White v. Vananda

• Decision Date: 15 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 7128SC665,7128SC665
• Parties: George Thomas WHITE v. William E. VANANDA.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 247

185 S.E.2d 247

13 N.C.App. 19

George Thomas WHITE v. William E. VANANDA.

No. 7128SC665.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1971.

Riddle & Shackelford by John E. Shackelford, Asheville, for plaintiff appellant.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Hyde by O. E. Starnes, Jr., and Uzzell & Dumont by Harry Dumont, Asheville, for defendant appellee.

PARKER, Judge.

Plaintiff's evidence that the collision occurred when defendant's son drove left of the center of the highway made a Prima facie case of actionable negligence on the son's part, Lassiter v. Williams, 272 N.C. 473, 158 S.E.2d 593; Anderson v. Webb, 267 N.C. 745, 148 S.E.2d 846, and the only question presented by this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to require the jury to pass upon an issue as to defendant's responsibility for his son's actions. We think that it was.

Since the collision occurred in North Carolina, the family purpose doctrine as enunciated in this State rather than as declared in the State of defendant's residence must be considered in determining if the doctrine is applicable under the facts of this case. Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398. In discussing that doctrine, Moore, J., speaking for our Supreme Court in Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 571, 119 S.E.2d 784, 787, said:

'The family purpose doctrine is an anomaly in the law. When the facts essential to invoke the doctrine are established by the verdict or admitted, an irrebuttable presumption arises that the family member operator was the agent of the family member owner and acted pursuant to and within the scope of the agency. 'The doctrine is an extension of the principle of Respondeat superior. * * *' 38 N.C. Law Review, 249, 250, In this State it is not the result of legislative action, but is a rule of law adopted by the Court.'

The doctrine has been stated and restated many times by our Supreme Court 'and, collectively, the cases define it as follows: Where the head of a household owns, keeps, provides, or maintains an automobile for the convenience and pleasure of his family, he is liable for the injuries caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle by any member of his family who is using the vehicle for the purpose for which it was provided.' Sharp, J., in dissenting opinion in Smith v. Simpson, 260 N.C. 601, 614, 133 S.E.2d 474, 484.

In the present case defendant has admitted ownership of the car which his son was driving. He testified that he provided it for the convenience and pleasure primarily of his wife, but that at times it was also used by special permission by the two oldest boys, who were of an age to drive, 'if they really needed the car for something.' He testified that his son, William Ronald Vananda, had special permission to use the car for the purpose for which it was being used and on the occasion when the collision occurred. The only real question presented by this appeal is whether, under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the jury could legitimately find that William Ronald Vananda was, at the time of the collision, a member of his father's family for purposes of applying the family purpose doctrine. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it must be in passing upon the correctness of the directed verdict against him, Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396, we think that the jury could so find.

At the outset we observe that while the record does not disclose how old William was at the time of the accident, the family purpose doctrine 'is not confined to situations involving parent and minor child. It applies with equal force when the child is an adult,' Smith v. Simpson, Supra, for 'the parent is under no more legal obligation to supply an automobile for the use and pleasure of a minor child than he is for the use and pleasure of an adult child.' Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 130 S.E. 630. Nor do we think that the fact that at the time of the collision William was serving in the armed forces and for the period of his enlistment was not dependent upon his father for support should, as a matter of law, exclude him from membership in his father's family as that group is conceived of in applying the family purpose doctrine. To so hold would in these times automatically exclude from the family group thousands of young men whose relationship with their parents and within the family group, and whose financial responsibility, has undergone no real...