Whitehead v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 03 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00318-COA.,2000-CA-00318-COA.
• Citation: 797 So.2d 317
• Parties: Laura W. WHITEHEAD, Appellant, v. Essex JOHNSON and Mississippi Valley Gas Company, Appellees.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

797 So.2d 317

Laura W. WHITEHEAD, Appellant, v. Essex JOHNSON and Mississippi Valley Gas Company, Appellees.

No. 2000-CA-00318-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

April 3, 2001.

Dana J. Swan, Clarksdale, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey S. Dilley, Elizabeth T. Bufkin, Clarksdale, Attorneys for Appellees.

EN BANC.

LEE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Coahoma County which granted the appellees, Essex Johnson and Mississippi Valley Gas Company, a summary judgment in a lawsuit brought against them by the appellant herein, Laura A. Whitehead. The basis for the lawsuit was for injuries incurred by Whitehead as a result of an automobile collision with Johnson, an employee of Mississippi Valley Gas Company. Johnson and Mississippi Valley Gas Company filed their motion for summary judgment based on a release signed by Whitehead. Whitehead argued that the release was for property damage only and not for her personal injuries. Johnson and Mississippi Valley Gas Company argue that the release was clear and unambiguous and summary judgment was proper. Feeling aggrieved with the trial courts decision, the appellant perfected her appeal asserting the trial court committed error in granting summary judgment when a material issue of fact existed as to whether or not the release was void because it was procured by fraud, a failure of consideration, or that the consideration, if any, was grossly inadequate.

FACTS

¶ 2. This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on July 31, 1995, in Clarksdale, Mississippi, when a tractor driven by Johnson rear-ended an automobile being driven by Whitehead. At the time of the collision, Johnson was employed by Mississippi Valley Gas Company and was acting in the course and scope of his employment. As a result of the collision, Whitehead asserts she incurred damage to her automobile and injuries to herself. Whitehead received an estimate of damages to her automobile from the Hilltop Body Shop in Memphis, Tennessee, in the amount of $3983.99. Whitehead chose not to have an attorney represent her, but rather communicated with Mississippi Valley Gas Company herself. She submitted the estimate to Barbara Grant, the claims agent for Mississippi Valley Gas Company. Whitehead received medical treatment for her injuries during the month of August 1995, following the collision, including five physical therapy treatments in addition to other direct medical care, as well as emergency room treatment. She stated that as a result of the wreck she also had broken teeth and neck pain. Whitehead stated that Grant agreed to pay for her property damage and when questioned by Whitehead was assured that the release Grant asked her to sign was only for property damage and not her personal injuries. Thereafter, on August 30, 1995, Grant had Mississippi Valley Gas Company issue a check to Whitehead in the amount of $3983.99, the exact amount of the cost of repair of Whitehead's vehicle. Whitehead then issued her personal check in the amount of $3983.99 payable to Hilltop Body Shop.

¶ 3. In December of 1996, Whitehead sought more medical treatment for her neck and accordingly informed Grant who requested that Whitehead get a letter from her treating physician stating that her medical treatment was related to the accident. Dr. Karen Harper wrote a letter to Grant on February 13, 1997, stating that the treatment Whitehead was receiving was related to the accident. In a March 14, 1997 letter to Whitehead, Grant included payment for Whitehead's insurance co-payment for medical treatment. According to Whitehead, no discussion had ever taken place wherein Grant had disavowed any liability for Whitehead's medical treatment by asserting the release or otherwise. Whitehead was still not represented by an attorney.

¶ 4. On April 28, 1998, Whitehead filed a complaint against the appellees seeking damages for her personal injuries. On May 29, 1998, the appellees filed their answer and among other defenses, pled accord and satisfaction and that Whitehead was estopped from asserting the claims set forth in her complaint inasmuch as she had signed a full, final and complete release for all damages and injuries both property and personal. Thereafter, the appellees filed their motion for summary judgment attaching a copy of the release Whitehead had signed and Whitehead filed her affidavit in opposition thereto. On January 31, 2000, the trial judge granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment, bringing about this appeal.

