White v. Kline

• Citation: 119 Wash. 45,204 P. 796
• Decision Date: 08 March 1922
• Docket Number: 16636.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: WHITE v. KLINE et al.

204 P. 796

119 Wash. 45

WHITE v. KLINE et al.

No. 16636.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 8, 1922

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Frater, Judge.

Action by N. G. White against Frank Kline and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Morris B. Sachs, of Seattle, for appellants.

Shorett McLaren & Shorett, of Seattle, for respondent.

MACKINTOSH J.

This action for damages, arising out of an automobile collision was tried to the court without a jury and resulted in judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The city ordinance of Seattle, where the collision occurred, makes it a misdemeanor for any person under the age of 18 years to drive or operate a motor vehicle without first obtaining a permit. The collision in this case occurred between respondent's auto truck and appellants' taxicab. The respondent's son, who was less than 18 years of age, was at the time driving the truck without having obtained a permit. Frank Kline, one of the appellants, was the driver of the taxicab.

This appeal presents a question of fact and a question of law. It is the claim of appellants that, because the respondent at the time of the accident was operating his truck in violation of the ordinance, such negligence prevents his recovery. Of course, it is negligence per se to operate a vehicle without complying with the positive requirements of a statute or ordinance in regard to such operation, but that does not mean that the person guilty of negligence in that respect cannot recover against some one else whose negligence immediately occasioned the injury. Negligance arising from the violation of a statute has the same effect as any other negligence. If it is not the proximate cause of the injury, it will avoid liability the same as any other negligence. This court has sanctioned this rule heretofore in Burlie v Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 P. 684, Koch v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 583, 194 P. 572, and Greater Motors v. Taxi Co. (Wash.) 197 P. 327.

The rule is generally recognized that the violation of the law must be the proximate cause of the injury suffered in order to bar the injured party's right of recovery. If there is no causal relation between the violation of the law and the happening of the accident, the right of recovery remains. Lang v. New York Central Railway Co., 255 U.S. 455, 41 S.Ct 381, 65 L.Ed. 729; Moran v. Dickinson, 204 Mass 559, 90 N.E. 1150, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675; Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N.E. 404, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; Conroy v. Mather, 217 Mass. 91, 104 N.E. 487, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801;...