White v. Watts
| Citation | 92 N.W. 660,118 Iowa 549 |
| Parties | ROBERT WHITE et al, Appellants, v. MELISSA WATTS et al, Appellees |
| Decision Date | 18 December 1902 |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--HON. A. R. DEWEY, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Brown & Brown for appellants.
C. H Mackey, D. W. Hamilton, Bolton & Bolton, D. T. Stockman and George B. Baker for appellees.
THE opinion states the case. Judgment affirmed.
Plaintiffs seek the partition of certain real estate, of which they claim to be tenants in common with the defendants. Defendants deny that plaintiffs have any interest in the land. The land was formerly owned by William G. White, who died intestate March 4, 1900, leaving surviving him ten children and several grandchildren representing a deceased daughter. These descendants are the parties to this proceeding, and the controversy between them arises out of the following facts: Several years prior to his death William G. White made advances of considerable sums of money to several of his children, and about the same time executed deeds to others of them for the land which is the subject of the present litigation, together with other lands. The deeds, when executed, were placed by the grantor in the hands of the notary before whom they were acknowledged, with instructions to deliver them to the several grantees after the death of the grantor. Subsequently, and before the grantor's death, and upon his order, the notary delivered one or more of the deeds to a son, who was one of the grantees named therein. The lands described in the deeds thus delivered are not involved in this controversy. So far as appears from the record, the grantees named in the remaining deeds had no knowledge of the conveyance thus made for their benefit until soon after the death of Mr. White, when the notary made delivery of the instruments in accordance with the instructions above mentioned. It is contended upon the part of the plaintiffs that there was no sufficient delivery of the deeds by the grantor, and that the lands descended to his heirs as if no conveyance had been attempted. The district court found for the defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
I. The one question thus presented for our consideration is whether the deposit of the deeds with the notary with instructions to deliver them to the grantees after the grantor's death and the actual delivery of the same by the notary upon the happening of the prescribed event, was, under all the circumstances, a valid conveyance. At the date of these instruments Mr. White was over seventy years of age. His wife was dead; and it is quite clear that, realizing the probability of his early demise, he undertook, by advances of money and by these deeds of conveyance, to make what he believed to be an equitable division of his property among his children. At the same time, with the evident purpose of insuring a support for himself, he took from his sons to whom advancements in money had been made their written obligations to pay him interest thereon during the remainder of his life, and, by depositing the deeds in the hands of a third person for delivery to the other children after his death, retained the life use and enjoyment of the real estate.
It is well established that a grantor may deposit a deed in the hands of a third person, to hold until after the grantor's death, and then deliver to the grantee, and that a delivery so made is perfectly valid and effectual to pass a good title to the grantee. Trask v. Trask, 90 Iowa 318, 57 N.W. 841; Hinson v. Bailey, 73 Iowa 544, 35 N.W. 626; Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446 (33 P. 338, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186); Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447 (3 Am. Dec. 66); Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N.Y. 92; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Met. (Mass.) 412 (37 Am. Dec. 154). See, also, numerous cases cited in 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 157, 158. Such a conveyance, from the date of its deposit with a third person for delivery after the grantor's death, operates substantially as a deed, with reservation of a life estate in the grantor. Cook v. Brown, 34 N.H. 460; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 (11 Am. Rep. 592); Bury v. Young, supra.
These general propositions are not seriously disputed by the appellants, but they contend that, to be effective, such deposit must be made without any reserved right or power in the grantor to control the deed or prevent its delivery upon his death. Prutsman v. Baker, supra; Logsdon v. Newton, 54 Iowa 448, 6 N.W. 715; Burk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 404 (55 N.W. 985). This may well be conceded to be the law, though the fact that it may be within the manual or physical power of the grantor to regain possession of the deed, or that it may be within his mental power to alter his intention, will not necessarily defeat the conveyance. Trask v. Trask, supra; Newton v. Bealer, 41 Iowa 334; Scrughan v. Wood, 15 Wend. 545 (30 Am. Dec. 75); Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo. 201 (16 S.W. 497, 24 Am. St. Rep. 326).
But we find nothing in the record before us to indicate that Mr White did retain any control over the deeds in controversy. It is true that, in answer to a question by counsel, the notary says he should have redelivered the deeds to the grantor had the latter, in his life time, demanded them; but this statement appears to have been no more than the witness' interpretation of his duty in the premises, and is without support in the instructions given him by the grantor, or in the circumstances surrounding the execution and deposit of the...
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McKemey v. Ketchum
...after the death, this custodian found that it named a certain son as grantee, and thereupon handed him the paper. In White v. Watts, 118 Iowa 549, at 552, 92 N.W. 660, we held that the fact that the grantor had power to was not controlling, where he said nothing and did nothing, after he le......
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McKemey v. Ketchum
...when, after the death, this custodian found that it named a certain son as grantee and thereupon handed him the paper. In White v. Watts, 118 Iowa, 552, 92 N. W. 660, we held that the fact that the grantor had power to recall was not controlling, where he said nothing and did nothing after ......
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Meyer v. Stortenbecker
...and this is especially so where the benefit is not burdened with onerous conditions to be performed by the beneficiary. White v. Watts, 118 Iowa, 549, 92 N. W. 660;Runkle v. Kettering, 127 Iowa, 6, 102 N. W. 142;Getchell v. Martin Lbr. Co., 124 Iowa, 599, 100 N. W. 550;Knott v. Railway Co.,......
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Meyer v. Stortenbecker
...for in the lifetime, and that all that death has to do with it is that it happened before payment was made. All held by White v. Watts, 118 Iowa 549, 92 N.W. 660, is that an effective symbolic delivery of land can be made depositing deed with a third person, to be delivered to grantee upon ......