ISSUE

¶ 5. The appellant raises the following issue for our review which we cite verbatim from her brief:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [sic] IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN A MATERIAL OF [sic] ISSUE OF FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE RELEASE WAS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD, A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, OR THAT THE CONSIDERATION, IF ANY WAS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6. Our standard of reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment is this:

The standard for reviewing the granting or the denying of summary judgment is the same standard as is employed by the trial court under Rule 56(c). This Court conducts de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment and looks at all the evidentiary matters before it-admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists lies with the moving party, and we give the benefit of every reasonable doubt to the party against whom summary judgment is sought. We do not try issues. Rather, we only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Furthermore, it is well-settled that motions for summary judgment are to be viewed with a skeptical eye, and if a trial court should err, it is better to err on the side of denying the motion. The focal point of our de novo review is on material facts. In defining a "material" fact in the context of summary judgments, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he presence of fact issues in the record does not per se entitle a party to avoid summary judgment. The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense."

Roebuck v. McDade, 760 So.2d 12 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted).

¶ 7. Whitehead argues that summary judgment should not have been granted in that a material issue of fact remains as to whether or not the release was void because it was procured through fraud, was void for lack of consideration or was void for grossly inadequate consideration.

¶ 8. The appellees argue that the terms of the release are clear and unambiguous and interpretation of an unambiguous contract is purely a legal question and therefore properly addressed by summary judgment. They further argue that Whitehead's allegations of fraud and/or misrepresentation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

¶ 9. In granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment the trial court found that "the plaintiff merely throws facts at the Court accompanying them with little argument and no authority in opposition to the defendants' motion." (emphasis in original). The court cited Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 311[sic] (Miss. 1997) for the proposition that "assertions of error without support from `reasons and authorities' are barred from consideration." In a criminal case, such as Holland, the party bringing an appeal is required to support each allegation of error by the trial court with case law or other authority. This standard has no application to a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. As previously stated, the burden is on the moving party to show that no issue of material fact exists. Roebuck, 760 So.2d at (¶ 9).

¶ 10. The lower court was further under the misapprehension that a question of material fact would exist only if the subject release was unclear and ambiguous, citing Ellis v. Powe, 645 So.2d 947 (Miss. 1994) and Willis v. Mississippi Farm Bureau, 481 So.2d 256, 258 (Miss.1985). In Willis, the court found that there was no dispute in the facts concerning interpretation of an automobile liability policy and that summary judgment was proper. In Ellis, the court found that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment where there was a dispute whether the defendant had notice of the insurance company's claim prior to settlement and execution of a release with the company's insured. The court stated:

Where doubt exists as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the trial judge should err on the side of denying the motion and permitting a full trial on the merits. Where the record is incomplete regarding any material fact, the summary judgment motion should generally be denied.

Ellis, 645 So.2d at 950, (citing American Legion Ladnier Post 42, Inc. v. City of Ocean Springs, 562 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss. 1990)). Neither of the cases cited by the court supports the court's argument that summary judgment was appropriate in the present case. The court based its decision solely on the failure of Whitehead to produce evidence or argument to challenge the release as unclear or ambiguous. In doing so, the court based its decision on an incorrect legal standard.

¶ 11. In Willis v. Marlar, 458 So.2d 722, 724 (Miss.1984), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the issue of whether a release was void because of "an absence of good faith and full understanding of legal rights [and the] nature and effect of instrument was misrepresented" was a question of fact for a jury. See Samples v. Hall of Mississippi, Inc., 673 F.Supp. 1413, 1417 (N.D.Miss.1987)

(summary judgment denied where plaintiffs alleged that release agreements were not explained to them before signing and that they were told they would not receive severance pay unless th...