White v. Teague

• Citation: 182 S.W.2d 288,353 Mo. 247
• Decision Date: 05 September 1944
• Docket Number: 38991
• Parties: James White v. Alice Louise Teague, Plaza Express Co., a Corporation, and Carl Collier, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

182 S.W.2d 288

353 Mo. 247

James White v. Alice Louise Teague, Plaza Express Co., a Corporation, and Carl Collier, Appellants

No. 38991

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 5, 1944

Appeal from Dunklin Circuit Court; Hon. James V. Billings Judge.

Affirmed.

Max B. Reid, Reid & Evrard, John M. Dalton and Arthur U Goodman, Jr., for appellant Alice Louise Teague.

(1) Defendant's counsel should not be compelled to reveal the name of an insurance company by whom they are employed, such information being irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in the case. Buehler v. Festus Merc. Co., 343 Mo. 139 119 S.W.2d 961; Schroeder v. Rawlings, 344 Mo. 630 127 S.W.2d 678. (2) It is prejudicial and reversible error to inject the poison of "insurance" into a suit for damages, particularly where there is no evidence in the case to connect such matter with the facts properly admitted in evidence. Gore v. Brockman, 138 Mo.App. 231, 119 S.W. 1082; Trent v. Lechtman Printing Co., 141 Mo.App. 437, 126 S.W. 238; Pettit v. Goetz Sales Co., 221 Mo.App. 966, 281 S.W. 973; Chambers v. Kennedy, 274 S.W. 726; Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876, 51 S.W.2d 4; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689, 59 S.W.2d 673; Whitman v. Carver, 337 Mo. 1247, 88 S.W.2d 885; Buehler v. Festus Merc. Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S.W.2d 961; Pitcher v. Schoch, 345 Mo. 1184, 139 S.W.2d 463; Melvin v. Cater, 221 Mo.App. 1212, 299 S.W. 103. (3) Defendant Teague was entitled to reject at least one juror from the list of eighteen men on the panel. All defendants had agreed on one challenge, and since defendants Plaza Express Company and Carl Collier were represented by the same attorneys and relied on the same facts as a defense, defendant Teague was deprived of her rights in not being allowed to reject a single member of the jury panel. The challenging of jurors from the panel is exercising the right of rejection and not the right of selection. The court abused its descretion in denying to appellant Teague the right to reject any juror, thereby enabling her codefendants to select and retain the juror desired by them. Sec. 720, R.S. 1939; 35 C.J., p. 405, sec. 459, p. 408, sec. 463, pp. 409, 410, sec. 468; O'Brien v. Vulcan Iron Works, 7 Mo.App. 257; Eckert v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 2 Mo.App. 36; Rogers v. Armstrong, 30 S.W. 848; Flowers v. Flowers, 74 Ark. 212, 85 S.W. 242; Cuero First Natl. Bank v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 97 Tex. 201, 77 S.W. 410; Waggoner v. Dodson, 96 Tex. 6, 68 S.W. 813, 69 S.W. 993; Hargrave v. Vaughn, 82 Tex. 112, 17 S.W. 772; Sweeney v. Taylor, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 92 S.W. 442; International, etc., R. Co., v. Bingham, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 469, 89 S.W. 1113; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Stell, 61 S.W. 980; Levyn v. Koppin, 183 Mich. 232, 149 N.W. 993. (4) It is error to give an instruction (such as No. 9-D) which is confusing or contradictory within itself. Schimmelpfenning v. Wells, 24 S.W.2d 154; Larey v. M.K. & T.R. Co., 333 Mo. 949, 64 S.W.2d 681; Kick v. Franklin, 342 Mo. 715, 117 S.W.2d 284; Perles v. Feldman, 28 S.W.2d 375; Yancey v. Central Mut. Ins. Assn., 77 S.W.2d 149; Bain v. M.K. & T.R. Co., 141 S.W.2d 577. (5) Instruction No. 9-D is further erroneous in that it informs the jury that Collier was not guilty of negligence if he made such a choice "as he believed a person of ordinary prudence might have made under like or similar circumstances." The test is not what he believed a person of ordinary prudence might have done; the test is what such a person would have done. 45 C.J., p. 688, sec. 56, pp. 710-713, secs. 92-96, pp. 962-966, secs. 517-519; Blyston-Spencer v. St. Louis United Rys. Co., 152 Mo.App. 118, 132 S.W. 1175; O'Rourke v. Lindell Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 342, 44 S.W. 254; Crupe v. Spicuzza, 86 S.W.2d 347; Mayne v. May Stern Furn. Co., 21 S.W.2d 211; Garvey v. Ladd, 266 S.W. 727; Williams v. Kansas City, 177 S.W. 783; The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317, 49 L.Ed. 610; Maguire v. Barrett, 223 N.Y. 49, 119 N.E. 79; Mertz v. Connecticut Co., 217 N.Y. 475, 112 N.E. 166; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Vanarsdell, 25 Ky. L. 1432, 77 S.W. 1103; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Scarborough, 104 S.W. 408, affirmed 101 Tex. 436, 108 S.W. 804; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Aitken, 196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317, 49 L.Ed. 317, 49 L.Ed. 610, affirmed 124 F. 1, 59 C.C.A. 521. (6) The "emergency doctrine" attempted to be enunciated in Instruction 9-D does not apply where the so-called emergency arises through the negligence of the one claiming the benefit of the rule, as in this case. 42 C.J., pp. 890-892, sec. 592, p. 713, sec. 96; Garvey v. Ladd, 266 S.W. 727; Hall v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 240 S.W. 175; Iman v. Walter Freund Bread Co., 332 Mo. 461, 58 S.W.2d 477; Windsor v. McKee, 22 S.W.2d 65; Crupe v. Spicuzza, 86 S.W.2d 347. (7) The court committed error in withdrawing Instruction 3-T after all instructions had been read to the jury and argument of the case completed, as defendant Teague was thereby deprived of her rights to have her case argued under the instructions of the court. Sec. 1118, R.S. 1939. (8) Instruction 3-T properly declared the law, was supported by the facts, and should have been given to the jury. Sec. 8385 (1), R.S. 1939; Dean v. Moceri, 87 S.W.2d 218; Ross v. Wilson, 163 S.W.2d 342; Nichols v. Schlensner, 227 Mo.App. 1106, 59 S.W.2d 708; Petring v. Albers, 241 S.W. 452. (9) The comments of the court as to the evidence were highly prejudicial, improper, and constitute reversible error. In effect, the court told the jury that defendant Teague had no right to proceed into the intersection, that there was no evidence she arrived at the intersection at approximately at the same time as the truck of her codefendant, thereby depriving defendant Teague of her defense before the jury. Such conduct and remarks amounted to an abuse of discretion and constituted reversible error. 64 C.J., p. 94, sec. 98, p. 102, sec. 107, p. 516, sec. 468; State ex rel. v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 149 Mo. 181, 50 S.W. 321; Schmidt v. St. Louis R. Co., 149 Mo. 269, 50 S.W. 921; Rose v. Kansas City, 125 Mo.App. 321, 102 S.W. 578; Webb v. Baldwin, 165 Mo.App. 240, 147 S.W. 849; State v. Potter, 102 S.W. 668, 125 Mo.App. 465; McPeak v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 128 Mo. 617, 30 S.W. 170; Dreyfus v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 124 Mo.App. 585, 102 S.W. 53; Laible v. Wells, 317 Mo. 141, 296 S.W. 428; Burgess v. Garvin, 272 S.W. 108, 219 Mo.App. 162. (10) The jury should have been discharged after the court had withdrawn Instruction 3-T and made its several remarks to the jury in connection with same. The effect of such action on the jury cannot be eliminated by the court's statement that he did not intend to comment on the evidence, which he clearly did. See all authorities cited under Point (9), supra. (11) A defendant may complain of an instruction given on behalf of a codefendant which is prejudicial to the complaining defendant. Pierce v. Michel, 60 Mo.App. 187; Asmus v. United Rys. Co., 152 Mo.App. 521, 134 S.W. 92; Asmus v. United Rys. Co., 160 Mo.App. 61, 140 S.W. 933; Nevens v. Solomon & Finn, 235 Mo.App. 967, 139 S.W.2d 1109; Story v. People's Motorbus Co., 327 Mo. 719, 37 S.W.2d 898; Barr v. Nafziger Baking Co., 328 Mo. 423, 41 S.W.2d 559; Gabelman v. Bolt & Bonner, 336 Mo. 539, 80 S.W.2d 171; McCombs v. Ellsberry & Fellis, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S.W.2d 135; Grimes v. Red Line Service, Inc., 337 Mo. 743, 85 S.W.2d 767; Berry v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 Mo. 658, 108 S.W.2d 98; State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes, 347 Mo. 968, 149 S.W.2d 836; Kelly v. Laclede R.E. & Inv. Co., 348 Mo. 407, 155 S.W.2d 90; Bowman v. Moore, 167 S.W.2d 675.

