was a scratch where the tear was ( Id.). White proceeded to leave for the Thanksgiving holiday and reported back to work the following Tuesday, November 29, 2011 ( Id.).
After he returned to work, White heard people at the plant talking about the fight between Duty and Doyle, and he also had heard the fight had been reported and was being investigated ( Id.). Doyle approached White and requested White talk to Duty, to see if they could simply put their problems behind them ( Id.). Doyle also indicated his side was hurting from the fight ( Id.). White, as requested by Doyle, approached Duty to explain what Doyle had said ( Id.).
Just over a week later, White was called into a meeting with the committee of people conducting the investigation into the altercation ( Id.). The committee was comprised of Teresa Taylor, Human Resources Specialist; George Dilz, White's supervisor; and Billy Hyland, the Maintenance Supervisor ( Id.). During the interview, the committee asked White “did you see or did you have any information pertaining to the physical confrontation between Daryl Duty and Duane Doyle on Wednesday, November 23, 2011?” White responded:
I was going to the refrigerator to get food and heard yelling. Walked out and saw Daryl and Duane about four feet apart yelling at each other. I heard f-bombs and I heard Duane tell Daryl that he would kick his fat ass and Daryl said come on. I said break it up. Duane grabbed his lunch box and walked away. Daryl Duty left also into the ICE break room. Mark House headed into the maintenance break room.
( Id.). The committee also asked White “what action did you take concerning this event, if any?” ( Id.) White responded that he said “break it up!” and that he was ready to go downstairs if needed ( Id.). The committee further asked if White knew anything else about the altercation and White responded in the negative ( Id.).
Later that day, Plaintiff indicates he stopped one of the committee members, Mr. Hyland, and told Hyland he had additional information ( Id.). Hyland responded that the committee was already planning to call White in for a second meeting ( Id.). During the second meeting, White stated the altercation was physical and that Doyle claimed to have been injured ( Id.).
After the committee completed interviews it concluded that by failing to report the fight, by not sharing that Doyle reported being hurt, and by not sharing completely what he had been told during the first interview, White had violated company safety policy, harassment policy, and the code of business ethics ( Id.). The committee recommended that White's employment be terminated ( Id.). White was informed of the decision and his last day was December 16, 2011 ( Id.). Following his termination, White appealed his discharge through Defendant's recourse process, but his termination was affirmed ( Id.). Defendant replaced White with Greg Bouras, a Caucasion (doc. 19). White then filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging race discrimination, which issued a right to sue letter (doc. 16). Plaintiff filed his Complaint for federal and state law racial discrimination on August 21, 2012 (doc. 1). Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment (doc. 16), to which Plaintiff responded (doc. 19), and Defendant replied (doc. 28) such that this matter is ripe for the Court's review.
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1992) (per curiam). In reviewing the instant motion, “this Court must determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir.1993), quoting in part Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The process of moving for and evaluating a motion for summary judgment and the respective burdens it imposes upon the movant and the non-movant are well settled. First, “a party seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). The movant may do so by merely identifying that the non-moving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. SeeBarnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.1993).
Faced with such a motion, the non-movant, after completion of sufficient discovery, must submit evidence in support of any material element of a claim or defense at issue in the motion on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As the “requirement [of the Rule] is that there be no genuine issue of material fact,” an “alleged factual dispute between the parties” as to some ancillary matter “will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added); see generally Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989). Furthermore, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir.1994). Accordingly, the non-movant must present “significant probative evidence” demonstrating that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial on the merits. Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir.1993); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.
Although the non-movant need not cite specific page numbers of the record in support of his claims or defenses, “the designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the non-moving party relies.” Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405, quoting InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, mere conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir.1990). The Court must view all submitted evidence, facts, and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Furthermore, the district court may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in deciding the motion. See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir.1994).
Ultimately, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that no...
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