White v. Ector Cnty. Appraisal Dist.
| Decision Date | 14 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-17-00059-CV,11-17-00059-CV |
| Parties | VICTOR DEWAYNE WHITE, Appellant v. ECTOR COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Ector County, Texas
Ector County Appraisal District sued Victor Dewayne White for the recovery of delinquent ad valorem taxes. The trial court found that White was delinquent in the payment of property taxes in the amount of $1,634.31 and authorized Ector County Appraisal District to foreclose on the property. On appeal, White requests that this court grant his "Writ of Quo Warranto," vacate the judgment, and vacate what he describes as a "void" judgment. We affirm.
The Appraisal District alleged that White had failed to pay his property taxes on certain real property in Ector County and filed suit. The Ector County Sherriff's Department completed service of the citation and petition on White, who was incarcerated in the Ector County Detention Center. Although White never filed an answer in the suit, he filed a motion to dismiss the case. The Appraisal District amended its petition and moved the trial court to set a tax hearing; the Appraisal District served the motion on all parties and counsel that had appeared. White acknowledged in his appellate brief that he received notice of the tax hearing. The trial court set the tax hearing for January 23, 2017. On that date, the Appraisal District appeared with counsel and announced ready, while White, who was not represented by counsel, did not appear. White also had not requested to appear by other means.
After the Appraisal District adduced evidence of the delinquent taxes that White owed for his property, as shown in certified copies of tax records, it moved for the admission of that evidence, which the trial court admitted. White presented no evidence in response to the Appraisal District's evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appraisal District.
White asserts multiple complaints in his "Writ of Quo Warranto," which this court accepted as his brief in this appeal. White also filed a reply brief in response to the Appraisal District's brief. Because of the multiplicity of complaints, we do not recite them here but, instead, address them in our analysis below.
In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Sw. Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). When neither party requests findings of factand conclusions of law following a nonjury trial, all fact findings necessary to support the trial court's judgment are implied. Shields Ltd. P'ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017) (citing Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003)). When, however, as in this cause, a reporter's record is filed, the trial court's implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). We conduct any review of sufficiency challenges to implied findings under the same standards of review that govern sufficiency challenges to jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Jistel v. Tiffany Trail Owners Ass'n, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (citing Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989)). In the absence of findings, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court if it can be upheld on any available legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987).
White asserts many complaints that are unrelated to his appeal of a delinquent tax case. White first argues that this court should grant his "Writ of Quo Warranto" because of alleged bad acts by several county employees. White also complains of alleged fraudulent acts by a now-deceased justice of the peace. Quo warranto proceedings provide the exclusive means by which the public may protect itself from unlawful occupancy of a public office. Norville v. Parnell, 118 S.W.3d 503, 505 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). However, White's appeal arises out of a suit over his failure to pay property taxes. None of his complaints in his brief about alleged county employees' actions and a deceased justice of the peace were before the trial court, nor was his quo warranto claim before the trial court. A judgmentmust be based upon pleadings, and as the Texas Supreme Court has stated, "[A] plaintiff may not sustain a favorable judgment on an unpleaded cause of action, in the absence of trial by consent . . . ." Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tex. 1979) (quoting Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. R.R. Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. 1964)). White's unpleaded complaints were not tried by consent and are irrelevant. Therefore, they are not before this court. See id. White next complains that he has a deceptive trade practices claim and a complaint about an arrest, but these claims also were unpleaded and not tried by consent, are irrelevant to this tax suit, and are not before this court. See id.
White further complains of alleged fraudulent acts by the law firm that represented the Appraisal District in the suit, complains of unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and claims that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies in this case. To preserve a complaint for appeal, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion and that the trial court ruled on the request, objection, or motion—either expressly or implicitly—or refused to rule and the party objected to the court's refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
A pro se litigant is required to properly present his case on appeal, just as he is required to properly present his case to the trial court. Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (citing Martinez v. El Paso Cty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. struck)). In addition, the complaint raised on appeal must be the same as the complaint presented to the trial court. See Gerdes v. Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). Furthermore, a party may not enlarge a ground of error on appeal to include an objection not asserted at trial. See Pfeffer v. S. Tex. Laborers' Pension Tr. Fund, 679 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
With respect to the complaints outlined above, White has not preserved them for appeal because he did not object or otherwise bring them to the trial court's attention. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). In addition, White never raised a "facial challenge" to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution at trial. We note that a facial challenge may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As a result, that issue is not before us. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Karenev, 281 S.W.3d at 434. However, an "as applied" challenge may be brought during or after a trial on the merits. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But in this case, White has not briefed an "as applied" challenge. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see Mathews v. State, 918 S.W.2d 666, 667 n.2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd). In addition, White's briefing on all of these complaints lacks a table of contents, index of authorities, statement regarding oral argument, issues presented, summary of the argument, and arguments that reference relevant parts of the record as well as relevant case law, as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). We also "know of no authority obligating us to become advocates for a particular litigant through performing their research and developing their argument for them." Tello v. Bank One, N.A., 218 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (quoting Jordan v. Jefferson Cty., 153 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied)). Because White failed to adequately brief these issues, he has waived them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1, 38.9; see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994).
White asserts that he failed to receive service of process for the tax suit, failed to receive the amended petition, and failed to receive notice of the tax hearing, which he claims violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution. He also claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. He argues that the violation of his due process rights requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial court. We disagree.
In re D.M.B., 467 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied). "A party enters a general appearance when it (1) invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court's jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative action from the court." Id. (quoting Exito Electronics Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302,...
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