White v. State

• Decision Date: 09 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. S13A0794.,S13A0794.
• Citation: 753 S.E.2d 115,293 Ga. 523
• Parties: WHITE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

293 Ga. 523

753 S.E.2d 115

WHITE

v.The STATE.

No. S13A0794.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 9, 2013.

Sheueli C. Wang, Atlanta, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Dep. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Katherine Thrower Parvis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Arthur C. Walton, Asst. Dist. Attys., Atlanta, for appellee.

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Adrian White was tried by a Fulton County jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of Anthony Jones. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, White appeals, contending, among other things, that the trial court applied the wrong standard to the general grounds of his motion. We agree that the trial court applied the wrong standard, and we vacate the denial of the motion and remand for the trial court to reconsider it, applying the correct standard.¹

1. Although White does not dispute that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain his convictions, we nevertheless review the record and independently assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence. In doing so, we apply the familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), asking whether any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence adduced at trial that White is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See 443 U.S. at 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781. As to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact. See Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506, 739 S.E.2d 313 (2013).

So viewed, the evidence in this case shows that, early on the evening of September 8, 2004, Jones and Arlene Long drove to the apartment building in which White's mother lived. White, Marquez Webb, and Demario Thornton were outside the apartment, and Jones exited his vehicle and exchanged heated words with Thornton. Webb apparently tried to put an end to the argument, White told Jones to leave, and White's mother called for White to come inside. Then, according to Thornton and Webb,² Jones began walking back to his vehicle, and as he did, White took a gun from Thornton, shot Jones in the back, and hit Jones with the gun. At that point, White, Thornton, and Webb all kicked Jones as he lay wounded on the ground. Jones was unarmed when he was shot, and he later died as a result of the gunshot wound. The evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the convictions, inasmuch as it is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that White is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.³ See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781.

2. Even when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury is “contrary to ... the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5–5–20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence.” OCGA § 5–5–21. When properly raised in a timely motion, these grounds for a new trial—commonly known as the “general grounds”—require the trial judge to exercise a “broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’ ” Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264(2), 737 S.E.2d 311 (2013). In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must consider some of the things that she cannot when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. See Choisnet v. State, 292 Ga. 860, 861, 742 S.E.2d 476 (2013). Although the discretion of a trial judge to award a new trial on the general grounds is not boundless—it is, after all, a discretion that “should be exercised with caution [and] invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict,” Alvelo v. State, 288 Ga. 437, 438(1), 704 S.E.2d 787 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted)—it nevertheless is, generally speaking, a substantial discretion.⁴ See State v. Harris, 292 Ga. 92, 94, 734 S.E.2d 357 (2012).

Here, White properly raised the general grounds in a timely motion for new trial. It appears, however, that the trial court applied the wrong standard in its consideration of the general grounds, erroneously applying the standard by which a court assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence. For instance, the trial court explained in its order that it was viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to [the] verdict,” and the trial court explained its rejection of the general grounds in these terms: “The evidence supported the verdict.... The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.... [T]he evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia ... to support the verdict.” Nothing in the order of the trial court indicates to us that the trial court performed its “duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence” in its consideration of the general grounds. Walker, 292 Ga. at 264(2), 737 S.E.2d 311 (citations omitted). Instead, its repeated statements that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict “denotes that the trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not discretion.” Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386(2), 711 S.E.2d 676 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). The same is true of the citation to Jackson and the statement that the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Walker, 292 Ga. at 264(2), 737 S.E.2d 311. Accordingly, we can only conclude that the trial court “failed to apply the proper standard in assessing the weight of the evidence as requested by [White] in his motion for new trial.” Manuel, 289 Ga. at 385(2), 711 S.E.2d 676 (citation and punctuation omitted). For this reason, we vacate the denial of the motion for new trial, and we remand for the trial court to apply the proper standard to the general grounds and to exercise its discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror” pursuant to OCGA §§ 5–5–20 and 5–5–21. ⁵Choisnet, 292 Ga. at 862, 742 S.E.2d 476;Walker, 292 Ga. at 265, 737 S.E.2d 311;Manuel, 289 Ga. at 387(2), 711 S.E.2d 676;Alvelo, 288 Ga. at 439(2), 704 S.E.2d 787.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur.

1. Jones was killed on September 8, 2004. White and co-defendants Demario Thornton and Marquez Webb were indicted on December 7, 2004, and all three men were charged with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault by shooting Jones with a firearm, aggravated assault by punching, kicking, and hitting Jones with a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Their trial commenced on October 30, 2007, but after the State rested, the case against Webb was severed from the case against White and Thornton, and Webb pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. The jury returned its verdict on November 8,...