R. F. Baynes, Harry H. Bock and L. R. Jones for appellants Plaza Express Company and Carl Collier.

(1) More than six months had elapsed between the date of the accident in which the deceased wife of plaintiff was killed and the date this suit was filed. The deceased died on September 20, 1941, and suit was not filed until March 20, 1942; the six months period expired on March 19, 1942. Secs. 3652, 3654, R.S. 1939. (2) A case should not be submitted to the jury unless there is evidence to support a finding of liability therefor. In other words, a case should not be submitted to the jury upon mere suspicion or conjecture. 4 Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, sec. 2847, p. 604; McCoy v. Home Oil & Gas Co., 60 S.W.2d 715; Burton v. Joyce, 22 S.W.2d 890; Cox v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 9 S.W.2d 96; Goodson v. Schwandt, 300 S.W. 795; Rowe v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 247 S.W. 443; Miller v. Wilson, 288 S.W. 997; Shepherd v. Railroad Co., 72 S.W.2d 985; Bauer v. Wood, 154 S.W.2d 356. (3) There is no evidence whatever in the case justifying a submission under the humanitarian rule. State ex rel. v. Shain, 159 S.W.2d 582; Gardener v. Turk, 123 S.W.2d 158; Swain v. Anders, 140 S.W.2d 730; Pogue v. Rosegrant, 98 S.W.2d 528; Perkins v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 102 S.W.2d 915; Putman v. Unionville Granite Works, 122 S.W.2d 389; Feeherty v. Sullivan, 129 S.W.2d 926; Winter v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 129 S.W.2d 99; Branson v. Abernathy Furniture Co., 130 S.W.2d 562; White v. Mo. Motors Dist. Co., 47 S.W.2d 245; Irving v. Kelting, 46 S.W. 924; Woods v. United Rys. Co., 203 S.W. 489; Phillips v. Henson, 30 S.W.2d 1065; Clark v. Railroad Co., 6 S.W.2d 954; Karte v. J.R. Brockman Mfg. Co., 247 S.W. 417; Shanks v. Springfield Traction Co., 101 Mo.App. 702; McGowan v. Wells, 24 S.W.2d 633; Huckleberry v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 26 S.W.2d 980; Bumgardner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 102 S.W.2d 594; Wallace v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H., & P. Co., 77 S.W.2d 1011; Massman v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 119 S.W.2d 833. (4) In applying the humanitarian rule, it is held that the defendant has a right to presume until the contrary appears, that the other driver will use his eyes and act as a reasonable...